Patent nonnuse: are patent pools as possible solution? by Chavosh, Alireza
I 
 
Alma Mater Studiorum – Università di Bologna 
 
DOTTORATO DI RICERCA IN 
General Management 
 
Ciclo ___27____ 
 
Settore Concorsuale di afferenza: 13/ B 2 
Settore Scientifico disciplinare:     SECS-P/08 
 
TITOLO TESI 
 
PATENT NONUSE: ARE PATENT POOLS A POSSIBLE SOLUTION? 
 
Presentata da: Alireza Chavosh 
 
 
Coordinatore Dottorato     Relatore 
Prof. Rosa Grimaldi                                                Prof. Salvatore Torrisi 
   
 
Esame finale anno    2015 
 
II 
 
 
 
 Board of Advisers 
 
       Prof. Salvatore Torrisi      
      Department of Management, University of Bologna 
 
Prof. Paola Giuri               
    Department of Management, University of Bologna 
 
   Prof. Laura Toschi          
  Department of Management, University of Bologna 
 
       Prof. Alberto Galasso       
   Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto 
                            
 
  Host Adviser 
 
     Prof. Lee Fleming 
         University of California at Berkeley 
                   
 
 
 
 
III 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This thesis was written in two universities in two cities and in two different countries: conceived in and 
shaped in University of Bologna, Italy; and finalized in University of California at Berkeley, USA. 
During the long journey of writing this thesis, my adviser Professor Salvatore Torrisi always encouraged 
me throughout the process, especially when faced with difficult matters. I am deeply thankful to him for 
his great guidance, patience and support. Undoubtedly, he has been the most influential teacher in my life. 
I would also like to express my deep appreciation to Prof. Paola Giuri for her contentious guidance on my 
thesis during the last three year. They both have enlightened my life and are unique in my heart. Their 
enthusiasm toward science and their knowledge, dedication, hard-work, and creativity are the landmarks 
for me to follow in life. I also thank my other committee members Prof. Laura Toschi form University of 
Bologna and Prof. Alberto Galasso from Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto for all 
their valuable comments and insights.   
I would also like to express my gratitude to my host adviser Prof. Lee Fleming for the wonderful 
opportunity that he provided me to spend the last year of my PhD with him in University of California at 
Berkeley which thoroughly inspired me by giving me the opportunity to attend very useful seminars and 
workshops and discuss my research with the most renowned and influential scholars in my field of 
research and recieve valuable feedback. I would also like to thank him for all his time and guidance and 
also for providing me with access to the Coleman Fung institute patent database at UC Berkeley that 
helped me accelerate my work and improve the quality of my research. 
I would also like to thank Prof. Patrizia Brigidi and Dr. Barbara Cimatti for the opportunity they gave me 
to be a Doctoral Fellow at Institute of Advance Studies in Bologna, Italy that supported me with a 
wonderful stay in Bologna and a lot of learning opportunities during my PhD studies. 
I also thank  all my colleagues and friends for their kindnesses and helps during my PhD. 
Finally, I want to thank my family; my lovely mom and dad, my lovely sister and brother, Anahid and 
Ardalan. I am really grateful for their understanding and support along my PhD. Special thanks to my 
parents, to whom I dedicate my Doctor of Philosophy degree. 
  
IV 
 
DEDICATION 
 
Dedicated to those who loved me and supported me most, my family: 
my lovely mom and dad, 
for taking the time to teach me the value of humanity and education, and 
for their continues support every day even from a long distance. 
V 
 
PREFACE 
Studies have depicted that the rate of unused patents comprises a high portion of patents in North 
America , Europe and Japan. The importance of the issue of nonuse is also highlighted within the 
literature on strategic patenting, IPR policy and innovation economics. Particularly, studies have 
identified a considerable share of strategic patents in the market for technology which are left 
unused due to pure strategic reasons. While such patents might generate strategic rents to their 
owner, they may have harmful consequences for the society if by blocking alternative solutions 
that other inventions provide; they hamper the possibility of better solutions. Moreover, the 
current literature has emphasized on the role of patent pools in dealing with potential issues such 
as excessive transaction cost caused by patent thickets and blocking patents (overlapping IPRs) 
that might hamper the use of patents in the market for technology. In fact, patent pools have 
emerged as policy tools facilitating technology commercialization and alleviating patent 
litigation among rivals holding overlapping IPRs. Accordingly, patent pools may favor the use of 
the pooled patents through decreasing licensing transaction cost and providing equal and non-
discriminatory access of all the members and potential licensees to the pool’s technology.  This 
might be seen by companies involved in technology markets with excessive transaction cost and 
high IPR fragmentation as an opportunity to exploit their patents through participating in patent 
pools.Considering the  importance of strategic patenting and patent nonuse from economics, 
social and technology point of view and the significant role of  patent pools in facilitating 
technology commercialization this doctoral dissertation first provides a critical literature review 
on strategic patenting with the aim of identifying some future research paths for this stream of 
research. Moreover, it investigates the drivers of strategic non-use of patents with particular 
focus on unused play patents. Furthermore, it examines if participation intensity in patent pools 
by pool members explains their willingness to use the unexploited patents they hold outside the 
pool(non-pooled patents) through pool participation. It also investigates those characteristics of 
the patent pools that are associated to the willingness to use such patents through pool 
participation.  
The first chapter presents the survey of the literature review titled “Strategic Patenting: A 
critical review and future research paths”.  By employing an interdisciplinary approach to 
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uncover theoretical gaps from across different domains I investigated three broad related issues  :  
the drivers of strategic patenting, the welfare effect of strategic patenting and the solutions to 
tackle issues caused by strategic patenting  and identified the key question that remained 
unexplored in each domain.  I presented summaries of the critical findings of different studies 
which provide insights to (1) managerial decision making process for strategic use of patents and 
(2) assessing welfare effect of strategic patenting and (3) comprehensive solutions to tackle 
issues caused by strategic blocking patents and benchmark to assess their effectiveness. In 
addition I discussed future research paths and possibilities which could help to encourage future 
theory advances. 
The second chapter titled “Why do they play? an empirical study on the antecedences of unused 
strategic patents” provides an empirical study on strategic non-use of patents. I investigate the 
drivers of unused strategic patents with particular focus on strategic patents intended to play.  
Using novel data from a large scale survey on European inventors of 22,533 EPO patents 
resident in Europe, USA, Japan and Israel (PatVal II), I find technological uncertainty and 
technological complexity as two technology environment specific factors that explain unused 
play patents.  
In the last chapter titled “Patent non-use: are patent pools a possible solution?”, I examine if 
patent pool  participation can explain the willingness to use patents held by a pool member 
outside the pool (non-pooled patents).  I also investigate those characteristics of the patent pools 
which are associated to the willingness to use non-pooled patents by a pool member through pool 
participation. Using PatVal II data as primary data and a considerably large database of patent 
pools in telecommunication and consumer electronics industries as secondary data, in this 
chapter I show that pool members participating more intensively in patent pools are more likely 
to be willing to use their non-pooled patents through pool participation. Furthermore, I show that 
pool licensors are more likely to be willing to use their non-pooled patents by participating in 
patent pools with higher level of technological complementarity to their own technology.  
 
 
VII 
 
CONTENTS 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT III 
DEDICATION IV 
PREFACE V 
Chapter 1      Survey of the literature review, Strategic Patenting: A critical review 
and future research paths 
 
1 Introduction 2 
2 Approach to the review 5 
3 Literature review 6 
3.1 Theoretical framework and hypotheses development 6 
3.2 Welfare effects of strategic patenting 7 
3.3 Solutions to the issues caused by strategic blocking patents 9 
4 Conceptual issues 13 
4.1 Theoretical framework and hypotheses development 13 
4.2 Assessing the welfare effects of strategic patenting 14 
4.3. The extent and the efficiency of the solutions 15 
VIII 
 
5 Suggestions for future research 17 
5.1 Strategic decision making process 17 
5.2 Assessing the welfare effect of strategic patenting 18 
5.3 The extent and the effectiveness of the proposed solutions 18 
6 Conclusion  19 
7 References  20 
Chapter 2      Why do they play? an empirical study on the antecedences of unused 
strategic patents 
1 Introduction 25 
2 Literature review 29 
2.1 Theoretical framework and hypotheses development 32 
3 Data and descriptive statistics 36 
3.1 Data 36 
4 Measurements, data analysis and regression results 37 
4.1 Measurement 37 
4.1.1. Dependent variable 38 
4.1.1. Independent variables 38 
IX 
 
4.1.3. Control Variables 39 
4.2 Empirical Framework 41 
4.3 Regression results and discussion 41 
5 Implications and conclusion 43 
5.1 Study limitations and future research 45 
5.2. Policy implications 46 
6 References 48 
Chapter 3      Patent nonuse: are patent pools a possible solution? 
1 Introduction 59 
2 Literature review 63 
2.1 Unused patents 63 
2.2 Patent pools 65 
2.3 Hypotheses development 67 
( i ) Technological complementarity 70 
( ii ) Information spilover and collboration 71 
( iii ) Broader and less costly access to licensees 74 
X 
 
3 Data collection and descriptive statistics 75 
3.1 Secondary data collection Procedure 76 
3.1.1. Initial data collection 76 
3.1.2. Sample selection procedure 76 
3.1.3. Data cleaning and harmonization 77 
3.1.4. Database construction 77 
3.1.5. Representativeness of the sample 78 
3.2. Analyzing (working) Sample 79 
3.3 Descriptive statistics  80 
4 Measurements, data analysis and regression results 87 
4.1 Measurement 87 
4.1.1. Dependent variable 87 
4.1.2. Explanatory variables 87 
4.1.3. Participation intensity 87 
4.1.4. Technological complementarity 88 
4.1.5. Control Variables  89 
4.2 Empirical Framework 90 
XI 
 
4.3 Regression results and discussion 90 
5 Implications and conclusion 94 
5.1 Study limitations and future research 96 
5.2 Policy implications 96 
6 References 98 
CONCLUSION 112 
Tables & Graphs 
Chapter 1 
Table1- Drivers of strategic patenting 14 
Table2- Welfare effect of strategic patenting 15 
Table3- Summary of solutions proposed to tackle issues caused by blocking 
patenting 
17 
Chapter 2 
Table 1- Share of unused strategic patents in our sample  50 
Table 2- Variables used in this study 51 
Table 3- Descriptive statistics 52 
Table 4- Correlation Matrix 53 
Table 4- Correlation Matrix 54 
Table 5- Probit estimation of unused play patents - Average marginal effects 55 
XII 
 
Chapter 3 
Table 1- Summary of patent pools’ information 102 
Table 2- Descriptive statistics of the general characteristics of entire sample of 
patent pools, Patent pool licensor covered by PatVal II and Patent pool licensor not 
covered by PatVal II 
103 
Table 3- Geographical distribution of patent pool licensors 103 
Table 4- Patent pool-level descriptive statistics – Pool licensors covered by PatValII 104 
Table 5- Variables used in this study 105 
Table 6- Descriptive statistics 106 
Table 7- Bivariate Correlations Matrix 107 
Table 8- Probit estimation - Average marginal effects 108 
Table 9- Weak instrument robust tests and confidence sets for IV probit 109 
Table 10- LPM and IV Regress- Dependent Variable is Unused but willing to use 109 
Graph 1- Country of origin of patent pool licensors covered by PatVal II 110 
Graph 2- Country of origin of patent pool licensors  not covered by PatVal II 110 
Graph 3- Patent pool participation 110 
Appendix 
Table A– Patent pools in our working sample 111 
1 
 
 
Chapter I  
 
 
Survey of the literature review 
Strategic Patenting: A critical review and future 
research paths  
 
 
2 
 
Abstract 
Strategic patenting has attained considerable attention within the literature on strategic 
management of IPRs, public policy and innovation economics. Nevertheless, the existing 
knowledge on strategic patenting is characterized by persisting knowledge gaps and theoretical 
inconsistencies. By employing a critical literature review approach this paper reviews studies 
related to strategic patenting from 1984 to 2014. We limited our review to peer-reviewed Journal 
articles and highly acknowledged working papers from accredited sources and omitted books and 
book chapters to have a validated and influential source of knowledge for our review. With the 
aim of contributing to advancing theory and practice, each gap is identified and discussed in our 
study. Based on our analyses, we made suggestions for future research which could help to 
promote future theory development and provide pertinent material for policy and managerial 
decisions. 
Keywords: strategic patenting, intellectual property right 
1. Introduction  
The main intention of the patent system is to temporarily protect the firm’s invention. However, 
firms might also use their patent right for other so called “strategic” motives. In a definition 
presented by Arundel and Patel (2003), “strategic” motives refer to any intention beyond 
protecting an invention which aims to appropriate benefits from that invention. In fact, patents 
are not homogenous for their owner with respect to their function and value, and therefore 
generate different levels of additional profit to the companies.   Such profits might go beyond 
original protection or monetary rent seeking purposes and provide the patent owner with 
strategic benefits.  
Strategic patenting has been long discussed by the literature on strategic management of IPRs, 
innovation economy and public policy. In fact, studies have identified a considerable share of 
strategic patents in the market for technology (Cohen et al, 2001; Giuri and Torrisi, 2011; Jung 
and Walsh 2011; Blind et al., 2009). In principle, strategic patents are defined as those patents 
which are intended to be employed strategically, and therefore generate strategic rents for their 
owner (Giuri and Torrisi, 2011). “Strategic use of the patent system arises whenever firms 
leverage complementarities between patents to attain a strategic advantage over technological 
rivals. This is anticompetitive if the main aim and effect of strategic use of the patent system is to 
decrease the efficiency of rival firms’ production.” (Harhoff, et al., 2007).  In practice such 
patents might be used in licensing or cross licensing deals, or even in an internal 
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commercialization process by their owner; however the importance of such patents rises more 
when they encompass value and are left unused or they impede use of other inventions by 
blocking them. In fact, although such patents might have strategic values to their owner, their 
negative social and economic consequences are long discussed by the literature. This is first 
because a share of these patents is blocking alternative solutions that other inventions provide 
and therefore hamper the possibility of better solutions offered by those inventions. In other 
words, the novelty required to attain a patent right for a successive invention can be threaten by 
an existing patent that can block it (Scotchmer, 1991; Shapiro,2001; Jaffe and Lerner, 2004; 
Ziedonis, 2004; Grimpe and Hussinger,2008). Strategic use of patents with the intention of 
blocking the follow-on innovations decreases the speed of the innovation in the market and 
deviate its development path (Cohen, 2004). Companies often have to bear high penalty fees and 
accept obligatory royalty payments as a result of being litigated by market player which raise 
entry barriers to the technology market by filing strategic patents (Harhoff, et al., 2007).  Patent 
races and slow diffusion of technology are also the consequences of strategic patenting.  
Thus, patents as the most common and prominent IP protectors within the technology markets 
have got the greatest attention by the scholars, policy makers and practitioners dealing with 
strategic IP as they can provide certain monopoly power to their owners (Feldman,2008) and 
therefore hamper technology transfer within the market for technology to a high extend . In fact, 
strategic use of patents by one party not only creates impediments for technology transfer for 
others but also encourages them to strategically file patents in reaction to their rivals.   
There are several motivations behind filing strategic patents which are discussed by the 
literature. A firm might protect its core technology from  rival’s immitations by filing 
functionally similar substitutive patents around that in order to create a shielding boundary 
(Cohen, Nelson and Walsh, 2000). This type of patenting is more common in industries with 
discrete underlying technologies such as chemical and drug industry which aims to exclude rival 
from the market.  
In complex technologies however the strategic incentives of the firms are different. In such 
technological fields firms might patent in order to obtain freedom to operate beyond the occupied 
technology or product space and avoid hold up problem (Grindley and Teece, 1997;Hall and 
Ziedonis 2001; Ziedonis 2004;Markman 2004; Blind, Edler, Frietcsh, and Schmoch 2006). This 
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provides the firm with the possibility to access to complementary technologies and use patents as 
bargaining chips in cross licensing (licensing) agreements. In fact as negotiation tool patents are 
also utilized as compelling medium for co-operation and strategic alliances (Blind et al., 2009; 
Peeters & de La Pottelsberghe Potterie, 2006; Reitzig, 2004; Lerner, 1995).  
Patents might also be used for signaling company’s strength for potential infringement law suits 
particularly for larger companies that have patents very close to those of small companies and 
just patent to signal their power and not to use it in a product. In fact, in regards to possible 
patent infringement, the firms’ patent position is vital since patents have a reactive function in 
co-operations and strategic alliances (Noel & Schankerman, 2006). 
They might also be used to signal the visibility of the company regarding its performance within 
the market or in order to attract potential parties for R&D co-investment, strategic alliance, 
standardization and cross-licensing (Arundel, 2001; Long, 2002; Arora et al., 2001). Moreover, 
they can display the firm’s earnings potential to investors (Rivette & Kline, 2000).  Such 
signaling benefit is particularly important for small companies. 
Nevertheless, the most important use of strategic patents for companies is to block other rival’s 
inventions and prevent their entry into the market (Gilbert and Newbery, 1984; Grant, 1991). 
Indeed, the literature has categorized strategic patents into fence and play patents. Fence patens 
are those which are filed with the intention of preventing rivals from imitating the company’s 
core technology (Cohen et al, 2000) which is more common in discrete technologies (Cohen et 
al, 2002;Davis, 2008; Jung, 2009). Cohen et al, (2002) define fence patents as those blocking 
patent which are not intended to be used in cross-licensing and licensing.  By fencing, companies 
pursue a pure blocking approach which leads to the exclusion of the competitors. Blind, et al., 
(2006), refer to these patents as “offensive” patents. 
Play patents that are more common in complex technologies are in general aimed for achieving 
freedom to operate and creating a reliable safeguard for future infringement litigations that might 
threat the company’s inventions. In fact the most prominent role of these patents is to obtain 
bargaining power in cross-licensing agreements and negotiations (Cohen et al, 2000; Cohen et al 
2002). As opposed to fence patents, these patents don’t necessarily exclude the rivals from the 
market (Allison, Lemley, and Walker, 2009). Thus, although a firm might plan to block other 
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opponents’ inventions through practicing a play strategy, play strategy is not considered as a 
pure blocking tactic. Blind, et al., (2006), refer to these patents as “defensive” patents 
In this paper we provide a critical review of the literature on strategic patenting. Strategic 
patenting in general falls within the broader literature stream of strategic management of 
intellectual property rights (Harhoff, et al., , 2007) which has been broadly defined as any 
possible strategic use of IPRs to gain competitive advantage, litigation power or market 
control(Fisher and Oberholzer-Gee, 2013; Meurer, 2003).   
The first goal of this study is providing an interdisciplinary review that incorporates studies from 
strategy, innovation, management, economics and public policy.  This goal is pursued by 
reviewing works conveying insights into (1) drivers of strategic patenting, the welfare effects of 
strategic patenting and the solutions to the issues caused by strategic blocking patents (2) 
providing the main discussions of the papers that address these issues. Our second goal is to 
identify the existing gaps. The literature has often investigated the drivers of strategic patenting, 
however there is a clear lack of a comprehensive framework that could explain the decision 
making process in strategic exploitation of patents. Moreover, the literature has long argued the 
negative welfare effect of strategic patenting; however, there exists a lack for a theory explaining 
the extent of this effect. Furthermore, although there have been some efforts in proposing some 
solutions for confronting issues caused by strategic blocking patents, yet there is no integrated 
and comprehensive framework proposed for these solutions. Furthermore, the effectiveness of 
these solutions is not examined.  The third objective of this review is to provide suggestions for 
future research which could lead to clearer and more consistent theories concerning the threefold 
gap we discuss in this study.  
2. Approach to the review 
We undertook search of articles published between 1984 and 2014. We limited our review to 
Journal articles and highly acknowledged working papers written in English, dealing with 
strategy, innovation, management and public policy from accredited sources. Keyword searches 
were conducted on EBSCO Business Resource Complete and other source using keywords 
‘strategic patenting’, ‘blocking patent’ and ‘strategic management of IPRs’. In addition we 
conducted Boolean searches on several combinations of these keywords. In selecting the studies, 
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we retained papers according to their relevance by title, abstract or through examination of the 
paper. Finally, with the aim of identifying those studies which might have been missed we did 
targeted searches of those journals that have a heavier concentration on the abovementioned 
topics in the EBSCO and Emerald database. With the aim of contributing to advancing theory 
and practice, each gap is identified and discussed in our study. Based on our analyses, we made 
suggestions for future research which could help to promote future theory development and 
provide pertinent material for policy and managerial decisions that executive and managers have 
to make in dealing with strategic exploitation of patents. 
3. Literature review   
3.1 Drivers of strategic patenting  
There is limited number of studies within the exiting body of the literature that have the drivers 
of strategic patenting. Among these drivers, firm-specific characteristics are one of the most 
studied factors. A number of studies have examined the link between firm size as a firm-specific 
factor and strategic use of patents (Hall and Ziedonis 2001; Blind, Edler, Frietsch and Schmoch 
,2006 ;Giuri, et al, 2007;Motohashi, 2008;Jung 2009; Jung and Walsh 2010) showing the 
importance and higher share of strategic patents for larger firms comparing to smaller ones. In 
fact, strategic patenting is found to be positively related to the size of the firm. Possessing 
valuable downstream assets and capital intensity are other firm-specific characteristic argued by 
Jung (2009) to be positively associated to defensive strategic patenting.  Moreover, Jung and 
Walsh (2010) found that technological maturity as a technology environment characteristic is 
negatively associated to the rate of strategic patents on account of the lower uncertainty 
associated to general characteristics of mature technologies. As another technology environment 
characteristic, Torrisi et al, (2014) found that the presence of one competitor for the patent is 
positively associated with strategic use of patents implying that, firm reliance on patents either to 
guarantee the firm’s freedom to operate through licensing and cross-licensing or to shield their 
product or process innovation is more likely in the presence of competitors. They also find that a 
large number of competitors (intense technological competition) spur investments in patent 
fences.   As another technology environment factor they also found that technological 
complexity is positively associated to strategic patenting. 
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3.2 Welfare effects of strategic patenting  
Various concerns have been raised by different studies regarding the weakening relation between 
the private and social value of patents, considering the patenting explosion and their diverse 
strategic exploitations (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Boldrin and Levine, 2005; Bessen and Meurer, 
2008).    By reviewing the literature, two different arguments can be obtained from the studies 
evaluating how a company’s strategic behavior affected by the fragmentation of intellectual 
property rights and the existence of overlapping patents consequently impact the social and 
economic welfare.   
The first stream of the studies focusing on strategic patenting (Levin, Klevorick, Nelson, & 
Winter, 1987; Bessen and Hunt, 2007), and patent proliferation (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; 
Ziedonis, 2004; Lemley and Shapiro, 2005) argue that companies expand the size of their 
portfolio in response to fragmentation of IP rights by adapting an aggressive patenting approach 
or through M&As (patent portfolio acquisitions). In fact, strategic use of patents is considered as 
one of the most significant drivers for forming large patent portfolios by firms in a number of 
industries (Cohen, Nelson and Walsh, 2000; Hall & Ziedonis, 2001; Bessen & Hunt, 2004). 
Through studying the software sector in the U.S., Noel and Schankerman (2013) argue that R&D 
activities and patenting rate increase as patent rights fragmentation upsurges.  This implies that 
patent accumulation is more important for resolving IP wars when there is higher number of 
patent holders (Noel and Schankerman, 2013).  Furthermore, as valuable assets patent portfolios 
can be used strategically to provide the firm with possibility to collude on anticompetitive deals. 
For instance, Grindley and Teece (1997) and Hall and Ziedonis (2001), investigated how patent 
portfolios can be utilized as bargaining tools within the semiconductor industry. Moreover, some 
studies have shown that the strategies companies use for patenting are influenced by their patent 
portfolio characteristics (Blind, Cremers and Mueller, 2009). 
According to Blind et al., (2009) the average for the citations by patent portfolio increases with 
the intensity of use of patents in order to obtain a protection objective, however it declines when 
strategic motives such as blocking and cross-licensing increases. They also postulated that when 
offensive blocking is an important reason for patenting, it is more probable that a company’s 
portfolio receives opposition. In a study by Grimpe and Hussinger (2008) on 479 European 
Merger and Acquisitions, patent portfolios encompassing blocking potential are found to be 
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acquired at a considerable fee.  There are a couple of reasons behind the necessity and usefulness 
of such technology acquisition such as obtaining those patents that are blocking the company’s 
current R&D or eliminating a threatening patent fence. Moreover, acquisition of potential 
blocking patents might leverage the strategic position of a firm within the market since it can 
raise barriers to entry for potential entrants and built patent fences. Therefore, for protecting their 
investments on research and developments, companies opt for controling over a portfolio that 
encompasses blocking patents of significant value (Grimpe and Hussinger, 2008). 
On the contrary to this line of research, the other stream of the studies argue that such technology 
markets are characterized by patent thickets (Shapiro, 2001; Lemley and Shapiro, 2007) patent 
holdup (Lemley and Shapiro, 2005), and the tragedy of anticommons (Heller and Eisenberg, 
1998) which discourage investment in innovation and as a result decrease the rate of patenting by 
firms.   
Patent thickets are broadly defined as "a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights 
that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology” 
(Shapiro, 2001).  Patent thickets occur in technology fields with considerable overlap of IP rights 
(Shapiro, 2001) where patents can block other inventions which can be resolved only by bearing 
considerable bargaining costs (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998; von Graevenitz et al., 2011). It is 
believed that most patents filed in complex technological fields are of dubious value (Jaffe and 
Lerner, 2004).Furthermore, there is skepticism about the contribution of these patents to 
technological progress (Bessen and Maskin, 2006). Scholars raise concerns that cumulative 
innovation in ICT might be stifled by patent thickets with many low quality patents having a 
blocking capacity.  In fact, Innovation can be dispirited when blocking patents prevent the use of 
other’s technology. Moreover, as a result of blocking other firms’ inventions, the interoperability 
between different companies and their own technologies would be prevented. Moreover, due to 
the overlap of the patent rights caused by the vague IP right boundaries, resolutions with the 
technology market become more complex and the probability of intentional or unintentional 
infringement increases (Bessen and Meurer, 2008; Thumm, 2005).  
Such technological environment provides opportunities for patent trolls (or sharks), who are 
patent right holders that  try to hide their patent portfolios with the intention of being infringed 
and therefor earn money by suing others  (Henkel and Reitzig, 2008; Merges, 2009; Reitzig et 
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al., 2010). Therefore, although patent trolls might claim to have a technology licensing business 
model they are in fact involved in litigation activities.  
“The Tragedy of Anticommons” also explains why valuable patents are under-utilized with the 
owners of the inventions blocking each other from exploiting their patents (Heller and Eisenberg, 
1998). This is considered as a type of coordination breakdown, where several IPR holders are 
preventing each other from using a single resource (invention) since they all own it (Heller, 
1998). Patent hold-ups are also discussed as another negative effect of strategic patenting 
(Lemley and Shapiro, 2005). A barrier, which holds up a company which is threaten by blocking 
patents is referred to as “hold up” which is in fact an abusage of patent right. Holdups mostly 
happen when companies make heavy sunk investments into specific technologies.  
It is worth mentioning however that within this line of the literature there are few studies which 
provide conflicting arguments. For example von Graevenitz et al. (2008) find that the density of 
patent thickets which can threaten a firm’s patent applications to get blocked, positively affects a 
firm's patenting activity. 
3.3 Solutions to the issues caused by strategic blocking patents  
As discussed cross licensing, patent pools and compulsory licensing are proposed by the 
literature as the solutions to issues such as excessive transition cost generated by overlapping 
IPRs or the firm’s anti-competitive behaviors. In 1995, the U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. 
Federal Trade Commission issued its “Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual 
Property,” which explicitly noted, “cross-licensing and pooling arrangements may provide pro-
competitive benefits.” “Portfolio cross licenses and patent pools can help solve the problems 
created by these overlapping patent rights, or patent thicket, by reducing transaction costs for 
licensees while preserving the financial incentives for inventors to commercialize their existing 
innovations and undertake new, potentially patentable research and development”(Shapiro, 
2001). 
An agreement according to which two or more parties grant a license to each other, in order to 
exploit the prior-art claimed in one or more of the patents each own is referred to as cross-
licensing (Shapiro, 2001). Cross-licensing is particularly common for cumulative industries with 
complex technologies in which the likelihood of holding all patents required for a product by a 
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single firm is very low. According to Giuri and Torrisi (2010) technological complexity as 
technology characteristics and cumulativeness and overlapping claims as patent characteristics 
have a substantial role in cross-licensing suggesting that cross-licensing can be useful for patent 
right holders in order to reduce transaction costs.  
Moreover, the current debate within the literature has concentrated on the role of patent pools as 
a solution to the issue of patent thickets and overlapping IPRs. Kelin (1997) defines patent pool 
as “…the aggregation of intellectual property rights which are the subject of cross licensing, 
whether they are transferred directly by patentee to licensee or through some medium,  such as a 
joint venture, set up specifically to administer the patent pool”. Merges (1999), also defines a 
patent pool as: “A patent pool is an arrangement among multiple patent holders to aggregate 
their patents. A typical pool makes all pooled patents available to each member of the pool. 
Pools also usually offer standard licensing terms to licensees who are not members of the pool. 
In addition, the typical patent pool allocates a portion of the licensing fees to each member 
according to a pre-set formula or procedure.”  
Patent pools as a solution were initially proposed by Merges (1999), Shapiro (2001), and the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office by Clark, Piccolo, Stanton, and Tyson (2001), where for-profit 
firms share patent rights with one another and third parties, providing that the relationship 
between pool patents is complementary and not substitutive. As a matter of fact, patents are in 
complementary relationship with each other if by amassing them jointly in a single patent 
portfolio they would gain additional values. In fact, in dealing with excessive transaction costs 
participation in patent pools with mostly complementary patents is of more benefit for firms 
engaged in industries with technological complexity comparing to those involved in industries 
with discrete underlying technologies.  
In fact, there are benefits associated to patent pools composed of mostly complementary patents 
in dealing with excessive transaction cost discussed within the literature. The most emphasized 
benefit is decreasing the licensing transaction costs derived from overlapping patent rights 
(Merges,1999;Clark, Piccolo, Stanton, and Tyson, 2001). Patent pools reduce the risk of 
litigation and disputes between licensors which leads to reduction in cost, time and uncertainty 
about IPRs. Moreover, patent pools eliminate the need for one-to-one licensing agreements and 
therefore not only reduce the cost, time and resources that should be dedicated to single licensing 
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agreements but also decrease the risk of hold ups(Clark, Piccolo, Stanton, and Tyson, 2001), the 
so called "one- stop shopping" advantage
1
. Patent pools also provide their members with equal 
access to the pool’s technology which escalates the patents commercial potential (Sung and 
Pelto, 1998). Providing equal access of the licensors to all potential licensees is another benefit 
associated to the patent pools (Bekkers, Iversen, and Blind, 2006). Furthermore, patent pool can 
also defuse information regarding invention developed by licensors which are not still patented 
(Merges, 1999), that can lower the likelihood of working on overlapping inventions which leads 
to accumulation of blocking patents and in extreme case patent thickets.  
Therefore, the transaction cost can be reduced through patent pools by providing a single access-
point that helps lowering searching cost, time and uncertainty, and increase transparency and 
accelerated and equal access to the firm’s technology and potential licensees and eliminating 
creation of overlapping IPRs that are sources of transaction cost elevation (Bekkers, Iversen, and 
Blind, 2006).  
Enhancing the competition which brings about pro-competitiveness is another benefit associated 
to patent pools consisting of mostly complementary patents that can reduce anti- competitive 
behavior among licensors. As pooled patents become more complementary patent pools tend to 
be more pro-competitive (Choi, 2010).  Vakili (2012) in a study on MPEG-2 patent pool argues 
that the competition among pool members can be increased as a result of the lower barriers to 
entry provided by the pool which invite new entrants into the technological space. Therefore, 
patent pools comprising mostly complementary patents reduces the rate of strategic patenting to 
a considerable extent as they increase competitiveness and reduce strategic and anticompetitive 
behaviors among their members (Lampe and Moser, 2014). 
Nevertheless, the role of patent pools in lessening the licensing transaction cost for companies 
involved in industries with complex technologies appears to be more significant as compared to 
those with discrete underlying technologies, since the fragmentation of IPRs and technology 
interdependencies causing excessive transaction costs is higher in these industries. Furthermore, 
the number of patent pool in complex technological fields is significantly higher as compared to 
                                                          
1 US Patent and Trademark Office, "USPTO issues white paper on patent pooling", Jan. 19, 2001. 
2
 David A. Hounshell & John k. smith, JR., Science and corporate strategy: DU PONT R&D, 1902-1980 at 200 
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discrete ones.  For instance, according to Merges (1996) in United States radio, aircraft, and 
automobile are examples of complex technologies which are developed based on patent pools. 
There are several other industries with complex technologies such as telecommunication and 
consumer electronics that are relying heavily on patent pools in developing technological 
standards.  
The potential positive ex-ante and ex-post influence of patent pools on companies’ innovation 
activities and technology commercialization is limited to the pool composed of mostly 
complementary patents. Patent pools can also have negative impacts on technology and 
innovation development and commercialization when they include patents with substitute 
relationships. As a matter of fact, by restricting the potential competitors’ and new entrants 
access to the pool’s technology, such patent pools encourage blocking activities by the pool 
licensors. Even creating the work-around the pool’s technology would be tremendously hard due 
to the extent and the scope of such pools (Saunders, 2002). 
Anti-competitive behaviors are therefore quite common among the licensors which in fact utilize  
the pool as a price-fixing mechanism, obliging the licensees to bear royalty fees for patents that 
normally they will not select, imposing restriction to outsiders who hold patents which substitute 
the patents included in the pool, restraining rivalry in downstream products which comprise the 
pooled patents or in other markets that are somehow linked to those, confining the accessibility 
of patents that are technically or economically necessary for those other standards; and  
eradicating  inducements for follow on innovations (Bekkers, Iversen, and Blind, 2006).  
Therefore, the potential welfare effect of patent pools will be positive if patents have a 
complementary relationship and will be negative if patents have a substitutive relationship 
(Shapiro, 2001). The welfare impact of patent pools is indeed studied through some models 
concerning their pro-competitive and anti-competitive impacts. The first model is presented by 
Lerner and Tirole (2003) through which necessary and sufficient condition for a pool is provided 
in order to increase welfare. This model is extended in a number of directions to convey an 
analysis of various patent pool-related issues including the external test evaluation which inhibits 
substitute patents to be included in a patent pool, the inducement of the firms engaged in a pool 
to do inventions around each other patents and the underlying principle meant for the provision 
of future-related patents’ automatic transfer to the pool,  
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Choi(2010) developed a model on the basis of the Lerner and Tirole (2003) framework which 
captures the full range of relationships between patents including perfectly substitutable and 
perfectly complementary. According to his model, the public policy scope is impacted by the 
relationship between the patent pool patents. Hence, when the relationship between pool patents 
are rather complementary patent pools turn to be pro-competitive. This implies that private and 
public enticements in forming such pools are perfectly aligned. On the contrary, when the 
relationship between the pool patents is substitutive the pool turns to be anti-competitive. This 
implies incongruities between public and social policies in the process of forming the patent 
pool. 
Compulsory licensing is also discussed as another possible way in order to prevent strategic 
patenting. Compulsory licensing is purposed as a legislative way to facilitate the external 
commercialization of patents. Although, such provision seems to be useful Yosick(2001), argues 
that compulsory licensing is rarely employed in some major countries such as United States . He 
argues that the use of compulsory licensing is in general rejected by the courts except for some 
cases of remedy of antitrust violations and therefore there has been a strong opposition in 
Congress against the proposed comprehensive compulsory licensing legislation. Compulsory 
licensing is indeed a way to increase the social welfare when the patented invention is not used 
or is not available in the United States or when a new invention is getting blocked by the 
previous patent .In the case of  strategic non-use of the patented invention compulsory licensing 
makes the invention available to the public and at the same time produces some royalties for the 
patent owner and in the case of pure blocking actions, bargaining deadlocks will be resolved 
through obliging the prior patent owner to accept to deal with the improver through either the 
threat or the implementation of a compulsory license(Yosick,2001). Therefore considering a 
comprehensive compulsory licensing legislation as an addition to the patent system would be 
advantageous particularly as a way to increase the use of technology. 
4. Conceptual issues 
4.1 Strategic decision making   
Despite the relatively rich body of the literature on strategic patenting, we lack a comprehensive 
theory concerning the decision making process for utilizing patents strategically. The literature 
on strategic patenting has discussed some patent, firm and technology specific factors explaining 
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the strategic use of patents (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Blind, Edler, Frietsch and Schmoch ,2006 
;Giuri, et al, 2007;Motohashi, 2008;Jung, 2009; Jung and Walsh, 2011;Torrisi et al, 2014). 
However, while these studies provide some insights on some drivers of strategic patenting, they 
don’t provide a clear framework for the firms’ decision making process in strategic exploitation 
of their patents. Table 1 presents the summaries of the studies providing explanations for why 
companies rely on strategic patenting  
 Table 1 Drivers of strategic patenting 
Factors explaining companies’ reliance on strategic patenting   Study 
Patent-specific characteristics Strong patent effectiveness Jung and Walsh (2010) 
Firm size Jung(2009),  Giuri and Torrisi (2011), 
Hall and Ziedonis (2001), Blind et al., 
(2006), & Giuri, et al., (2007), 
Motohashi (2008), Jung (2009),& Jung 
and Walsh (2010) 
Firm-specific characteristics Large size of technological assets Jung (2009), Jung and Walsh (2010) 
Possessing valuable downstream 
assets 
Jung (2009), Jung and Walsh (2010)  
Capital intensity Jung (2009), Jung and Walsh (2010)  
Technology Environment- 
characteristics 
 
Technology Maturity  Jung (2009), Jung and Walsh (2010) 
Technological Complexity Torrisi et al, (2014)  
Intensity of competition  Torrisi et al, (2014) 
 
4.2 Assessing the welfare effects of strategic patenting  
There has been considerable dependence on “Transaction Cost Economy” theory in explaining 
the negative welfare outcomes of strategic patenting. Based on this theory, it has been argued 
that strategic patents that cause blocking positions and create dense webs of overlapping 
intellectual property rights raise the transaction cost within the market for technology that 
ultimately impede the patents rightholdrs from using their patents (Shapiro, 2001; Lemley and 
Shapiro, 2007). Heller and Eisenberg (1998) refer to this effect as “The Tragedy of 
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Anticommons” where valuable patents are under-utilized where several IPR holders are 
preventing each other from using a single resource (invention) since they all own it (Heller, 
1998).  Patent hold-ups are also discussed as another negative consequence of strategic patenting 
(Lemley and Shapiro, 2005). A barrier, which holds up a company which is threaten by blocking 
patents is referred to as “hold up”.  
Although these studies provide some explanations for the welfare outcomes of strategic 
patenting, there is a clear lake for a comprehensive guidance for the assessment of the welfare 
effect of strategic patenting.  In fact, while these studies provide insights on consequences of 
strategic patenting they provide little guidance on to what extent strategic patenting affects the 
social and economic welfare.  Table 2 presents the main studies providing explanation for 
welfare effects of strategic patenting.  
Table 2 Welfare effect of strategic patenting  
Main Them   Author(s) Type  
Patent Thickets  Shapiro (2001) Theoretical  
Lemley and Shapiro (2007) Empirical 
Patent holdups Lemley and Shapiro (2005) Empirical 
Tragedy of Anticommons  Heller and Eisenberg (1998) Theoretical 
 
4.3. The extent and the efficiency of the solutions  
Due to the significance of the negative welfare impact of strategic patenting from a public policy 
and economic perspective some studies have proposed ex-ante or ex-post solutions to this issue 
that leads either to reducing the strategic behavior within the market for technology and as a 
result decreasing the rate of strategic patenting (ex-ante) or to facilitate technology transfer 
through mechanism that lower the transaction cost among firms (ex-post). Accordingly, relying 
on TCE theory the literature has emphasized on the role of cross licensing and more importantly  
patent pools of complementary patents (vs. substitutive patents) as mechanisms that can deal 
with potential issues such as excessive transaction cost caused by patent thickets and blocking 
patents (e.g. Carlson, 1999; Shapiro, 2001) which hampers the use of inventions.   
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Cross-licensing is discussed as a coordination mechanism that can moderate the litigation costs 
for the owners of overlapping patents by providing them with the possibility to grant their 
intellectual property right to each other and facilitate technology transfer among parties through 
lowering transaction cost. Patent pools are defined as “[…] an agreement between two or more 
patent owners to license one or more of their patents to one another or third parties” (USPTO, 
2000).   Patent pools can lower the rate of blocking patents in the market for technology either by 
intensifying the rate of use of blocking patents which are included in the patent pool by 
decreasing the transaction cost (Merges, 1999) and providing equal and non-discriminatory 
access of all the members and potential licensees to the pool’s technology (Sung and Pelto, 1998; 
Bekkers, Iversen, and Blind, 2006)- ex-post effect- or by preventing strategic behaviors by the 
pool members (Vakili 2012;Lampe and Moser, 2014) and decreasing the probability of working 
on overlapping inventions (Merges, 1999) -ex-ante effect-. Relying on “Property Rights Theory”, 
Compulsory licensing is also discussed as one possible way to prevent strategic patenting 
(Yosick,2001; Cornides ,2007; Reichman , 2009). Compulsory licensing is purposed as a 
legislative ex-post approach to increase the rate of external use of patents. Although, such 
provision seems to be useful, Yosick(2001), argues that compulsory licensing is rarely employed 
in United States . 
While the ex-post solutions rely mostly on TCE and Property right theory, the ex-ante 
mechanism explanation relies mainly on competition theory. Moreover, although these theories 
provide some explanations for the solution purposed to the issues generated by overlapping and 
strategic blocking patents, there exists a lake of an integrated framework that could explain a 
comprehensive solution mechanism. Moreover, there is a clear lack for studies investigating the 
extent to which these mechanisms can tackle the issue. Table 3 presents the summaries of the 
solutions for issues caused by strategic blocking patents by different studies. 
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Table 3 Summary of solutions proposed to tackle issues caused by strategic blocking 
patenting  
Studies Proposed solution Type Theory employed 
Shapiro (2001) Cross licensing Ex-post Transaction Cost Economy (TCE) 
Shapiro (2001), Merges 
(1999),Sung and Pelto, 
1998, Bekkers, Iversen, and 
Blind, 2006, Lerner and 
Tirole (2003), Choi (2010) 
Patent pool Ex-post Transaction Cost Economy (TCE) 
Vakili (2012),Lampe and 
Moser (2014) 
Patent pool Ex-ante Competition Theory 
Yosick(2001), Reichman 
(2009), Cornides (2007) 
Compulsory licensing Ex-post Property Right Theory(PRT) 
 
5. Suggestions for future research 
Through this review we identified three main gaps within the literature on strategic patenting. 
Bellow, we further discuss future research possibilities for each gap. 
5.1 Strategic decision making process 
The review of the literature on strategic patenting shows that although there have been some 
efforts to investigate the antecedences of strategic patenting, to date no integrated framework has 
been presented that can explain a firm’s decision making process in exploiting a patent 
strategically. In other words while some studies have identified factors explaining strategic 
patenting no study has investigated the firm’s process of decision making which leads to 
strategic exploitation of an invention. Future, research is needed to provide a decision step 
model, which could be based on a cost and benefit analysis that incorporates strategic rents and 
associated trade-offs with strategic use/nonuse of an invention. Moreover, future research could 
provide a theoretical framework that integrates resource base view, transaction cost economy and 
property rights theory together in order to provide a comprehensive strategic decision making 
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framework that incorporates the most relevant components explaining strategic patenting 
identified by the literature.  While the decision process to use an own invention strategically is 
interesting to study, there is also a further room for investigating the decision for strategic 
acquisition of other’s patents particularly within a cost and benefit analysis framework.  
Furthermore, as the motivations for patenting vary across different technological fields(Cohen et 
al, 2000; Cohen et al 2002), the process of decision making to patent an invention for strategic 
purposes might have also significant differences which would be interesting to explore.  
5.2 Assessing the welfare effect of strategic patenting  
While the literature review shows conflicting arguments raised by different studies regarding the 
welfare impacts of strategic patenting, there is a clear lack of theoretical and empirical studies 
investigating the extent to which strategic patenting might affect social and economic welfare. 
Such assessment is important not only from a policy perspective, but also from a managerial 
perspective since tackling with the social and economic issues caused by pure strategic 
exploitation of inventions by companies, requires also a within-firm awareness and practices. 
Particularly, welfare models could be developed that aim to address the mutual risks and costs 
associated to strategic use of patenting for parties contributing to the same technological space. 
Since the generalizability of such models might be questionable, the context specification 
considerations would be crucial in developing a more precise model.   A context-specific model 
for assessing the welfare effect of strategic patenting however, could integrate managerial, social 
and economic components together in order to come up with a more comprehensive benchmark. 
Furthermore, the welfare effect assessment of strategic patent acquisition is also a relatively 
unexplored area for future research. 
5.3.The extent and the effectiveness of the proposed solutions 
The review of the literature reveals solutions proposed by today to tackle issues caused by 
strategic blocking patents such as excessive transaction cost and nonuse of resources. While 
there are no integrated solutions suggested to date to these issues, there have been no efforts in 
assessing the effectiveness of each solution. However, although, different solutions might have 
various underlying mechanisms in tackling the issue, they ultimately have the same goal. This 
creates an opportunity to think of designing a more cohesive resolution framework.  More 
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importantly, understanding the effectiveness of each solution requires further research dedicated 
to investigation of the extent to which mechanisms such as patent pools can decrease the 
transaction cost. This would be feasible for example by examining the effect of patent pools on 
the rate of facilitation of technology commercialization. Some solutions such as compulsory 
licensing seem to be not favorable by firms and even some policy makers.  Therefore, further 
studies are needed to examine solutions that could provide superior alternatives to compulsory 
licensing.  
6. Conclusion  
The strategic use of patents has become a central topic within the strategic management of IPRs 
filed. Strategic patenting literature is characterized by approaches that have bridged economic 
and management theories, management practices and public policy. However, advances in the 
strategic patenting literature over the last two decades and diverse observations by senior 
scholars steadily show that the literature on the strategic management of IPRs presently shows 
some discrepancies, and persevering knowledge gaps.   
 In this study we employed an interdisciplinary approach to uncover theoretical gaps from across 
different domains.  Three broad issues were investigated:  the drivers for strategic patenting, the 
welfare effect of strategic patenting and the solutions to tackle issues caused by strategic 
patenting.  The main arguments in each theme were reviewed and the key question that remained 
unexplored was identified in each domain.  We presented summaries of the critical findings of 
different studies which provide insights to (1) managerial decision making process for strategic 
use of patents and (2) assessing welfare effect of strategic patenting and (3) comprehensive 
solutions to tackle issues caused by strategic blocking patents and benchmark to assess their 
effectiveness. In addition we discussed future research paths and possibilities which could help 
to encourage future theory advances. 
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Abstract  
Strategic patenting has been long discussed within the literature on strategic management of IPRs, 
innovation economy and public policy. Particularly, studies have identified a considerable share of 
strategic patents in the market for technology which are left unused due to pure strategic reasons. While 
such patents might generate strategic rents to their owner, they may have harmful consequences for the 
society if by blocking alternative solutions that other inventions provide they hamper the possibility of 
better solutions. Using a novel database of inventors (PatVal II), this study investigates the drivers of 
unused strategic patents. We focus our attention on strategic patents intended to play. We find 
technological uncertainty and technological complexity as two technology environement specific factors 
that drive unused play patents. This study contributes to the literature on strategic management of 
intellectual property rights and public policy by identifying new determinants of unused strategic patents.  
Keywords: Strategic patenting, play patents, patent nonuse  
 
 
 
1- Introduction 
Strategic patenting has been long discussed within the literature on strategic management of 
IPRs, innovation economy and public policy. Studies have identified a considerable share of 
strategic patents in the market for technology which are left unused (Giuri and Torrisi, 2011, 
Jung 2009, Jung and Walsh 2011).  Although a share of these patents is not used since they 
might have no value (Rivette and Kline 2000), the importance of the issue of nonuse of these 
patents  raises when they encompass value and are left unused or they are blocking the use of 
another valuable invention.  
Strategic patents are defined as patents intended for strategic purposes and therefore will be 
basically left unused if they provide their owners with strategic rents (Giuri and Torrisi, 
2011).According to Harhoff, et al., (2007) “Strategic use of the patent system arises whenever 
firms leverage complementarities between patents to attain a strategic advantage over 
technological rivals. This is anticompetitive if the main aim and effect of strategic use of the 
patent system is to decrease the efficiency of rival firms’ production.” 
In general, there exists several strategic motives behind developing an invention discussed by the 
literature, however not necessarily all these motives will result in unused strategic patents. 
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Moreover, these motivations vary across different technological fields and therefore might 
generate different shares of unused patents across different industries.   
As for industries relying on complex technologies such as semiconductor or telecommunication 
industry , the literature has discussed strategic patenting motive such as obtaining freedom to 
operate (Grindley and Teece, 1997;Hall and Ziedonis 2001; Ziedonis 2004;Blind, Edler,Frietcsh, 
and Schmoch 2006), signaling company’s strength for potential infringement law suits 
particularly for larger companies that have patents very close to those of small companies, 
blocking other inventions and obtaining negotiation power in cross licensing agreements (Cohen 
et al, 2000;Cohen et al 2002; Davis, 2008). In general in such industries those patent filed with 
the intention of blocking others or providing their owner with freedom to manufacture as 
bargaining tools for cross licensing and licensing negotiations are categorized as play patents 
(Cohen at al, 2000;Cohen at al, 2002). While these patents might be used by their owner or 
through an agreement with others, they might also be left unused. For instance patents filed as 
bargaining tools might not be ultimately used due to bargaining or contracting failure. Such 
patents might also be utilized just to signal the company’s power to other rivals or be filed just to 
serve as a counter-suit in litigation cases and therefore never be used in a product. A patent also 
may not be used by its owner as a result of other strategic motives such as avoiding the negative 
market effect of own innovation on existing products (Gilbert and Newbery,1984). 
All these motivations might generate unused strategic patents which may have considerable 
value. Scotchmer (1991) argues that in industries which rely on cumulative technologies where 
inventions are built upon each other, the inducement of second round innovators which are 
building their innovation based on the first round inventions will be impacted by the threat of 
plausible patent infringements litigations.  In industries relying on discrete technologies such as 
chemical and paramedical industries however, companies use strategic patents to prevent their 
rivals from imitating their core technology. Hence, they file numerous functionally similar 
patents around their core invention in order to create a protecting boundary to exclude rivals 
(Cohen, Nelson and Walsh, 2000). Such patents are in general very unlikely to be used internally 
or externally and are categorized as fence patents (Cohen at al, 2000;Cohen at al, 2002;Jung, 
2009;Saunders 2002).  
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As a matter of fact while strategic patents might generate strategic rents to their owner who is 
paying a fee to hold her patent right, they may have negative social and economic consequences 
if by blocking alternative solutions that other inventions provide they hamper the possibility of 
better solutions. Patents are essentially meant as shielding tools for inventions, and for that 
reason they have the potential of generating monopoly power for their owner (Feldman,2008).  
As a result if patents are not used they support the monopoly without providing any social and 
economic benefits since the innovations based on those patents are not eventually exploited.  
A patent which is not used with the intention of inhibiting entry of competitors into the market 
forces the new entrants to bear additional costs of inventing around, to pay royalties to the patent 
owner, or to bear perhaps severe ex-post fines (Harhoff,  et al., 2007). According to Cohen 
(2004), the existence of strategic patents in the market for technology might negatively impact 
the development of innovation because the fundamental inventions might impede the 
exploitation of the follow-on innovations that might also restrict the speed and even the trail of 
the innovation.  Galasso and Shankerman (2014) and Sampat and Williams (2014) however, 
provide evidence that the impact of patent rights on follow-on innovation is context specific and 
is not homogenous across technological fields. Adopting a new identification strategy in 
estimation of the causal impact of patent protection on follow on innovation Galasso and 
Shankerman (2014) use the patent invalidity decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeal for the 
Federal Circuit, founded in 1982 and has exclusive authority in appellate cases including patents. 
They argue that invalidation of patent rights has significant impact on downstream innovations 
only in computers and communications, electronics, and medical instruments (including 
biotechnology) fields and they find no evidence that invalidation of patent rights affect follow-on 
innovation in drugs, chemicals or mechanical technologies. Consistently in a recent 
contemporaneous study, Sampat and Williams (2014) employ administrative data on successful 
and unsuccessful patent applications submitted to the USPTO, to link the exact gene sequences 
claimed in each patent application. They employ two methods including simple comparison of 
follow-on innovation across genes and the “leniency” of the assigned patent examiner as an 
instrumental variable for whether the patent application was granted a patent both showing that 
gene patents have no impact on follow-on innovations. 
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The strategic use of patents also generates patent races in which marginal innovation is the basic 
incentive for patenting. Technology diffusion will be also delayed or even impeded by the 
presence of such unused patents.   Therefore, for a more efficient utilization of resources and also 
from a policy viewpoint, studying strategic non-use of patents is of considerable significance.  
To date, the literature has identified some factors explaining strategic patents. There exists few 
empirical studies that have distinguished between used and unused strategic patents (e.g. Torrisi 
et al., 2014)  however no study has paid attention to unused play patents. Accordingly in this 
study we investigate the drivers of non-use of play patent.  We focus on play patents since, first 
the innovation and the technology market mechanisms for play patents are very different from 
fence patents. Moreover, there exists higher variety of strategic intentions behind play patents as 
compared to fence patents which are not sufficiently explored by the literature. More importantly 
the importance of play patents is significantly highlighted in the literature as the drivers of 
patents thickets (Shapiro, 2001; Lemley and Shapiro, 2007; von Graevenitz et al., 2011) and 
patent hold ups (Lemley and Shapiro, 2005). We define unused play patents as those patents 
filed to block other’s inventions or to be used as bargaining chips in licensing and cross-licensing 
deals (Cohen, et al., 2002), but are not used in an internal commercialization process by their 
owner or are not used externally through licensing, sale or creation of a spin off.  
To test our hypotheses we use the data collected through PatVal II Survey on European inventors 
of 22,533 EPO patents resident in Europe, USA, Japan and Israel conducted between 2009 and 
2011. The PatVal II Survey, ask among other things if a patent is used. It also asks the inventor’s 
filing intention for each patent including strategic and non-strategic motives.   
We contribute to the literature by examining the underlying technological mechanisms leading to 
patent nonuse. We provide novel evidence in exploring the antecedences of unused strategic 
patent which are intended to play. We show that the probability of non-use for play patents is 
higher for companies facing higher technological uncertainty.  We also show that play patents 
held by companies involved in complex technological fields are more likely to be left unused.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  In section 2 we present the literature review on 
strategic patent nonuse, discuss the theoretical background in more details and develop our 
hypotheses. In the third section the description of the data used in this study is presented. In 
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section 4 the empirical methodology of the study along with our results is discussed. In section 5 
we review the main findings and discuss the study’s implications for the managers, policy 
makers and researchers. 
2. Literature review   
 “Strategic use of the patent system arises whenever firms leverage complementarities between 
patents to attain a strategic advantage over technological rivals. This is anticompetitive if the 
main aim and effect of strategic use of the patent system is to decrease the efficiency of rival 
firms’ production.” (Harhoff, et al., 2007).  Strategic patents are patents which are filed to serve 
a company’s strategic purposes and as a result will not be used because they provide their owners 
with strategic rents (Giuri and Torrisi, 2011). 
 Different studies have shown that the strategic use of patents is one of the most important 
reasons behind forming large patent portfolios by companies in a number of industries (Cohen, 
Nelson and Walsh, 2000; Hall & Ziedonis, 2001; Bessen & Hunt, 2004). Blocking is one 
possible and common strategic use of patents by which the owner of an IPR intends to impede 
rivals from using their invention. According to the literature, strategic use of patents might be 
intended to  play  that is generally aimed for creating a credible insurance against probable 
infringement lawsuits threatening the company’s inventions, blocking other’s inventions and 
achieving negotiation power in cross-licensing agreements (Cohen et al, 2000;Cohen et al 2002). 
According to Allison, Lemley, and Walker (2009), strategic use of a patent in order to play 
consists of creating a patent portfolio with a large enough size including counter-suit patents 
which prevent rivals from suing the focal firm. This will provide the focal firm with freedom to 
operate and does not necessarily imply exclusion of the competitors from the market. In fact, the 
firm’s player status will be guaranteed in an industry by means of preventing rivals from having 
control over all the essential rights in order to commercialize products through getting access to 
the rivals technologies via cross-licensing or at the very least possessing freedom to operate by 
achieving a credible counter-claim tool (Cohen et al 2002).  Davis (2008) argues that play 
strategy consists of developing and patenting inventions by intellectual property vendors which 
are complementary to the buyer’s invention and is used by firms which are interested in licensing 
or selling their IPRs to third parties. Therefore, while a company may intend to block other 
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competitors’ inventions by pursuing a play strategy, play strategy is not a pure blocking 
approach. Blind, et al., (2006), refer to this type of strategic patents as “defensive” patents.  
Strategic use of patents might also be intended to fence with the aim of prevention of imitation 
by competitors (Cohen et al, 2000), particularly by firms encompassing huge patent portfolios 
which are more willing to exclude their competitors by making a shielding edge around their 
core technologies through patenting several substitute inventions (Cohen et al, 2002;Davis, 2008; 
Jung, 2009). Cohen et al, (2002) define fence patents as those blocking patent which are not 
intended to be used in cross-licensing and licensing .“Such fence building involves the patenting, 
though not licensing (nor necessarily even commercializing), of variants and other inventions 
that might substitute for the core innovation in order to preempt rivals from introducing 
competing innovations” Cohen et al (2000). For example, by patenting more than 200 substitutes 
for its core invention “Nylon”, Du Pont tried to protect its core invention by employing fence 
strategy (Hounshell and Smith [1988]) which shows that although the company may use a focal 
patent internally but several fence patents around the core technology will remain unused with 
the aim of blocking competitors. “Du Pont's patent policy stemmed from the nature of U.S. 
patent law, which allowed patentees to maintain patents even though such patents were not 
worked.... that is, they employed their researchers in finding small modifications or variations as 
well as alternatives to basic patents as a means of protecting a basic patent”2. Saunders (2002) 
argues that a patent may not be commercialized by a firm in an industry in which “the norm is to 
patent en masse any and all innovations”, where the intention of the patent holder is occupying 
the whole field by filing patents for all varieties or secondary applications of a core invention, 
although a huge number of patents filed might not be used or are of little use to the patent holder. 
In fact, fence patents are an example of “tragedy of the anti‐commons” in the market for 
technology when valuable patents are under-utilized since the owners of the inventions block 
each other from exploiting their patents (Heller et al., 1998).  Fencing is considered as a pure 
blocking action that excludes the rivals and gives the monopoly power to the blocker. Blind, et 
al., (2006), refer to strategically patented inventions used to fence as “offensive” patents.  
                                                          
2
 David A. Hounshell & John k. smith, JR., Science and corporate strategy: DU PONT R&D, 1902-1980 at 200 
(1988). 
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Cohen et al. (2002) and Jung (2009) findings show that fence strategy is favored in discrete 
technologies such as chemical and pharmaceutical industry while play strategy is favored in 
complex technologies such as semiconductor industry. Although nonuse of patents with blocking 
intentions can encompass all fence patents, the use of patents to play is more than blocking since 
they are also used in licensing and cross licensing agreements (Cohen et al., 2002).  
Consequently, the probability of nonuse for either of these two types of strategic patents seems to 
be different. In fact, by fencing a company may patent several substitute patents to keep 
competitors out and prevent their imitation when the single patents are not effectively preventing 
them from substitution or imitation (Cohen et al, 2000). In fact, fence patents might represent 
development upon the original product and the company may have no intention for 
commercializing them (Cohen et al., 2000). Hence, fence strategy in general creates a 
considerable number of unused patents. Accordingly, Jung (2009) refers to fence patents as 
“strategic nonuse patents”. In fact play patents comparing to fence ones seem much more likely 
to be used since they can be used in cross-licensing and licensing agreements (Jung, 2009; Cohen 
et al, 2000) or even internally by their owner.  
 
Consequently, fence and play patents can be further divided into used and unused patents. 
Unused ones comprise in general all fence patents. They may be also play patents which are 
intended to create a counter-suit threat against rival’s infringement lawsuits that are also very 
unlikely to be used in an internal commercialization or an external use such as cross licensing or 
licensing deal unless the company settles litigation and enters a cross-licensing agreement to end 
the lawsuit. Finally, play patents which are filed to be utilized as bargaining tools may be also 
left unused in case of failure to conclude the agreement by parties. Used patents can be 
categorized as those play patents which are utilized externally in a cross-licensing or licensing 
agreement. 
 
To date the literature has investigated some drivers for strategic patents. Firm-Specific 
characteristics such as firm size and possessing valuable downstream assets are discussed as 
some of these drivers. A number of studies have examined the link between firm size and 
strategic use of patents (Hall and Ziedonis 2001; Blind, Edler, Frietsch and Schmoch ,2006 
;Giuri, et al, 2007;Motohashi, 2008;Jung 2009; Jung and Walsh 2010) showing the importance 
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and higher share of strategic patents for larger firms comparing to smaller ones. Possessing 
valuable downstream assets is another firm-specific characteristic argued by Jung (2009) to be 
positively associated to strategic defensive use of patents. Moreover, Jung and Walsh (2010) 
found technological maturity as a technology-specific characteristic is negatively associated to 
the rate of strategic patents on account of the lower uncertainty associated to general 
characteristics of mature technologies.  
In this study we put one step further by investigating the antecedences of a particular type of 
unused strategic patents which is very common in cumulative industries. Accordingly we 
investigate the association between technology-specific factors such as technological uncertainty 
and technological complexity and unused play patents.   
2.1 Hypotheses development  
As it has been shown in the literature review, technology-specific characteristics such as 
technological uncertainty are discussed as a driver for sleeping patents (Weeds, 1999). Within 
the current body of the literature the impact of technology environment characteristics on the 
strategic nonuse of patents has been rarely studied.  The only exceptions are the studies by Jung 
and Walsh (2010) and Torrisi et al., (2014). Torrisi et al, (2014) found that the presence of one 
competitor for the patent as a technology environment factor is positively associated with 
strategic use of patents. As another technology environment factor they also found that 
technological complexity is positively associated to strategic patenting.  
Jung and Walsh (2010) investigated the effect of technological maturity and technological 
uncertainty on strategic nonuse of patents. They examined how evolutionary stages of 
technology development and firm capabilities influence the strategic non-use of patents by 
conducting empirical estimations, using data from Georgia Tech inventor survey. Their study 
examines the influence of technological maturity on strategic patenting and their results show 
that the probability of strategic non-use of a patented invention is lower in mature technologies 
due to the lower level of uncertainty as well as a favorable selection environment of technology 
associated to the general characteristics of mature technology. Their study also demonstrates that 
this effect is higher in complex technologies as compared to discrete technologies. 
33 
 
Although, Jung and Walsh (2010) explain the effect of technological maturity on strategic non-
use of patents on account of the lower uncertainty associated to mature technologies, they have 
not examined the direct effect of technological uncertainty on strategic non-use of patents. 
Moreover, they have not distinguished between unused play patents vs. unused fence patents in 
their setting. Accordingly, following the same line of argument in explaining technology-specific 
characteristics we put one step further in our study by arguing that technological uncertainty may 
further explain unused play patents (as opposed to unused fence patents) by causing the cross-
licensing and licensing agreements between companies fail since it increases the licensing 
transaction cost. Following Huchzermeier and Loch (2001) and Ziedonis (2007) we define 
technological uncertainty as the uncertainty associated to manufacturing and technical 
performance as well as the feasibility of the patented technology which influences its 
commercial potential eventually.  
Within the market for IPR-based technologies, technological uncertainty may increase the 
transaction cost due to two main reasons; increase in information cost and increase in the 
bargaining and contracting cost. In the presence of technological uncertainty the licensees’ 
concern about the value and the feasibility of commercialization of a new invention raises. 
Particularly, the licensee has lower technological information about the invention comparing to 
the licensor (information asymmetry) as a result of the learning effect (as in general the licensor 
has previous investment in related technologies) or the licensor’s internal knowledge about the 
process of implementing the invention. The existence of information asymmetry raises the cost 
of information acquisition and as a result delays negotiations and elevates licensing transaction 
cost which may cause contracting failure. 
 Bargaining and contacting cost rise as a result of technological uncertainty. The literature on 
transaction cost economy, argues that the bargaining cost is higher in the presence of higher 
uncertainty (i.e. Williamson, 1981), which may cause impediments for parties in coming up with 
an agreement.  According to Merges (1994) an important reason why an inventor and improver 
fail in concluding a bargain is the great uncertainty associated to technology's future 
development path and profitability. According to him, in presence of uncertainty both inventor 
and improver encounter a “classical situation” where they face occasional bargaining failures 
although both parties were able to achieve considerable gains in case of coming up with an 
agreement. He gives the example of bargaining breakdown involving patents caused by immense 
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uncertainty in the early radio industry between Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company’s patented 
diode and De Forest’s patented triode which is considered in the literature as a classic example 
for blocking patents(Yosick;2001). “The Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company held the 
Fleming patent for the diode used in the radio industry, while De Forest held patents for the 
triode, which was an improvement of the Fleming pioneering patent. As holder of the dominant 
patent, Marconi was able to block use of the improvements, and the parties were unable to come 
to a licensing agreement. The outbreak of World War I forced a resolution, but the dispute 
delayed the development of the radio by several years” (Yosick;2001). 
According to Arrow (1969) also, contracts can be rendered incomplete finally, since the nature of 
the knowledge is tacit and there is an inherent risk associated to it, implying that the uncertainty 
about the future and value of a technology impedes parties from concluding the negotiations 
(Arrow, 1969; Oxley, 1997).  
Therefore, although use of a patent as a bargaining chip in licensing and cross licensing 
agreements could be a result of uncertainty as cross licensing will decrease the risks and costs 
associated to possible future infringement lawsuits, but uncertainty can also prevent a licensing 
or cross licensing agreement from being concluded through rising the transaction cost and 
therefore can create unused patents which can be categorized as unused play patents as argued. 
In fact, in spite of the fact that technological uncertainty provides the incentive to play in the 
market for technology by raising the importance of achieving bargaining tools, it impedes the 
utilization of these tools because parties are hardly able to conclude a deal. Even if some 
contracts are rendered, the uncertainty leads to continual updating of contracts and incurring the 
considerable costs associated to renegotiations which in many cases are not reasonable and 
therefore renegotiations will not be continued (eventually causes contracting failure). Williamson 
(1991) argues that in the presence of uncertainty contract are very repeatedly misaligned 
throughout the extensive period of costly renegotiations among parties. Therefore, uncertainty 
about the technology may encourage firms to adapt a play strategy to equip themselves with 
negotiation tools, but at the same time may cause negotiation (and renegotiation) efforts to fail 
by increasing transaction cost and therefore create unused play patents.  Therefore we forward 
our first hypothesis as: 
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H1) Play patents held by companies dealing with technological uncertainty are more likely to be 
left unused. 
There exist a positive link between technological complexity as another technology environment 
factor and strategic patenting (Torrisi et al, 2014). However, technological complexity may also 
explain unused play patents as a type of unused strategic patents. We focus our attention on 
technological complexity in this study particularly due to the importance of this factor in 
strategic patenting literature. According to Cohen et al., (2000), complex technologies are 
distinguished from discrete technologies as “a new, commercializable product or process is 
comprised of numerous separately patentable elements versus relatively few”. Therefore, in 
contrast with discrete technologies, complex technologies which are generally the underlying 
technology in cumulative industries are characterized by a high level of interdependency 
between patents and a considerable number of overlapping IPRs. Such interdependency requires 
firms’ access to large number of patents as a result of their lack of control over the entire 
technologies and essential complementary components needed for developing their products and 
therefore companies in such industries tend to massively accumulate patents. In fact, in such 
industries, firms are mostly led through patent thickets (Shapiro, 2001). As a result in complex 
technological fields many competitors are holding patents in order to build up large patent 
portfolios as a powerful means of bargaining and negotiation as well as a way to decrease the 
risk of being held up by competitors and prevent patent infringement lawsuits (Heller and 
Eisenberg 1998;Cohen et al ,2000; Shapiro, 2001; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Cohen et al ,2002) 
which leads to creation of play patents.  
Technological complexity can also increase the transaction cost in the market for technology and 
therefore firms involved in industries with complex technologies, generally rely on patenting as a 
strategic tool for negotiations and preventing infringement lawsuits. In fact, in cumulative 
industries and complex products innovator firms are dealing with excessive transaction costs as a 
result of the necessity for bargaining and negotiating with many patent right holders (Heller and 
Eisenberg, 1998). Consequently, technology transfer by means of licensing or sale is not well 
supported by the market for technology. Therefore, the main motivation for firms in using 
licensing in such industries is to play by achieving freedom-to-manufacture, to gain bargaining 
and negotiation control in litigations or to prevent patent infringement lawsuits (Gallini, 1984; 
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Gallini and Wright. 1990). Giuri and Torrisi (2010) also argue that technological complexity as 
technology characteristics and cumulativeness and overlapping claims as patent characteristics 
have a significant role in cross-licensing implying that cross-licensing can be helpful for patent 
holders in order to decrease transaction costs. Such importance will be more critical when it 
comes to complex technologies as in case of complex technologies getting blocked or blocking is 
probable because of the high number of interconnected patents required for a complex product or 
process which brings about a high negotiations cost for the patent owners. Hence, cross licensing 
is more common in complex technologies as compared to discrete ones.  
All in all, it can be argued that holding a patent in order to play is of high importance to the firms 
involved in complex technological fields. Cohen et al., (2000) show that in complex industries 
such as electronics or semiconductors filing patents is often intended to play. This is particularly 
common for high capital-intensive firms which are more vulnerable to patent infringement 
lawsuits (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Ziedonis, 2004). However although technological complexity 
might create a considerable share of play patents it might also hamper the use of them. First of 
all, although cross licensing is more common in industries with complex underlying 
technologies, the excessive transaction cost resulted by technological complexity in such 
industries may prevent cross licensing agreements from ending and as a result may cause unused 
play patents. Secondly, a share of the play patents which are resulted by technological 
complexity and are intended to be utilized as countersuits in case of future infringement lawsuits 
are very unlikely to be used by their owners in an internal commercialization process or 
externally as argued. Hence we posit that:    
H2) Play patents held by companies involved in complex technological fields (vs. discrete 
technological fields) are more likely to be left unused. 
3. Data and descriptive statistics  
3.1 Data 
With the aim of testing the hypotheses in our study we employ primary data from PatVal II 
database which is a cross-country database developed within InnoS&T project sponsored by the 
European Commission.  The survey started in 2009 in Europe and Israel and ended in US and 
Japan in 2011.  The survey is intended for studying the determinants of patent licensing, patent 
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sale and new venture creation by firms, universities and PROs. It inspects several key 
dimensions of the inventive process, involving the origin of new ideas, the organization and 
sources of inventive activities, the reasons for patenting and the use of patents,  by surveying 
inventors of 22,533 EPO patents with propriety dates between 2003 and 2005 resident in Europe 
(Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, 
United Kingdom, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Sweden, Slovenia), USA, Japan and Israel, through employing a harmonized 
questionnaire across all the surveyed regions.  In comparison to earlier innovation and patent 
surveys, PatVal II provides a broad international coverage of the antecedents and uses of 
patented inventions (Torrisi et al, 2014). 
There are a number of indicators obtained through PatVal II database. The PatVal II Survey, asks 
among other things if a patent is used. It also asks the inventor’s filing intention for each patent 
including strategic motives such cross-licensing, prevention of imitation, blocking patents, 
prevention of infringements suits, reputation and pure defense to ensure that the use of own 
technology is not blocked by others and, non-strategic motives including commercial 
exploitation,  licensing and intention to use in technical standards. Our unit of analysis in this 
study is EP patent. Table 1 shows the share of nonuse for play and fence patents in our sample. 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
4. Measurements, data analysis and regression results 
4.1 Measurement  
Dependent variable 
 
Unused play Patents  
For operatiolizing this variable we use a dummy equal to 1 if the patent has not been used by any 
of the inventors and the important motivation (>3)  for patenting is reported not for prevention of 
imitation but for blocking patents and cross licensing or licensing (Cohen et a., 2001).  PatVal II 
askes among other things if the applicant(s) or affiliated parties ever used the patented invention 
commercially or if the ownership right to the patent was sold or licensed to another party not 
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related to the original owner(s) or applicant(s), or if this patent been used by any of the inventors 
or applicants to found a new company.It also askes the inventors motivation when filing the 
invention. Through this measure, we make sure that our operationalization of unused play patent 
is exclusive from fence patents which are strategically used to prevent competitors from 
imitating the firm’s core technology. 
 
Independent variables  
 
Technological Uncertainty (TM): For the sake of operationalizing technological uncertainty 
(TU) we use the measure utilized by Djokovic and Souitaris(2007), originally devised by Lowe 
(2003) which is based on the average age of the cited patents (PCj). Before a patent gets issued, 
the prior inventions that must be cited will be determined by the patent officers through 
researching previous patents.  Each cited patent by the patent refers to a particular issuance date 
when it was issued. The idea is that the technology field will get more certain and mature, with 
higher average age of the citation. Following Djokovic and Souitaris(2007), technological 
uncertainty is measured based on the average age of the patents cited (PCj) where j is the number 
of the cited patents. The validity of this measure is due to the fact that it evaluates the level of 
uncertainty at the time the patent was issued and as a result is not a retrospective measure for 
technological uncertainty (Djokovic and Souitaris, 2007). Lowe (2003) gives an example of 
average age of cited patent as if a patent is issued in 1990 and is citing two patents, one issued in 
1980 and the other issued in 1970, then the average age of cited patents is calculated as 
(10+20)/2=15. As PCj ,technological uncertainty and j can take the value of zero Djokovic and 
Souitaris(2007)  measure technological uncertainty as : 
   
 
  ∑     
 
Although technological uncertainty can be measured through asking experts such as inventors, 
technology transfer officers and patent lawyers about each single patent at the time of publication 
as suggested by Walker and Weber (1984) for measuring technological uncertainty of products 
for a limited number of established companies, Djokovic and Souitaris (2007) purposed measure 
overcomes two important limitations of the this approach with respect to our study. First, 
considering the number of patents in our sample the Walker and Weber (1984) approach limits 
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our sample size and is costly to be accomplished for each individual patent(Markman et al., 
2004). Second, their approach is impracticable for the purpose of this study as the patents in our 
sample are already published for couple of yours and therefore their measure will provide us 
with a retrospective measure for technological uncertainty.  
 
Technological Complexity (TC): 
 For operationalizing technological complexity we use two alternative measures. First, following 
Giuri and Torrisi (2010), we classify the patent rather than the firm’s sector in accordance with 
the level of complexity of its underlying technology since as they argue even though Cohen et 
al., (2000) distinguish high complexity industries from low complexity ones, their classification 
is derived from technological dimensions. Consistent with their approach, we use a dummy in 
order to operationalize the variable technological complexity. This dummy takes the value 1 
when the patent belongs to one of the following classes: Electrical devices, engineering, energy, 
Audio-visual technology, Telecommunications, Information technology, Semiconductors, 
Optics, Analysis, measurement, control technology, Medical technology, Machine tools, 
Engines, pumps, turbines, Transport, Nuclear engineering, Space technology weapons. 
 
As the second measure for technological complexity we use average for triples employed by 
Torrisi et al., (2014). Triples are introduced by von Graevenitz et al. (2013) as the size of the 
complexity and are defined as citations link between three companies within each OST 
technology area. Von Graevenitz et al. (2013) define triple as the group of three companies  in 
which each company has critical prior art limiting claims on recent patent applications of each of 
the other two firms, from the backward XY citation point of view . Therefore, they measure 
triples as the count for frequency with which three companies holding EP patents claimed in the 
other two firms’ patents as X or Y references between 1988  and 2002. Following Torrisi et al., 
(2014), we measure Triples(mean) as the average for triples over this period. The higher the 
Tripe(mean) the higher the complexity a firm faces in the market for technology. 
 
Control Variables:  
We control for firm, patent, technology and country level factors in our estimations. We control 
for the size of the firm as firm size is considered as a general factor explaining patent nonuse by 
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previous literature (Giuri and Torrisi,2011; Hall and Ziedonis ,2001; Blind et al., 2006; Giuri, et 
al., 2007; Motohashi ,2008; Jung and Walsh, 2010).  We control for firm size by using 7 dummy 
variables. Through these dummies we distinguish the size by number of employees from the 
small firms employing less than 50 workers (baseline category accounting for 10.03% of our 
observations) to very large organizations (more than 5000 employees representing 56.73 % of 
observations). We also control for the age of the firm. We employ 4 dummy variables 
distinguishing young firms less than 5 years-old from more mature firms.  We further control for 
the presence of the competitors at the time of the invention. The presence of competitors at the 
time of invention might increase the likelihood of strategic motives while filing the patent 
application in order to achieve freedom to operate, to use the patent as a negotiation chip, to 
prevent future lawsuits or to protect a product or process which might lead to strategic nonuse of 
patents if the patent is merely field to be used as a countersuit or the bargaining negotiation fails. 
We use 3 dummies distinguishing the presence of no competitor from the presence of one 
competitor or several competitors.  
We also control for patent-level characteristics.  First we control for the number of inventors for 
each patent as a measure for the efforts that have been devoted to develop an invention. The 
higher the number of inventors for each patent the less might be the probability that it will be left 
unused since more efforts has been dedicated to accomplish it. Furthermore, to control for the 
scope of the patent we use number of claims included in the patent document. We also control 
for the significance of prior patent documents through controlling for the number of backward 
citations. Moreover, we control for the number of overlapping claims as a measure for legal 
validity of the patent.  In European patent system citations classified as “X” or “Y” references 
can be labeled as blocking citation (Czarnitzki, Hussinger and Leten, 2011). X/Y references can 
partly hamper the patentability of the competitors’ inventions and their R&D activities (Grimpe 
and Hussinger, 2008a,b; Guellec et al., 2009). In fact the owner of the cited patent will be 
benefited because other competitors are deprived of getting patents on similar inventions 
(Guellec et al., 2008) or the scope of their patents will be narrowed. Therefore, X and Y 
references might affect the likelihood of litigation as they are indicators for lack of novelty or 
inventive step and as a result might cause strategic patent non-use.  At the patent level, we also 
control for the priority year of patents (2003-2005).  We also control for the country of the 
applicant as a dummy variable. 5 dummies indicating the region of the inventor of the patent 
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including Europe, US, JP, Israel and the rest of the world. At technology level we control for 
technological classes and at the industry level we also control for SIC codes.  
Table 2 shows the list of variables used in our analyses along with their descriptions and sources. 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
4.2 Empirical Framework  
The descriptive statistics for our variables and their correlation matrix are presented in Table 2 
and Table 3.  
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 and Table 4 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
4.3 Regression results and discussion  
We checked whether multicollinearity existed among our explanatory variables before carrying 
the econometrics analysis. In fact, multicollinearity is considered as one of the most typical 
econometrics issues with cross-sectional regressions.  For our model, Pearson correlation 
coefficients were all < 0.5 except for few values for some of our control variables firm age, firm 
size and the country of the applicant in the correlation matrix of the covariates. We further 
investigated the issue by computing variance inflation factor. We found that VIF is less than 2 
for all our variables. Moreover, the average variance inflation factor for our model is 1.27.  
Since our dependent variable unused play patent is a dichotomous variable we employed probit 
estimation to carry our analysis (Greene, 2000). The results of the probit estimation are shown in 
Table 5.   
In the first column of the table we show the average marginal effects for the direct effect model 
including our dependent variable and both of our explanatory variables. Then we run the control 
model including patent, firm, technology and country level variables.  Column 2 shows the 
results of the probit estimation for our control model.  Column 3 to 4 show the average marginal 
effects after progressively adding our main regressors including technological uncertainty and 
technological complexity. Since, the progressive inclusion of the variables does not really affect 
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the significance and magnitude of each variable we interpreted the results of the last model 
(column 4).  
Hypothesis 1 is related to the association between technological uncertainty and nonuse of play 
patent. As it is shown in column 4 the coefficient for technological uncertainty is positive and 
significant.  Our results show that play patents held by firms involved in complex technological 
fields (as opposed to discrete technological fields) are more likely to be left unused . This is in 
line with our expectation that technological uncertainty might create bargaining failure for the 
parties holding play patents through raising the transaction cost in the technology market and 
therefore increase the likelihood of nonuse of these patents. The magnitude of the link between 
technological uncertainty and the nonuse of play patents is considerable although we have 
controlled for various patent, firm and technology observable factors.  As shown in Table 5 
technological uncertainty increases the probability of nonuse of play patents by 20.6%.  
Hypothesis 2 is regarding the link between the technological complexity and unused play patent. 
Technological complexity is positive and significant increasing the likelihood of non-use of play 
patents by 2 %.  This result is also in line with our expectation. Similar to Technological 
uncertainty , technological complexity might also increase the transaction cost in the market for 
technology and impede parties owning play patents intended to be employed as bargaining chips 
to come into a final agreement to use their technology. Technological complexity might also 
make the use of an invention difficult which might hinder the use of play patents in possible 
internal or external commercialization processes.   
In order to further explore the link between technological complexity and unused play patents we 
employ the average number of triples used by Torrisi et al., (2014) to measure technological 
complexity that is computed by von Graeventiz et al. (2013) as a measure for the density of 
patent thickets. Model 5 reports the result of this estimation showing a positive and significant 
marginal effect of the average of triples on unused play patents. It's worth mentioning that von 
Graeventiz et al (2013) have calculated the number of triples at a relatively high aggregation 
level. As a result the marginal effect of the triples might be attenuated due to the heterogeneity 
within each of the thirty technological areas (Torrisi, et al, 2014) 
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We control for firm, patent, technology and country level factors.  As expected the marginal 
effect of large (1000-4999 employees) and very large (over 5000 employees) firms are positive 
and significant on unused play patents as compared to baseline category (less than 50 
employees). This might imply that the complexity and size of the patent portfolios of large and 
very large licensors increases the probability of holding unused patents by these companies. 
Morover, the magnitude for legal validity (overlapping claims) while zero is not significant. 
Priority year while positive is not significant too. Moreover, the magnitude for patent scope 
(number of claims) and number of backward citations is zero. While negative we also don’t find 
number of inventors and the dummies for the country (region) significant.   
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
5. Implications and conclusion   
Using a novel database of inventors, this study investigates the drivers of unused strategic 
patents with particular focus on unused play patents. We employ data from the PatValII survey 
containing data for a sample of 23,044 inventor-invention pairs in Europe, Japan, Israel and the 
U.S. The survey was conducted in 2009-2011 with the aim of providing novel evidence about the 
characteristics of the inventive process leading to patent applications filed at the EPO.  
Our findings can be summarized as follows. First, a considerable share of the patents in our 
sample is left unused (35%) out of which 19% are unused play patents and 10.90 % are unused 
fence patents. Moreover, our probit estimation showed that play patents held by companies 
dealing with higher technological uncertainty are more likely to be left unused. This is consistent 
with other studies by (Jung 2009, Jung and Walsh 2011) that find technological maturity is 
negatively associated to the rate of strategic use of patents on account of higher uncertainty. Our 
finding is also in consistence with the evolutionary arguments on technology development by the 
literature (Dosi, 1982; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Nelson and Winter, 1982). 
We also find evidence for the argument that play patents held by companies involved in complex 
technological fields (vs. discrete technological fields) are more likely to be left unused. 
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Therefore, while studies argue that the rate of play patents is higher in complex technological 
fields (e.g. Cohen et al., 2002) as the propensity to file a patent as a mean to gain freedom to 
operate and achieve negotiation power in cross licensing and litigations is higher in these fields, 
we further find that technological complexity itself is a driver for the nonuse of play patents.    
The literature on transaction cost economy argues that companies’ ex-post opportunistic 
behaviors can be a result of complexity and uncertainty. Contracts or assets encompassing more 
complex or uncertain components might provide a better opportunity for the parties to act based 
on their individual benefits (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 1991). As a result 
the transaction would be suppressed and higher controls would be imposed since there are 
several risks and hazards associated to the contracts suffering from high complexity and 
uncertainty. Therefore, in line with this stream of the literature we argue that although 
technological complexity and technological uncertainty might increase the propensity to file play 
patents, they also impede the use of play patents most importantly by increasing the transaction 
cost in the market for technology.  
Our results also show that large and very large companies are more likely to hold unused play 
patents. This result is in consistence with other studies (Giuri and Torrisi,2011; Hall and 
Ziedonis ,2001; Blind et al., 2006; Giuri, et al., 2007; Motohashi ,2008; Jung and Walsh, 2010) 
which show that in general the size of the firm is negatively related to the use of patents.  This 
might reflect the fact that the complexity and size of the patent portfolios of large licensors 
makes it complicated for them to evaluate the value and the potential use and application of their 
patents. 
Study limitations and future research  
We contribute to the current body of the literature on strategic patenting through investigating 
the drivers of unused play patents. Previous studies have investigated some drivers associated to 
strategic patents, however our study puts one step further to examine the drivers of unused 
strategic patent with particular focus on unused play patents. Our results provide theoretical and 
empirical ground for future studies concerning strategic patenting and use of patents. 
The characteristics of technology and markets within industries relying on complex technologies 
are very different from those in discrete technological fields in terms of invention development 
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process, IPR structure and positioning and mechanisms. Considering the wider variety of 
strategic intentions behind filing play patents and due to the significance of these patents as the 
drivers of hold ups and patent thickets, we focused our attention on these types of strategic 
patents with the purpose of exploring their drivers more in depth. Future, research could further 
explore the drivers of unused fence patents and provide a comparative bench mark for the 
characteristics and determinants of both types of strategic patents. Furthermore, our data is cross-
sectional. Future, research could employ longitudinal data in order to explore more dynamic 
market and technology level factors which can explain strategic non-use of patents.  
In line with other studies’ arguments on the welfare effects of strategic patenting, our research 
suggests that although companies might apply for strategic patents to gain strategic rents, such 
strategic behaviors might be detrimental to social welfare as they cause nonuse of resources. 
However, to date it has not been clear to what extent strategic benefits of a company might 
negatively affect the society and what could be the most feasible and efficient policies to deal 
with that. Future research could shed light on this unexplored ambiguity.  
Our study investigated the antecedences of unused strategic patent. Future studies could be done 
in order to explore those patent, firm and market level mechanisms which might favor the use of 
these patents. It would be also nice to explore more in depth different strategic motives leading 
to strategic nonuse of patents by employing a more qualitative approach.  
Policy implications  
This study contributes to the literature on strategic management of intellectual property rights by 
identifying new determinates of patent nonuse through examining factors explaining unused 
strategic patents. The study provides new evidence in order to fill the gap in empirical analysis of 
unused play patents by employing an original set of data adding to the discussion on strategic 
patenting and patent non-use. 
There exists a growing concern among management scholars and policy makers regarding patent 
non-use. Our study along with other studies within the literature suggest that in designing 
policies to tackle this issue governments and policy makers should be aware of the differences 
between various types of unused patents and their  antecedences since the role of patents for 
companies is heterogeneous across the technological contexts. In other words the issue of nonuse 
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should not be tackled by employing a general policy design and should be targeted with respect 
to the industry and technology specifications differences.  
The negative social outcome of the strategic non use of patents could be tackled by employing 
proper policies. One suggested approach is compulsory licensing that imposes the holder of a 
strategic patent with high value to the society to provide licenses to others (Moser and Voena, 
2012; Yosick,  2001). However, since this approach is not favored in many countries the policy 
makers should take into account alternative approaches such as encouraging firms to contribute 
to patent aggregation mechanisms such as modern patent pools that are particularly designed to 
reduce strategic and anti-competitive behaviour and facilitate the technology commercialization 
(Lampe and Moser, 2014). 
As a matter of fact, IPR and competition policies can affect the contracting environment in the 
market for technology and therefore impact different strategic patenting intentions. However, 
overcoming the issue of nonuse and its negative social consequences would be a challenging task 
particularly with unused play patents. On the one hand, aggressive protection policies might be 
employed in markets with highly fragmented IPRs to avoid competitors using each other’s 
technology. On the other hand, this might grow the strategic and opportunistic behaviors of the 
companies that often take advantage of their patent right monopoly power and therefore increase 
the share of strategic patent which will be filed with pure strategic intentions. Nonetheless, the 
degree of the enforcement of IPR law might vary across countries and regions. Some regional 
policies might be more towards less aggressive enforcement of laws to decrease strategic 
motives among competitors in order to reduce the rate of strategic patenting. However, this may 
also negatively affect the protection of the inventions which are developed without any strategic 
intentions. This implies that even by taking in to account the context specificity considerations 
while designing and implementing policies, the importance of the differences across the role of 
patents for different firms should not be overlooked which is of course a challenging 
consideration to undertake.  
  
 
 
 
47 
 
References 
1. Allison, John R., Lemley Mark A. & Walker Joshua, Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? Evidence From the 
Most-Litigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2009). 
2. Arrow, Kenneth J. 1969. The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market 
versus Non-market Allocation. In The Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditure: The PPB System. 
Washington, DC: Joint Economic Committee, 91st Congress, 1st Session. 
3.  Bekkers, R., Iversen, E., Blind, K. ‘Patent pools and non-assertion agreements:  coordination mechanisms 
for multi-party IPR holders in standardization’, paper for  the EASST 2006 Conference, Lausanne, 
Switzerland, 23–26 August 2006 
4. Blind, K.; Edler, J.; Frietsch, R.; Schmoch, U. (2006): Motives to patent: empirical    evidence from 
Germany. In: Research Policy, 35, pp. 655-672. 
5. Cohen, W. M., Goto, A., Nagata, A., Nelson, R. R. and Walsh, J. P. 2002. R&D spillovers, patents and the 
incentives to innovate in Japan and the United States. Research Policy 31, 1349–67. 
6. Cohen, W.M., Nelson, R.R., Walsh, J.P., 2000. Protecting their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability 
Conditions and Why US Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not), NBER Working Paper no. 7552. 
7. Cohen, W.M., 2004. Patents and appropriation: Concerns and evidence. Journal of Technology Transfer, 
30, 57-71. 
8. Davis, Lee, 2008, "Licensing Strategies of the New "intellectual Property Vendors",California Management 
Review,5-32. 
9. Djokovic, D. and Souitaris, V. (2007)The effects of market and technological uncertainty on university 
spinout formation: A real option approach to technology commercialization. Paper presented in academy of 
management annual conference 2006. 
10. Dosi, Giovanni. 1982. Technological paradigms and technological trajectories. Research Policy 11:147-
162. 
11. Feldman, Robin Cooper Patent and Antitrust: Differing Shades of Meaning, 13 VA. J.L. & TECH. 5 
(2008). 
12. Galasso, Alberto and Mark Schankerman, “Patents and cumulative innovation: Causal evidence from the 
courts,” 2014. unpublished mimeo. 
13. Gallini, NT 1984 Deterrence by market sharing: A strategic incentive for licensing-The American 
Economic Review. 
14. Gallini, N. and Wright, B. (1990) Technology transfer under asymmetric information. RAND Journal of 
Economics, 21, 147–160. 
15. Gilbert R.J. and Newbery D.M. (1984), Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly: A Reply, in 
American Economic Review, 74 (1), pp. 251-253. 
16. Giuri, P. and Torrisi, S. 2010. "Cross-licensing, cumulative inventions and strategic patenting." in European 
Policy on Intellectual Property. Maastricht, Netherlands. 
48 
 
17. Giuri, P., and Torrisi, S. (2011), The Economic use of patents, Theme 1,Innovative S&T indicators 
combining patent data and surveys: empirical models and policy analysis INNOS&T (contract no 217299, 
EC, FP7-SSH07,). 
18. Giuri, P., Mariani, M., Brusoni, S., Crespi, G., Francoz, D., Gambardella, A., Garcia-Fontes, W., Geuna,A., 
Gonzales, R., Harhoff, D., Hoisl, K., Lebas, C., Luzzi, A., Magazzini, L., Nesta, L., Nomaler, 
O.,Palomeras, N., Patel, P., Romanelli, M., Verspagen, B., 2007. Inventors and Invention Processes in 
Europe. Results from the PatVal-EU survey. Research Policy 36, 1107-1127. 
19. Greene, W.H. 2000. Econometric Analysis (4th edn). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
20. Grindley, P. C., D. J. Teece. 1997. Managing intellectual capital: Licensing and cross-licensing in 
semiconductors and electronics.California Management Rev. 39(2) 1–34 
21. Hall, B.H., Ziedonis, R.H., 2001. The patent paradox revisited, an empirical study of patenting in the US 
semiconductor industry, 1979-1995. RAND Journal of Economics 32, 101-128. 
22. Harhoff,  et al., The Strategic Use of Patents and Its Implications for Enterprise and Competition Policies, 
Report  Commissioned by the European Commission (8 July 2007), pp. 91, 128-29, 136-141, available at:  
www.en.inno-tec.bwl.uni muenchen.de/research/proj/laufendeprojekte/patents/stratpat2007.pdf 
23. Heller, M. and R. Eisenberg (1998). “Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical 
Research,” Science, 280 May: 698-701. 
24. Henderson, Rebecca M., and Kim B. Clark. 1990. Architectural Innovation: The Reconfiguration of 
Existing Product Technologies and the Failure of Established Firms. Administrative Science Quarterly 35 
(1):9-30. 
25. Hounshell, D.A., Smith, J.K., 1988. Science and Corporate Strategy. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
26. Huchzermeier, A. & Loch, C. H. (2001). Project Management under Risk: Using the Real Option Approach 
to Evaluate Flexibility in R&D. Management Science, 47, 85-101. 
27. Jung, T., 2009. Uses and nonuses of patented inventions, Public Policy. Georgia Institute of Technology, 
Atlanta. 
28. Jung, T. and J. Walsh. (2010). “What Drives Strategic Patenting?: Evidence from the Georgia Tech 
Inventor Survey.” Mimeo. 
29. Klein, Benjamin, Robert G. Crawford, and Armen A. Alchian. 1978. Vertical Integration,Appropriable 
Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process. Journal of Law and Economics 21 (2):297-326. 
30. Lowe, R.A., (2003) “Entrepreneurship and information asymmetry: Theory and evidence from the 
University of California.” Working Paper: Carnegie Mellon University. 
31. Lemley, M. A., & Shapiro, C., 2005. Probabilistic Patents. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(2): 
75-98. 
32. Markman, G.D. M.I Espina & P.H. (2004) “Patents as surrogates for inimitable and nonsubstitutable 
resource.” Journal of Management, 30(4): 529-544. 
49 
 
33. Merges, Robert P. 1994. Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking 
Patents. Tennessee Law Review 62:75-106.  
34. Motohashi, K. (2008). Assessment of technological capability in science industry linkage in China by 
patent database. World Patent Information, 30(3), 225-232. 
35. Nelson, Richard R., and Sidney G. Winter. 1982. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
36. Oxley, Joanne E. 1997. Appropriability Hazards and Governance in Strategic Alliances: A Transaction 
Cost Approach. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 13(2):387-409. 
37. Rivette, K. G.;Kline, D. (2000), Discovering New Value in Intellectual Property. Harvard Business 
Review, No. 1, pp. 54-66. 
38. Saunders Kurt M., Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public Interest as a Deterrent to Technology Suppression, 
15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 389 (2002). 
39. Sampat, Bhaven and Heidi L. Williams, “How do Patents Affect Follow-on Innovation? Evidence from the 
Human Genome,” available athttp://economics.mit.edu/files/9778 (2014). 
40. Scotchmer, S., 1991. Standingon the shoulders of giants: cumulative research and the patent law. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 5, 29–41. 
41. Shapiro, C. 2001. Navigating the patent thickets: Cross-licenses, patent pools, and standard-setting. A. 
Jaffe, J. Lerner, S. Stern, eds. Innovation Policy and the Economy. NBER, Cambridge, MA. 
42.  Torrisi, S., Gambardella, A., Giuri, P.,Harhoff, D., Hoisl, K. and Mariani M.,2014, "Used, blocking and 
sleeping patents:Empirical evidence from a large-scale inventor survey”. Mimeo 
43. von Graevenitz, G., Wagner, S., Harhoff, D., 2011. How to measure patent thickets: a novel approach. 
Econ. Lett. 111 (1), 6–9. 
44. von Graevenitz, G., S. Wagner, and D. Harho 
, 2013, \Incidence and Growth of Patent Thickets - The Impact of Technological Opportunities and 
Complexity,"Journal of Industrial Economics , 61, 521-563. 
45. Walker, G. & Weber (1984) “A Transaction Cost Approach in Make-or-Buy Decisions.”Administrative 
Science Quarterly 29(4): 373-391. 
46. Weeds, H. (1999). Sleeping patents and compulsory licensing: an options analysis, Warwick Research 
Papers #577, Warwick University, Coventry. 
47. Williamson Oliver E., 1981. The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach. American 
Journal of Sociology 87 (3):548-577. 
48. Yosick, Joseph A. “Compulsory Patent Licensing for Efficient Use of Inventions,” 2001:5 University of 
Illinois Law Review 1275–1304, <http://www.usebrinks.com/publication.cfm?publication_ id=107>, at pp. 
1293–1294, 1297. 
49. Ziedonis, R.H., 2004. Don't Fence Me In: Fragmented Markets for Technology and the Patent Acquisition 
Strategies of Firms. Management Science 50, 804–820. 
50. Ziedonis, A. A. 2007. Real Options in Technology Licensing. Management Science, 53(10):1618-1633. 
50 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1- Share of unused strategic patents in our sample (N=8245) 
Variable Share in our sample % 
Unused patents 35.16 
Unused play patents 19.2 
Unused fence patents 10.90 
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Table 2- Variables used in this study  
Variable Description   Source  
Play(Unused) Dummy- dummy equal to 1 if the patent has not been 
used by any of the inventors and the important 
motivation (>3)  for patenting is reported not for 
prevention of imitation but for blocking patents and cross 
licensing or licensing. 
PatVal II 
Technological Uncertainty  Technological uncertainty is measured based on the 
average age of the patents cited (PCj) where j is the 
number of the cited patents :    
 
  ∑     
 (Djokovic 
and Souitaris, 2007; Lowe , 2003) 
 
UC Berkeley Fung 
database, EPO Patstat 
Technological Complexity  Dummy- dummy equal to 1 when the patent belongs to 
one of the following classes: Electrical devices, 
engineering, energy, Audio-visual technology, 
Telecommunications, Information technology, 
Semiconductors, Optics, Analysis, measurement, control 
technology, Medical technology, Machine tools, Engines, 
pumps, turbines, Transport, Nuclear engineering, Space 
technology weapons. (Giuri and Torrisi, 2010)  
 
WIPO, EPO Patstat 
Triples Average number of triples (cross X or Y references 
among three firms) calculated by von Graevenitz et al 
(2013) by 30 OST technology area 
von Graevenitz et al 
(2013)  
 
Priority year Dummy-The year in which the invention was filed to 
EPO 
EPO Patstat 
No. of Backward Citations 
 
Total number of backward citations the patent has 
received  
UC Berkeley Fung 
database, EPO Patstat 
Patent Scope (No. of 
claims) 
Number of claims included in the patent document UC Berkeley Fung 
database, EPO Patstat 
No. of inventors  Number of inventors for each patent EPO Patstat 
XY Patent Reference  Number of overlapping claims with earlier patents (X or 
Y references assigned by patent examiners) 
EPO Patstat 
Missing XY Reference Dummy- equal to 1 if XY Reference is missing EPO Patstat 
Firm size Dummy-7 dummy variables to distinguish the size by number 
of employees from very small firms (1-49 employees) to very 
large organizations (more than 5000 employees).   
PatVal II , Amadeus, Lexis 
Nexis, Osiris 
Firm age Dummy—4 dummies distinguishing the age of the licensor 
from  young to more mature 
PatVal II , Amadeus, Lexis 
Nexis, Osiris 
Missing firm age Dummy- equal to 1 if firm age is missing PatVal II 
Region  Dummy—5 dummies indicating the region of the inventor of 
the patent including Europe, US, JP, Israeli and the rest of the 
world. 
EPO Patstat 
Technological class   Technological classes based on EPO classification  EPO Patstat 
Industry 3 digit SIC codes  PatVal II 
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 Table 3- Descriptive statistics (N=8245) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable                 
Mean 
                S.D.                
Min 
          
Max 
Play (Unused)   0.198 0.4 0 1 
Technological Uncertainty 0.107 0.059 0.028 1 
Technological Complexity  
Triples 
0.613 
26.96 
0.487 
33.55 
0 
0 
1 
117.70 
Propriety year- 2003   0.374 0.484 0 1 
Propriety year- 2004 0.38 0.486 0 1 
Propriety year- 2005 0.245 0.43 0 1 
No. of inventors   2.676 1.833 1 19 
No. of claims 17.152 13.01 1 228 
No. of backward citations 14.517 32.775 1 830 
XY References 4.431 2.892 0 43 
D-Miss-XY Refs  0.069 0.253 0 1 
Firm age < 2 Yrs 0.033 0.178 0 1 
Firm age  2-4 Yrs 0.065 0.246 0 1 
Firm age  5-10 Yrs 0.081 0.272 0 1 
Firm age  11- 20 Yrs 0.103 0.304 0 1 
Firm age > 20 Yrs 0.719 0.45 0 1 
D-Miss- Firm age 0.045 0.207 0 1 
Firm size  1-49 epml 0.1 0.3 0 1 
Firm size  50-99 empl 0.029 0.169 0 1 
Firm size  100-249 empl 0.051 0.22 0 1 
Firm size  250-499 empl 0.052 0.221 0 1 
Firm size  500-999 empl 0.051 0.219 0 1 
Firm size  1000-4999 empl 0.15 0.357 0 1 
Firm size  5000-9999 empl 0.567 0.495 0 1 
JP 0.007 0.086 0 1 
IL 0.277 0.447 0 1 
US 0.006 0.079 0 1 
EP 0.306 0.461 0 1 
Rest of the world 0.403 0.491 0 1 
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Table 4 Correlation Matrix (N=8245) 
*** p < 0.001, p** < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0. 1  
 
 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 12 13 14 
1. Play (Unused) 1             
2. Technological Uncertainty 0.05*** 1            
3. Technological Complexity  0.04*** 0.14*** 1           
4. Propriety year- 2003   -0.01 -0.03* 0.03* 1          
5. Propriety year- 2004 0 0 -0.02† -.61*** 1         
6. Propriety year- 2005 0.01 0.03* -0.01 -.44*** -.45*** 1        
7. No. of inventors 0 -.09*** -0.01 0 0.01 -0.01 1       
8. No. of claims -0.02 0.05*** -0.01 0.02† 0.02 -0.04*** 0.08*** 1      
9. No. of backward citations -.04*** -.04*** -.1*** -0.01 0.01 0 0.07*** 0.18*** 1     
10. XY References -0.02 -.06*** -.09*** .07*** 0.01 -0.09*** 0.03*** 0.02 0.06*** 1    
11. Firm age < 2 Yrs -0.01 0.02† 0 -.02† 0 .02† -.01 0.03*** 0.03*** -.01 1   
12. Firm age  2-4 Yrs -0.01 0.03* 0.01 0.02 0 -0.01 0.01 0.05*** 0.06*** -.01 -.05*** 1  
13. Firm age  5-10 Yrs -0.02 0.01 0 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0 0.04*** 0.02 0 -.05*** -.08*** 1 
14. Firm age  11- 20 Yrs -0.01 0.03*** 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -.02 0.05*** 0.01 0 -.06*** -.09*** -.1*** 
15. Firm age > 20 Yrs 0.06*** -.05*** -0.01 0.02 0 -0.02 0.01 -0.1*** -.06*** 0.01 -.29*** -.42*** -.47*** 
16. Firm size  1-49 epml -.05*** -0.01 -0.02† 0.01 0 0 -.09*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.01 0.31*** 0.29*** .16*** 
17. Firm size  50-99 empl -0.03** -0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0 -.01 .03* .02* .02* 0.01 0.05*** .11*** 
18. Firm size  100-249 empl -.04*** -.06*** -0.03* 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0 0.03*** .02* 0 -.02* 0.04*** .04*** 
19. Firm size  250-499 empl -.06*** -0.01 -0.03* 0 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -.02 0 
20. Firm size  500-999 empl -0.02** -0.03* -0.02† 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -.02† 0 0 -0.01 -.03*** -.03* -.01 
21. Firm size  1000-4999 empl -0.02† -0.03* -0.02* 0 0 0 -0.02 -.05*** -.03* 0.01 -.05*** -.06*** -.06*** 
22. Firm size  5000-9999 empl 0.11*** 0.07*** .06*** -0.01 0 0.01 0.08*** -.03*** -.04*** -.03*** -.12*** -.15*** -.1*** 
23. JP 0 0.03* 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0 -.01 0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0 0.04 
24. IL 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.09*** 0 0 0 0.06*** -.24*** -.14*** 0.05*** -.06*** -.08*** -.09*** 
25. US -0.01 0.02 0.01 0 0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.03* 0 -0.01 0.03* .08*** 0.02 
26. EP -.04*** 0 0 -0.01 0.01 0 0.04*** 0.28*** 0.24*** -0.02 0.07*** .06*** 0.05*** 
27. The rest of the world  0 -.05*** -.08*** 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -.09*** -.05*** -.1*** -0.03* -0.02 0.01 0.02 
28. Triples (mean) 0.07*** 0.19*** 0.5*** -0.01 0.01 0.01 -.05*** 0.09*** -.07*** -.08*** 0.03*** 0.01 0.01 
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Table 4 Correlation Matrix (continued)  
 
     *** p < 0.001, p** < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0. 1  
Variable 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 
15. Firm age  11- 20 Yrs -0.01 
              
16. Firm age > 20 Yrs .06*** 
1              
17. Firm size  1-49 epml 
-.05*** 
0 1             
18. Firm size  50-99 empl 
-0.03** 
-.41*** -.05*** 1            
19. Firm size  100-249 empl 
-.04*** 
-.12*** 0 -.06*** 1           
20. Firm size  250-499 empl -.06*** -.07*** -.01 -.08*** -.04*** 1          
21. Firm size  500-999 empl 
-0.02** 
-.02 .13*** -.08*** -.04*** -.05*** 1         
22. Firm size  1000-4999 empl -0.02† 
.01 .06*** -.08*** -.04*** -.05*** -.05*** 1        
23. Firm size  5000-9999 empl .11*** .1*** 0 -.14*** -.07*** -.1*** -.1*** -.1*** 1       
24. JP 0 
-.03* .02 0 0.03* 0 .01 -.01 -.01 1      
25. IL 
.04*** 
.18*** .04*** -.16*** -.07*** -.08*** -0.01 -.02† .14*** -.05*** 1     
26. US 
-0.01 
-.08*** 0 .07*** .06*** .03* 0 0 .01 -.01 -.05*** 1    
27. EP 
-.04*** 
-.12*** -.01 .11*** .04*** .05*** -.01 -.01 -.08*** -.06*** -.41*** -.5*** 1   
28. The rest of the world 
0 
-.03* -.03* .03*** 0.01 .02* .02 .03*** -.05*** -.07*** -.51*** -.7*** -.55*** 1  
29. Triples (mean) .07*** -.07*** -.04*** -.02** -.07*** -.03*** -.03*** -.03*** .12*** .01 .06*** .02 .02† -.08*** 1 
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Table 5- Probit estimation of unused play patents - Average marginal effects 
Variables 1 
 
2 
 
3 4 5 
Triples (mean)     0.001*** 
     (0.000) 
Technological Uncertainty 0.347***  0.225*** 0.206*** 0.253*** 
 (0.091)  (0.066) (0.066) (0.096) 
Technological Complexity  0.052***   0.020**  
 (0.013)   (0.010)  
Propriety year- 2004  0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Propriety year- 2005  0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
No. of inventors  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
No. of claims  0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. of backward citations  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
XY References  -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Firm age  2-4 Yrs  0.011 0.010 0.010 0.014 
  (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) 
Firm age  5-10 Yrs  -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 -0.004 
  (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Firm age  11- 20 Yrs  -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.002 
  (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) 
Firm age > 20 Yrs  -0.008 -0.007 -0.005 0.002 
  (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
D-Miss- Firm age  -0.154*** -0.153*** -0.153*** -0.151*** 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) 
Firm size  50-99 empl  0.007 0.006 0.007 0.006 
  (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Firm size  100-249 empl  0.004 0.004 0.006 0.005 
  (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Firm size  250-499 empl  -0.025 -0.026 -0.026 -0.028 
  (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Firm size  500-999 empl  0.036 0.036 0.036 0.033 
  (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Firm size  1000-4999 empl  0.050** 0.050** 0.049** 0.045** 
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Firm size  5000-9999 empl  0.103*** 0.102*** 0.100*** 0.094*** 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
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Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses, adjusted for clusters by firms’ identifier.  
All models include dummies for missing values for firm age and missing values for XY References. 
Regressions also included additional control variables for technological classes and industry 
classifications *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JP  -0.007 -0.008 -0.006 -0.009 
  (0.062) (0.061) (0.062) (0.058) 
IL  -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0.011 
  (0.081) (0.080) (0.081) (0.077) 
US  -0.040 -0.040 -0.037 -0.039 
  (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.055) 
EP  -0.022 -0.020 -0.016 -0.016 
  (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.057) 
Observations  8245 8245 8245 8245 8245 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0032 0.0253 0.0265 0.0270 0.0291 
Prob > chi2 P <0.001 P <0.001 P <0.001 P <0.001 P <0.001 
Log liklihood -4098.58 -4008.0186 -4003.08 -4000.70 -3992.0873 
Wald chi -square 27.66 168.71 181.38 183.56 197.32 
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Abstract 
Studies have depicted that the rate of unused patents comprises a high portion of patents in North America (35% 
Non-use on average), Europe (37% Non-use on average) and Japan (64% Non-use on average). The importance of 
the issue of nonuse is also highlighted within the literature on strategic patenting, IPR policy and innovation 
economics and in this regards, the literature has paid particular attention to blocking patents. Moreover, the current 
literature has emphasized on the role of patent pools in dealing with potential issues such as excessive transaction 
cost caused by patent thickets and blocking patents (overlapping IPRs) that might hamper the use of patents in the 
market for technology. Accordingly, patent pools may favor the use of the pooled patents through decreasing 
licensing transaction cost and providing equal and non-discriminatory access of all the members and potential 
licensees to the pool’s technology.  Hence, companies willing to license their patents through patent pools might 
consider taking advantage of faster, easier, broader and less costly access to the pool licensees. Nevertheless, in this 
study we argue that the willingness to use patents through pool participation by a pool member is not limited to the 
use of those patents that it includes in the patent pool. Becoming a member of a patent pool may also favor the use 
of blocking and non-blocking patents held by a pool member outside the pool (non-pooled patents) by providing the 
opportunity to use the patent internally or externally in collaboration with other members. Using the data from a 
large scale survey on European inventors of 22,533 EPO patents resident in Europe, USA, Japan and Israel (PatVal 
II) as primary data and a considerably large database of patent pools in telecommunication and consumer electronics 
industries as secondary data, in this study we show that pool members participating more intensively in patent pools 
are more likely to be willing to use their non-pooled patents through pool participation. Furthermore, we show that 
pool licensors are more likely to be willing to use their non-pooled patents by participating in patent pools with 
higher level of technological complementarity to their own technology. This study contributes to the current 
discussion on social, economic and technological benefits of patent pools. The results of this study have practical 
implications for strategic decision-making and for policy makers dealing with the issue of patent nonuse, 
overlapping IPRs and cumulative innovations. 
 
Keywords: Patent nonuse, Patent pools, technology commercilization  
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1. Introduction  
During the last decade the issue of patent nonuse has got attention by economics and 
management scholars. This is firstly due to the fact that although patents are considered as firm’s 
valuable assets, a high share of patents is left unused within the companies’ patent portfolios. 
Studies have depicted that the rate of unused patents comprises a high portion of patents in North 
America (35% Non-use on average)
3
, Europe (37% Non-use on average)
4
 and Japan (64% Non-
use on average)
5
. Moreover, even early records have also shown a high rate of unused patents 
particularly in North America. An Economic Review of the Patent System 12 (Study No. 15 of 
the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Committee, 1958) 
reports an estimation of between 80 to 90% of all patents which are neither used nor licensed out. 
According to Chesbrough (2006), in the past the rate of patent commercialization has been 
determined for multinational companies such as Procter & Gamble about 10% and Dow 
Chemical about 19%. A report by The Economic Council of Canada (1971) also shows that out 
of the total number of patented inventions granted in Canada in the period of three years of the 
survey, only 15% have been used in Canada and 48 % are used outside this country. A study by 
Palomeres(2003) also provide evidence that more than half of the IP  portfolios of companies 
such as IBM, Siemens and Philips are left unused. In general, it is reported that non-use of 
patents consisting of internal non-use as well as not licensing out or not selling comprises a share 
of higher than 35% of companies’ patent portfolios (BTG, 1998, Giuri et al., 2007).  
There are also theoretical arguments within strategic management, IPR policy and innovation 
economics literature which highlight the importance of studying this issue. First of all, since 
patents are basically used as means of protecting inventions, they have the potential to create 
monopoly power for their owner (Feldman,2008) and therefore if patents are not used they 
support the monopoly without providing any social and economic benefits since the innovations 
based on those patents are not eventually exploited. Accordingly, for a better and more efficient 
                                                          
3
  Nagaoka, S., and J. P. Walsh. 2009. Commercialization and other uses of patents in Japan and the US: Major 
findings from the RIETI-Georgia Tech inventor survey. RIETI Discussion Paper, Tokyo, Japan. Research Inst. of 
Economy, Trade and Industry. 
 
4  Giuri et al., 2007. Inventors and Invention Processes in Europe. Results from the PatVal-EU survey. Research 
Policy 36, 1107-1127. 
 
5
   Japanese Patent Office (JPO) (2004), “Survey Results on Intellectual Property: Related Activities”, Power Point 
Presentation, JPO, Tokio. 
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exploitation of resources and also from a policy perspective, studying the issue of patent nonuse 
is of high importance. In fact a share of patents are not used since they have no value (Rivette 
and Kline 2000), however, the importance of the issue of nonuse arises when the unused patent 
encompass value. A share of patents is not used because they have been filed for purely strategic 
purposes. This includes protecting firm’s core technology when the firm tries to file patents in 
order to create a protecting boundary around its core business (Cohen, Nelson and Walsh, 2000), 
obtaining freedom to operate (Grindley and Teece, 1997;Hall and Ziedonis 2001; Ziedonis 
2004;Blind, Edler,Frietcsh, and Schmoch 2006), signaling company’s strength for potential 
infringement law suits particularly for larger companies that have patents very close to those of 
small companies and just patent to signal their power and not to use it in a product, to obtain 
negotiation power in cross licensing agreements (Cohen et al, 2000;Cohen et al 2002) and not 
necessarily these patents will be finally a part of cross-licensing agreements and therefore will be 
left used. A patent also might not be used due to its owner’s strategic purposes such as 
preventing the negative market effect of own innovation on existing products or preventing 
rivals’ entry into the market (Gilbert and Newbery,1984).These will create unused patents which 
might be of high value. In fact, development of innovation can be negatively affected by the 
existence of strategic use of patents as subsequent inventions can be limited by fundamental ones 
which restricts the pace and even direction of the innovation (Cohen, 2004). According to 
Scotchmer(1991), in cumulative technologies where inventions are built upon each other, the 
incentive of second round innovators which are building their innovation on the basis of the first 
round inventions will be affected by the risk of probable patent infringements lawsuits. A patent 
which is not used in order to prevent entry of competitors into the market obliges the new 
entrants to pay extra costs of inventing around such patent, pay royalties to the patent owner, or 
accept probably strict ex-post fines (Harhoff,  et al., 2007).  Patent races, are also the 
consequence of strategic importance of using patents in which marginal innovation is the basic 
motivation for patenting. Diffusion of the technology will be also hindered by the existence of 
unused patents.  
Unused patents are broadly defined as those patents which are neither used internally for 
commercial or industrial purposes nor used externally through licensing out or selling to third 
parties (Palomeras, 2003). Therefore, if a patent is not used in an internal commercialization 
process or externally through licensing (cross-licensing), sale or spin-off it can be considered as 
an unused patent (Giuri and Torrisi, 2011, Torrisi et al., 2014). The literature has distinguished 
between the two types of unused patents namely, sleeping and strategic (mainly blocking) 
patents. There are several strategic motives behind developing an invention discussed by the 
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literature, nevertheles not necessarily all of them will result in unused strategic patents. 
Furthermore, these motivations vary across different technological fields and as a result may 
generate different shares of unused patents across different industries.     
Besides studying patent nonuse the literature has also proposed some solutions in order to tackle 
the social and economic issues caused by them and in this regard the most attention has been 
paid to issues caused by blocking patents. In fact, the current literature has emphasized on the 
role of patent pools in dealing with potential issues such as excessive transaction cost caused by 
patent thickets and blocking patents and overlapping IPRs (e.g. Carlson, 1999; Shapiro, 2001) 
that might hamper the use of patents. Patent pools are defined as “[…] an agreement between 
two or more patent owners to license one or more of their patents to one another or third 
parties”(USPTO, 2000).  
The convergence between strategic patenting literature and patent pool studies identifying the 
benefits related to patent pools however, does not exceed some theoretical papers concerning the 
role of patent pools in decreasing the transaction cost associated to licensing of blocking patents 
(Carlson, 1999; Shapiro, 2001 ; Merges, 1999), providing equal access of all the pool members 
to these patents (Sung and Pelto, 1998) and very few empirical studies concerning  the role of 
pools in decreasing the rate of strategic patenting in the market for technology (Lampe and 
Moser, 2014). There exists particularly a lack of empirical analysis on the relationship between 
pool participation and facilitation of patent use perceived by companies. We cover this gap, 
extending the theory on the patent commercialization benefits associated to pool participation 
perceived by firms involved in the market for technological standards to the commercialization 
of the patents held by a pool member out of the patent pool.    
In fact, patent pools have emerged as policy tools facilitating technology commercialization and 
alleviating patent litigations among rivals holding overlapping IPRs. Accordingly, patent pools 
may favor the use of the pooled patents through decreasing licensing transaction cost and 
providing equal and non-discriminatory access of all the members and potential licensees to the 
pool’s technology.  This might be seen by companies involved in technology markets with 
excessive transaction cost and high IPR fragmentations as an opportunity to exploit their patents 
through participating in patent pools. As a matter of fact, companies willing to license their 
patents through patent pools are taking advantage of faster, easier, broader and less costly access 
to the pool licensees (technology implementers). Nevertheless, in this study we argue that the 
willingness to use patents by a pool member involved in high fragmented IP markets is not 
limited to the use of those patents that it includes in the patent pool which will be automatically 
62 
 
 
licensed out after inclusion.  Becoming a member of a patent pool may also favor the use of 
blocking and non-blocking patents held by a pool member outside the pool (non-pooled patents) 
by providing the opportunity to use the patent internally or externally in collaboration with other 
members. Such an effect can be the result of mechanisms provided by the patent pool including  
greater access to the pool’s complementary technology for members, formal collaboration inside 
the pool and informal collaboration outside it, changes in members strategies as a result of pool 
membership, enhanced information sharing and increased technological spillover , partnership 
opportunities and greater access to other parties’ complementary assets and broader and less 
costly access and connections to the technology implementers (licensees). Considering such 
potential mechanisms favoring the use of non-pooled patents held by a pool member, in this 
study we empirically examine if participation intensity in patent pools by pool members explains 
their willingness to use their non-pooled patents. Furthermore, we investigate which 
characteristics of the patent pools are associated to the willingness to use non-pooled patents 
through pool participation. 
To test our hypotheses we use the data from PatVal II Survey on European inventors of 22,533 
EPO patents resident in Europe, USA, Japan and Israel with propriety dates between 2003 and 
2005 conducted within the 7FP InnoS&T project between 2009 and 2011 as primary source of 
data and our database of 24 patent pools in telecommunication and consumer electronics 
industries including 21476 cross-country patents from 96 patent offices around the world as our 
secondary source of data. We focused our analysis on pool members that joined the patent pools 
between 2003 and 2011.  The PatVal II Survey, asks among other things if a patent is used and if 
not used yet, is its owner willing to use it.  
We show that pool members participating more intensively in patent pools are more likely to be 
willing to use their non-pooled patents through pool participation. Furthermore, we show that 
pool licensors are more likely to be willing to use their non-pooled patents by participating in 
patent pools with higher level of technological complementarity to their own technology. In 
particular, this study contributes to the current discussion on social, economic and technological 
benefits of patent pools. We show that companies involved in highly fragmented IP markets, do 
not only see participation in patent pools to get the opportunity to facilitate their patent 
(technology) commercialization process by introducing their patents to the pool, as in the 
absence of a pool they can’t use their technology without infringing on their competitors’ 
patents. They also see pool participations as a way to facilitate the use of their unused (non-
pooled) patents which have not been included in the pool. Moreover, in order to contribute to the 
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better understanding of how pool participation explains the willingness to use non-pooled patents 
we investigated those characteristics of the patent pools which are associated to the willingness 
to use these patents through participating in patent pools. The results of this study have practical 
implications for strategic decision-making and for policy makers dealing with the issue of patent 
nonuse, overlapping IPRs and cumulative innovations.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the literature review on 
patent nonuse and patent pools, discuss the theoretical background in more details and develop 
our hypotheses. In the third section the data collection and the descriptive statistics will be 
presented. In section 4 the empirical methodology of the study along with our results will be 
discussed. In section 5 we review the main findings and discuss the study’s implications for the 
managers, policy makers and researchers. 
2. Literature review 
 
2.1 Unused patents  
Patents can be either used internally in a new products or process or externally through licensing 
(or cross-licensing), sale, spin offs or joint ventures. The market for technology is the place in 
which companies can make revenues from patented inventions through licensing royalties or by 
patent sales. Nevertheless, the external use of patents through sale or licensing out is becoming 
more common in time since first, contractual uncertainty in the market for technology is 
decreasing as a result of the continues enhancements of patent rights enforcement and second, 
the emergence and growth of online markets for patents has generated new channels for patent 
trade (Palomeras, 2003; Dushnistsky and Klueter, 2011). Moreover, use of patents in cross-
licensing agreements as another form of external use of patents is particularly common in 
cumulative industries wherein the likelihood of holding all patents required for a product by a 
single firm is very low. Another form of external use is Spin off. Spin offs which can be either 
voluntary or involuntary (Buenstorf, 2007;Klepper, 2009), are normally external utilization of 
patented innovation by universities and other research institutions which usually lack 
complementary assets in order to reach to the market. Joint venture by the use of patented 
inventions is also another form of external use of patents. If a patent is not utilized in at least one 
of the aforementioned ways it is considered as an unused patent(Giuri and Torrisi, 2011, Torrisi 
et al., 2014). 
In an attempt to provide a more precise definition for unused patents the literature has 
distinguished between sleeping and strategic patents as the two types of unused patents. Sleeping 
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patents are defined as those patents which are left completely unused and unexploited for reasons 
other than strategic purposes, while strategic patents are those which are deemed to be used 
strategically by the patent owner (Palomeras, 2003). In fact, sleeping patents are a result of the 
patent owner’s failure in commercializing his patent when there is no enough present 
commercial value for the patent or when the patentee’s attempt in order to license the patent fails 
(Turner, 1998). Sleeping patents are those which are left completely unused for reasons other 
than strategic purposes. Sleeping patents have the potential to be utilized at some point in time 
by the patent holder or other parties provided that the cost of exploiting the sleeping patents is 
rational or it is not complicated to utilize them. Strategic patents are deemed to be used 
strategically by the patent owner and therefore generate strategic rents for their owners through 
blocking rivals or protecting the company’s existing assets. According to Harhoff, et al., (2007) 
“Strategic use of the patent system arises whenever firms leverage complementarities between 
patents to attain a strategic advantage over technological rivals. This is anticompetitive if the 
main aim and effect of strategic use of the patent system is to decrease the efficiency of rival 
firms’ production.” Different studies have shown that the strategic use of patents is one of the 
most important reasons behind forming large patent portfolios by companies in a number of 
industries (Cohen, Nelson and Walsh, 2000; Hall & Ziedonis, 2001; Bessen & Hunt, 2004).   
Blocking is one possible strategic use of patents by which the owner of an IPR intends to impede 
rivals from using their invention. According to the literature, strategic use of patents might be 
intended to fence with the aim of prevention of imitation by competitors (Cohen et al, 2000), 
particularly by firms encompassing huge patent portfolios which are more willing to exclude 
their competitors by making a protecting boundary around their core technologies by patenting 
several substitute inventions (Cohen et al, 2002;Davis, 2008; Jung, 2009). Fence patent are in 
general very unlikly to be used by their owner(Cohen et al., 2000). Strategic use of patents might 
also be intended to  play  that is generally aimed for creating a credible insurance against 
probable infringement lawsuits threatening the company’s inventions, and achieving negotiation 
power in cross-licensing agreements (Cohen et al, 2000;Cohen et al 2002). Play patents might be 
used in a cross-licensing (or licensing) deal or even commercialized, however if they are filed to 
block competitors or are held in order to tackle possible future litigations are very unlikely to be 
used in an internal commercialization process or externally. Moreover, those play patents filed to 
be employed as bargaining chips might be left unused due to the barraging failure between the 
parties. 
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2.2 Patent pools 
 
The term “patent pool” is defined in the literature by some studies. USPTO (2000), defines 
patent pools as “[…] an agreement between two or more patent owners to license one or more of 
their patents to one another or third parties”. Merges (1999), defines a patent pool as: “A patent 
pool is an arrangement among multiple patent holders to aggregate their patents. A typical pool 
makes all pooled patents available to each member of the pool. Pools also usually offer standard 
licensing terms to licensees who are not members of the pool. In addition, the typical patent pool 
allocates a portion of the licensing fees to each member according to a pre-set formula or 
procedure.” Kelin (1997) also defines patent pool as “…the aggregation of  intellectual property 
rights which are the subject of cross licensing, whether  they are transferred directly by patentee 
to licensee or through some medium,  such as a joint venture, set up specifically to administer the 
patent pool” 
In general, patent pools require essential patents to be implemented into the practice of a 
technological standard. Shapiro (2001), defines an essential patent as a patent which is claimed 
as an invention which must be utilized in accordance with a technological standard. He argues 
that blocking patents are particularly common in the context of standard settings implying that 
once a standard is chosen any patent which is necessary in complying with that standard 
becomes truly essential.  Even though, patent pools necessitate inclusion of essential patents, in 
reality not all the patents included in the pools are essential to the pool’s technology. Indeed, 
companies with more bargaining power within the pool might also include non-essential or even 
substitute patens in the pool.  Patents pools composed of mostly complementary essential patents 
can decrease the issues caused by blocking patents (Carlson, 1999) or stacking licenses (Heller 
and Eisenberg, 1998). Staking licenses is an issue that a licensee may face in order to develop a 
product which requires licenses from all the licensors that hold the patents necessary to develop 
that product. In fact, this causes a combined royalty payment issue which may make the product 
unprofitable and therefore the licensee fails to take it in to the market.  
 Patent thickets are broadly defined as "a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights 
that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology” 
(Shapiro, 2001) which cause overlapping and blocking rights. There are different features of 
patent thickets discussed in the literature such as cumulativeness of innovation, defined as the 
degree to which the innovations in an industrial sector are linked with or build on each other and 
concentration of patent ownership (Noel and Schankerman 2006, Cockburn and MacGarvie 
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2011).Patent holders who possess overlapping or blocking patents and are not able to develop the 
underlying technology unless being involved in infringing each other’s patents try to establish 
formal or informal organizations with the aim of administering a patent pool or alternatively they 
may collaborate with one another in a cross-licensing agreement. Indeed, patent pools as 
cooperative mechanisms can help firms involved in the pool agreement to concentrate on their 
core competencies, since they can use other parties’ technologies in order to develop their 
innovation and as a result from the social and economic point of view the innovation process will 
reach a higher speed of development (Shapiro,2001).The role of patent pools as a solution to 
these issues was initially proposed by Merges (1999), Shapiro (2001), and the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office by Clark, Piccolo, Stanton, and Tyson (2001), where for-profit companies 
share patent rights with each other and third parties, given that the relationship between patents 
involved in the patent pool is complementary. From this point of view patent pools are addressed 
as economically significant institutions. In fact, patents with complementary relationship are 
those which have more value if they are collected jointly in a single patent portfolio. Indeed, the 
necessity of patent pools for firms involved in industries with higher level of technological 
complexity is more comparing to industries with discrete underlying technologies since first, 
patent pools facilitate the access to complementary patents which are necessary for firms in order 
to develop their products and second, as the fragmentation of intellectual property rights and 
technological interdependencies is higher in these industries, the influence of patent pools in 
decreasing the transaction cost in the market for technology for these industries seems to be 
higher. For example, according to Merges (1996) in United States radio, aircraft, and automobile 
are examples of complex technologies which are developed based on patent pools.  
It is worth mentioning that albeit patent-pooling agreements have potential to generate positive 
impact on firms’ innovative activities and produce significant efficiencies when the patents 
relationship is complementary and freedom-to-operate is achieved by the parties, they can also 
create negative influences on firms’ innovative activities and competition when the patents 
relationship is substitutive which results in blocking activities by the firms involved in patent 
pools by limiting the access of potential rivals and new entrants to the pool’s technology and the 
market. Therefore, patent owners involved in a pool may also demonstrate anti-competitive 
behaviors such as restricting competition among the licensors that take part in the pool, using the 
patent pool as a price-fixing mechanism, forcing the licensees to pay for patents that they usually 
would not have chosen, restricting non-participating patent holders which own patents that are 
substitutes to the patents included in the pool, restricting competition in downstream products  
which contain the pooled patents or in other markets that are somehow linked to those, restricting 
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the accessibility of patents that are technically or economically necessary for those other 
standards; and  eliminating  incentives for subsequent innovations (Bekkers, Iversen, and Blind, 
2006). In fact, along with the pro-competitive effect of patent pools, their anti-competitive 
influences are also addressed by some studies in the literature. For example, Shapiro (2001) 
argues that the impact of patent pools on welfare will be positive when patents have a 
complementary relationship and will be negative when patents have a substitutive relationship. 
Considering both pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects of patent pools some models are 
presented within the literature mostly addressing the social welfare issues. For instance, through 
a model presented by Lerner and Tirole (2003) necessary and sufficient condition for a patent 
pool is provided in order to increase welfare. This model is extended in a number of directions in 
an attempt to provide an analysis of different patent pool related issues consisting of the external 
test evaluation which prevents substitute patents to be included in a patent pool, the inducement 
of the firms involved in a pool to do inventions around each other patents and the underlying 
principle meant for the provision of future-related patents’ automatic transfer to the pool. 
Nevertheless, the full range of relationships among patents including perfectly substitutable and 
perfectly complementary patents are encompassed in a model presented by Choi(2010) which is 
developed on the basis of the Lerner and Tirole (2003) framework. He argues that the 
relationship between the pool’s patents influences the public policy scope. Hence, patent pools 
are pro-competitive when the relationship is rather complementary for patents, implying the 
perfect alignment of private and public incentives to form the pool, while pools consisting of 
patents with substitutive relationship are inclined to be anti-competitive, implying a discrepancy 
among the social and public policies in forming the pool. 
2.3 Hypotheses development 
 
The benefits associated to patent pools are not limited to reducing the issues caused by blocking 
patents (Carlson, 1999), stacking licenses (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998) or patent thickets 
(Shapiro, 2001). There are other benefits related to patent pools, which can further address the 
issue of blocking patents. In a number of industries, there exist too much IPR fragmentation and 
technological interdependencies in which several patent owners are controlling the patent rights 
needed for commercializing a product. This raises the transaction costs for negotiating more 
licenses and brings about increased cumulated royalties. Nevertheless, although this may 
increase the costs to bring products to the market, the trade of intellectual property rights is of 
high importance to the industries which provide complex products and as a result finding some 
solutions for this issue is of great importance from economic and social point of view. Indeed, 
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another advantage associated to patent pools discussed in the literature is reducing licensing 
transaction costs (Merges,1999;Clark, Piccolo, Stanton, and Tyson, 2001). This is due to the fact 
that first patent pool agreements decrease the litigation and disputes among patent owners to a 
high extent which can considerably reduce the cost, time and uncertainty about intellectual 
property rights associated to patent litigations. These seem to be more crucial to firms with 
relatively small size as they are basically not able to afford the cost of patent litigation. Second, 
patent pools provide the opportunity for licensors involved in a pool covering a core technology 
to license all the necessary patents through one agreement without needing to do one by one 
licensing (Clark, Piccolo, Stanton, and Tyson, 2001), that apart from the cost, time and resources 
required can also create the risk of hold ups by other patentees in licensing patents. As a matter 
of fact, a patent pool enables interested parties to bring together all the essential tools for 
practicing a certain technology in one place, e.g, "one- stop shopping," rather than acquiring 
licenses from each patent holder separately6. Therefore, patent pools can decrease the transaction 
cost in the market for technology by creating a single access point which leads to lower 
searching cost, lower uncertainty, increased transparency and accelerated access (Bekkers, 
Iversen, and Blind, 2006).  Lowering the licensing transaction cost will intensify the rate of use 
of the blocking patents which are included in the patent pool. 
The equal access of all the pool members to the patent pool’s technology can be considered as 
another advantage of patent pools which can increase the patents commercial potential (Sung and 
Pelto, 1998). Patent pools can also warrant equal access of their members to all potential 
licensees (Bekkers, Iversen, and Blind, 2006). Therefore by providing pool members’ equal 
access to each other’s patents as well as to potential licensees, patent pools eliminate 
discriminatory accessibility of patents and make them available to use for all their members. This 
can help to intensify the rate of use of blocking patents included in the pool as a result of more 
accessibility of the patents.  
Information sharing is another benefit associated to patent pools (Merges, 1999; Clark et al, 
2000). According to Clark et al, (2000), patent pools provide their members with 
“institutionalized exchange of technical information” which is not covered by patents. As a result 
of collaborating and communication with each other in the technological area covered by the 
patent pool, pool members will get access to technical information related to the patented 
technology. Furthermore, the information about non-patented inventions will be also transferred 
                                                          
6
 US Patent and Trademark Office, "USPTO issues white paper on patent pooling", Jan. 19, 2001. 
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among the patent pool members (Merges,1999). These will provide the licensors and the 
licensees with information sharing mechanism advantage that in turn decreases the probability of 
working on overlapping inventions which are a source of blocking patents. Therefore, patent 
pools can lower the rate of blocking patents in the market for technology either by intensifying 
the rate of use of blocking patents which are included in the patent pool by decreasing the 
transaction cost and providing equal and non-discriminatory access of all the members and 
potential licensees to the pool’s technology or by preventing strategic behaviors by the pool 
members and decreasing the probability of working on overlapping inventions. From a firm’s 
perspective, however lower transaction cost and equal and non-discriminatory access to other 
members technology and the licensees can be seen as important benefits that could facilitate its 
technology commercialization process which affects the firm’s willingness to exploit its patents 
through pool participation particularly if it is facing any difficulties in commercializing its 
technology.  However, the benefits provided by patent pools and therefore the effect of patent 
pools on the rate of use of patents may not be limited to the blocking patents which are included 
in the patent pool. Patent pools may also affect the rate of use of blocking and non-blocking 
patents, which are not included in the pool and are owned by patent pool members within the 
same or different technological classes from those of patent pools (non-pooled patents).  
The number of non-pooled patents in those ICT-based technologies where the formal ICT 
standardization process is an ex-post process developed by standard setting organizations is 
considerable. This is due to the fact that in developing such formal standards the companies have 
been involved in costly R&D rivalries prior to the standard selection process, developing 
competitive technologies out of which, only a portion will be finally evaluated as essential 
patents to the standard by the ad hoc working groups (or entities).  This is as opposed to an ex-
ante process where the development of the technology and the standard happens concurrently 
with the ex-ant contracting among the companies involved in developing the standard 
(Ganglmair & Tarentino, 2011). Therefore, the number of non-essential patents is expected to be 
lower in the technological standards resulting from ex-ant consortia formed by firms on account 
of a prior clearer and better commonly managed technological roadmap by the parties.  
Regardless of its type (blocking, partially blocked , or sleeping), a non-pooled patent which has 
enough value and is left unused can be used in an internal commercialization process or 
externally through cross-licensing or licensing agreements or sale conditioning upon its owner’s 
willingness to use it. Accordingly, in this study we argue that participation in patent pools not 
only explains the willingness to use the patents which a licensor includes in a pool, but it also 
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explains the willingness to use non-pooled patents as becoming a member of a patent pool may 
also favor the use of non-pooled blocking and non-blocking patents held by the pool member 
through providing the opportunity to use the patent internally or externally. Below, we discuss 
the mechanisms through which patent pool membership might favor the willingness to use non-
pooled patents through pool participation by a member. 
 
( i ) Technological complementarity  
 
A valuable sleeping or strategic patent that is left unused but its owner is willing to 
commercialize it internally might be left unused due to the firm’s lack of access to 
complementary technologies. Makri, Hitt, and Lane (2010) define technology complementarity 
as “the degree to which the technological problem solving focuses on different narrowly deﬁned 
areas of knowledge within a broadly deﬁned area of knowledge that they share”. In their 
approach technology complementarity is operationalized as the overlap in patents in the same 
subcategory but in a different class. Their definition addresses the technology complementarity 
within a value chain activity versus asset complementarity across different value chain activities.  
By joining a pool a company might get access to complementary technologies necessary for 
commercializing its patent (within the same value chain). However, contingent upon the 
complementarity between the firms’ patents and the patent pool patents a patent pool might 
affect the propensity to use non-pooled patents as a result of providing complementary 
technologies necessary to exploit the patent. Such complementarity is excepted as in general a 
patent pool increases the interoperability of a member’s technology with those of others. A non-
pooled patent which is left unused due the lack of access to the complementary technologies 
might be used as a result of the firm’s membership in a pool that is contributing to those 
complementary technologies, benefiting from full access and lower transaction cost. Therefore, a 
valuable non-pooled patent that is in the same technological filed of the patent pool but in a 
different technological class from the main technological class of the pool (has a complementary 
relationship with pool’s technology) can be exploited by its owner’s access to the 
complementary technologies provided by the patent pool. Moreover, becoming a member of a 
patent pool that is covering a technological standard can give the opportunity to a firm to 
navigate the technological development of the standard in a pathway which can lead to creation 
of a technology that is complementary to the firm’s own installed IP base. Perceiving, such 
benefits affects a licensor’s willingness to use its non-pooled patents through participating in 
patent pools with complementary technologies to its own technology.  Hence, the higher the 
level of technological complementarity of the pool to the firm’s own technology, the more likely  
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might be a pool member to be willing to use its non-pooled patents through participating in that 
pool. Therefore, we posit: 
 
H1) Patent pool licensors are more likely to be willing to use their non-pooled patents through 
participating in patent pools with higher level of technological complementarity to their own 
technology.  
( ii ) Information spilover and collboration  
 
A valuable sleeping patent whose owner is waiting to receive further information in order to get 
the possibility to use it, can be commercialized if such information (and knowledge) can be 
acquired from other pool members in the process of interacting and collaborating with them 
within a patent pool. Patent pools decrease the communication cost among their members and 
lower search and information cost between them. According to the literature, lower 
communication cost leads to higher level of collaboration among parties (Agrawal and Goldfarb, 
2008; Jones, Wuchty, and Uzzi 2008; Adams, Clemmons, Black, and Stephan 2005).  In fact, the 
information sharing mechanism which is a result of formal collaboration with the patent pool 
discussed as another benefit associated to patent pools (Merges,1999; Clark et al. ,2000),  may 
help a firm to acquire further information and knowledge required for exploiting an invention. It 
also might help the firm to find new and better ways of commercializing its unused patent 
through learning from other members by having the possibility to collaborate with them within 
the patent pool in the process of creating and developing the pool’s technology. Indeed, the 
collaborative learning mechanism provided by the patent pool may increase the knowledge of 
each individual member about technological possibilities and opportunities in the technological 
field of the patent pool. Even if a pool member has not a significant or equal role in developing 
the pool’s technology with other members, joining a patent pool provides her with the possibility 
to be up-to-dated about the technological development of the pool which might help her in 
exploiting her invention.  
The literature on organizational learning argues that the knowledge acquired form others can be 
divided into product knowledge and process knowledge (Kogut and Zander 1992; Rindfleisch 
and Moorman 2001). Such knowledge makes the owner of a non-pooled patent aware of new 
internal or external ways for exploiting her patent outside the patent pool. Direct communication 
among patent pool members engaged in further product development of a pool increases the 
spillover among the members of the patent pool.  As a matter of fact, the information sharing 
advantage associated to patent pools affects downstream product development for the pool 
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members through the spillover effect among them in the procedure of developing a marketable 
product. Marshall (1920) identifies technological spillovers which are a result of information 
exchange as one of the sources of positive externalities among firms. Indeed, considering the 
theoretical arguments provided by the literature on the concept of technological (R&D) spillover 
patent pools can be considered as collaborative licensing mechanisms which can increase 
spillover among their members, however the level of the spillover might vary across patent pools 
and their members.  Steurs (1994) defines R&D spillover as “R&D spillovers refer to the 
involuntary leakage, as well as, the voluntary exchange of useful technological information”. 
Grossman & Helpman (1991) define spillover as “By technological (or R&D) spillovers we 
mean that a firm can acquire information created by others without paying for that in a market 
transaction”. According to Jaffe (1986, 1989) the magnitude of knowledge spillovers is a 
function of the technological distance between firms. Although patent pools are not expected to 
affect the technological distance between firms, firms involved in developing the same 
technological standard of a pool are expected not to be technologically far. Therefore companies 
participating in the same pool are expected to have higher knowledge spillover as compared to 
other companies that develop their technologies independent or in collaboration with very 
limited partners. The literature also provides evidences that there is a positive relationship 
between specialization (as opposed to diversity) and knowledge spillover (Saxenian, 1994). 
Since in contributing to the pool’s technological standard development licensor are mostly 
specialized in the same technology a higher spillover is expected to exist among them. These all 
may increase the possibility of commercializing a patent with enough value to the market since 
the owner may learn new ways of commercializing her patent internally and externally. All these 
possibilities will be raised particularly when a company is mainly operating in the same 
technological filed of the patent pool in collaboration with others.  
Furthermore, firms with in-house innovations might try to complement their activities in 
collaboration with others. In this regard, they might also seek collaboration with their 
competitors. Particularly, in case of developing technological standards, firms are typically 
involved in collaborative innovation activities within a patent pool. Such collaboration might 
have been started even before formation of a pool through consortia or after its formation 
through standard setting organizations or quasi-formal standard bodies. Although firms usually 
collaborate even in the absence of a patent pool, by participating in a pool a firm might expect 
collaboration with others on a broader scale. As collaboration often necessitates considerable 
coordination costs and brings about potential moral hazard, joining a pool might also help a firm 
to reduce the associated costs and risks as a result of the pool’s cost and risk sharing benefit. 
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Therefore patent pools can be also seen as mechanisms which can facilitate formal collaboration 
among their members. However, the intensity of collaboration might differ across firms and 
patent pools. The possibility to have formal collaboration inside the patent pool may also provide 
the opportunity for members to have informal collaborations outside the pool in the same or 
other related technological fields not covered by the patent pool. This can also increase the 
probability of use of a non-pooled patent since the patent owner may find new ways and better 
opportunities for commercializing her valuable sleeping patent through some informal 
collaboration out of the pool.  Moreover, this might affect the use of a non-pooled patent that is 
left unused as a result of being blocked by the firm’s competitors. If the competitor is a pool 
member, by joining a pool the company might find an easier and less costly way to have an 
agreement with its rival and therefore as a result of this agreement use the patent outside the 
pool. 
A valuable sleeping patent might have been also left unused due to the firm’s lack of access to 
complementary assets or due to the fact that it has not found a partner that might have the 
necessary complementary assets in order to exploit the patent yet. The possibility to interact with 
other members within the patent pool might give the opportunity to a firm to recognize the 
technological capacities of other members particularly in terms of their manufacturing 
capabilities. A firm with lack of complementary assets to commercialize its valuable patent 
might find a pool partner (across another value chain) owning the required complementary assets 
that is able to use its patent in a product or process.  Therefore, holder of a non-pooled sleeping 
patent that is left unused due to the lack of complementary assets will be able to exploit her 
patent by finding a partner through joining a patent pool. Particularly, if a patent belongs to a 
sector where the company is not present, by joining a patent pool that is contributing to that 
sector the company might get better opportunities to use that patent.  
 
Collaborating in process of technological development of a standard in dialogue with others 
within the patent pool and acquiring further knowledge for more beneficial exploitation of a 
patented invention, might also affect the firm’s strategies. A valuable strategic patent that is left 
unused intentionally due to strategic reasons might be actually exploited by its owner as a result 
of the change in the firm’s strategy after joining a patent pool although it has been initially filed 
for blocking purposes. In fact, a firm might find the monetary rents out of the patent superior to 
its strategic rents at a point of time after joining the pool, since the pool might offer better 
opportunities for exploiting the patent in a non-strategic way. Moreover, patent pools decrease 
anti-competitive and strategic behaviors among their members (Lampe and Moser,2014) to a 
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considerable extent and therefor increase competition between them (Vakili, 2012) which 
consequently decreases the propensity of strategic non-use of patents by pool members.  
 In particular, the decision to earn monetary rents instead of strategic ones is more likely to be 
made by vertically integrated firms rather than research and development oriented firms as 
besides lowering the licensing transaction cost, in general pro-competitive pools of 
complementary patents decrease the aggregate license fee faced by manufacturers. Particularly, 
vertically integrated firms using the pool’s standard essential patents in their products can benefit 
from less costly cross-licensing deals with other parties. R&D oriented firms are typically less 
likely to join a pool as their main source of revenue is licensing and they might earn higher 
royalties by licensing patents individually outside a pool considering that as specialized firms 
they hold especially valuable patents contributing to the standards that gives them the possibility 
to negotiate higher fees for their patents unmixed with less valuable patents held by vertically 
integrated firms (Layne-Farrar and Lerner, 2011). 
 
( iii ) Broader and less costly access to licensees  
 
A pool provides access to a larger number of licensees, which is a result of superior resources 
that a pool has in tracking and signing up the licensees as well as the larger size of the patent 
pool (as compare to a single licensor). Singing up licensees is very costly for a single firm; 
however for a patent pool signing up a limited number of licensees is feasible, as the substantial 
cost associate for setting up the pool is worn by all the pool members, the patent pool initiator 
and the pool administrator.  As a result, a patent pool prepares a ground for its members to have 
access to a broader range of licensees and therefore establish informal connections with them 
outside the pool. Licensees might also seek further technological supports from pool licensors in 
developing their products beyond the technological coverage provided by the pool. In fact, the 
licensing packages provided by patent pools are limited to certain technological standards; 
however, in developing their products licensees might need further technologies, which are often 
provided by pool licensors out of the technological space of the pool as particularly in case of 
ICT pools, licensors are in general very large firms with broad technological capacities.  Seeking 
further technological support might lead to broader informal collaborations among licensors and 
licensees outside of the pool. Broader informal collaboration outside the pool might increase the 
chance of using a non-pooled patent which has the potential to be licensed out or sold to other 
parties as discussed.  
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 Hence, partnership opportunities and greater access to other parties’ complementary assets, 
broader access and connections to the licensees (technology implementers), formal collaboration 
inside the pool and informal collaboration outside it, causing changes in members strategies, 
enhanced information sharing and increased technological spillover provided by the patent pool 
may help a company to use its non-pooled patents. Seeing such opportunities provided by the 
pool, a licensor might get more willingness to use its non-pooled patents through participating in 
patent pools more intensively. Firms as technology providers to a pool will have a higher 
intensity of participation if they introduce more patents into the pool out of their IP portfolio. 
The inclusion of a higher share of patents out of a firm’s portfolio not only implies the 
willingness of the firm to commercialize its patents through the pool, but also shows the higher 
technological involvement of the firm in the pool’s technological area.  Companies, with higher 
technological capacities and engagement in the pool technological area are more also more likely 
to own non-pooled patents in the technological field of the pool or in related tech areas. 
Therefore, such companies recognizing the benefits provided by the pool are more likely to be 
willing to use the non-pooled patents through participating in pools more intensively. 
Thus, we forward our hypothesis as:  
H2) Pool members participating more intensively in patent pools are more likely to be willing to 
use their non-pooled patents through pool participation.  
3. Data collection and descriptive statistics  
With the aim of testing the hypotheses in this study primary and secondary data are employed 
conjointly. The primary source of the data for this study is PATVAL II database which is a 
cross-country database developed within InnoS&T project in 2010 and 2011, intended for 
studying the determinants of patent licensing, patent sale and new venture creation by firms, 
universities and PROs(Torrisi, et al, 2014). The survey collected information on inventors’ 
education, invention process, inventors’ motivations and rewards and use and value of patents by 
surveying inventors of 22,533 EPO patents with propriety dates between 2003 and 2005 resident 
in Europe (Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, 
France, United Kingdom, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, Sweden, Slovenia), USA, Japan and Israel, through employing a harmonized 
questionnaire across all the surveyed regions(Torrisi, et al, 2014). This data was compared with 
supplementary information obtained from other sources on the patent, technology, region and 
inventor. There are a number of indicators obtained through PatVal II database. The PatVal II 
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Survey, asks among other things if a patent is used and if not used yet, is the owner willing to use 
it. 
3.1 Secondary data collection Procedure 
3.1.1  Initial data collection  
3.1.2 Sample selection procedure  
As the main concern of this study is investigating the link between pool participation intensity 
and willingness to use non-pooled patents, a sample of patent pools is constructed as the 
secondary source of data. Our sample represents the industries with IPR-based (patent) 
standardization where the establishment of patent pools has been based around the technological 
standards. We particularly focus on telecommunication and consumer electronics industries due 
to the crucial role of patents in development of the technological standards in these two 
industries. In telecommunication industry, the protection of the R&D based inventions has been 
long provided by patents, and patent-based standardization has been prominently an issue in this 
industry. The industry more than any other one, is severely relying on patent-based 
standardization efforts mostly done by Standard Setting Organizations, where patent pools have 
been playing a crucial role in making the licensing practices more efficient and bringing the 
standard to the market in a faster, easier, less costly and non-discriminatory manner(e.g. 3G, 
4G(LTE), WIFI patent pools).  Consumer electronics industry which comprises standards for 
video and audio recording and compression as well as reproduction (e.g Mpeg and H.264 for 
audio and video), is also characterized by the dominance of major patent pools (e.g. DVD6C & 
ONE BLUE & BD Premier), where the establishment of the pool is basically done in consortia, 
rather than quasi formal standard bodies or Standard Setting Organizations. In most of the cases 
the consortia is formed by few dominant market players that hold patents essential to the related 
standard and later on the pool is administered by specialized pool administrators such as MPEG 
LA, SISVEL and Via Licensing.  
 
The standardization efforts in both industries has been enhanced by the presence of patent pools, 
since the more efficient licensing of Standard Essential Patents has been provided by patent 
pools through lowering transaction cost including lowering search and information cost, 
contacting and bargaining costs and policing and enforcement cost. Patent pools in these 
industries also provide lower market uncertainty, lower license fees and lower degree of 
discrimination among licensees. All the  licensing packages included in our sample are 
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contributing to the complex technological fields were the overlapping IPRs and blocking patents 
have raised the necessity of formation of  modern patent pools with the intention of decreasing 
transaction cost, and providing equal access of the pool members to the pool’s technology. Until 
Second World War many patent pools in various technological areas were subject to non-
essential or substitute patents. During 1997 and 1999 antitrust authorities in Europe and USA 
authorized a new model of patent pooling providing precautions against anti-competitive abuses 
through which the complementarity and essentiality of the patents in the pool should assure the 
legal certainty of the pooled patents.  Accordingly modern patent pools which are an outcome of 
these efforts, are a proper context for our study as in general they consist of complementary and 
not substitute patents that are essential to the standard covered by the pool as argued. 
Furthermore, another important characteristic of the modern patent pools is the freedom of their 
licensors to license out their patents directly and not through the patent pool which gives the 
licensors the possibility to have formal and informal collaborations outside the patent pool which 
might increase the likelihood of use of a non-pooled patents as a result of the licensors’ 
collaborations outside the patent pool. 
 
3.1.3 Data cleaning and harmonization  
With the purpose of constructing the patent pool database and performing matching analysis 
between Patval II and the patent pool dataset in both firm and patent level, I cleaned, re-
formatted and harmonized the collected data manually  (including standardizing patent 
publication numbers and company names). I also cleaned and harmonized all the family patents 
for the patents in the PatvalII survey (totally 195,118 family patents) which was further used to 
perform the patent-level matching analysis between the patent pool dataset and PatvalII survey. 
The result of patent-level matching analysis was only 58 patents as our primary source of data 
includes patent with priority date 2003-2005 and our secondary data is limited to patents from 
ICT sector. Nevertheless, through the firm level matching analysis I found 37 companies from 
PatvalII participating in patent pools holding 2149 non-pooled patents. The final sample is thus 
composed of 2149 non-pooled patents belonging to 37 licensors that have joined the patent pools 
in our database.  
3.1.4 Database construction  
I retrieved patent-level data corresponding to patent application, patent publication, inventor, 
citation, claim, technological class, title , abstract and patent family from PATSTAT online by 
issuing a series of SQL commands. Furthermore, for each licensor in my patent pool database, I 
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collected firm-level information such as age, size, type, industry (SIC), country and competitors 
from various databases such as Amadeus, Lexis Nexis , Osiris and Hoovers. Additional variables 
such as date of each licensor’s membership (in each pool), licensors’ experience, no. of 
technological classes and no. of patent families per licensor are also constructed. I also collected 
patent pool-level information including patent pool administrator, pool age, pool size (no. of 
patents), no. of licensors, no. of licensees, no. of technological classes, no. of patent families and 
no. of licensing packages.  
3.1.5 Representativeness of the sample:  Our sample represents 24 out of 52 modern patent 
pools (24 out of 33 modern patent pools with publically available patent data) in both industries 
and is considerably larger than any other sample of the patent pools studied (The largest sample 
studied consists of 9 pools by Delcamp 2012 and Layne-Farrar &Lerner,2011)
7
. Our sample 
represents 21476 cross-country and cross industry patents which have been participated in at 
least one of these patent pools, meaning that one patent might have contributed to more than one 
patent pool licensing package. In our sample of patent pools, patents are from patent offices from 
all around the world including, North America (US and Canada), South America, Europe 
(Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Czech Republic, Germany, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, 
United Kingdom, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Sweden, Slovenia),and Asia (Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Thailand, Taiwan, South 
Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, China, India, etc). This data is mainly collected from patent pool 
packager (administrator) websites including Mpeg La
8
, Sisvel
9
 , DVD6c La
10
, Sipro Lab. 
Telecom
11
 ,ULDAGE
12
 and One Blue
6
.  Considering the wide range of the technologies covered 
by the patent pools in our sample, the considerable number of patents and the wide time span for 
the pool foundation date (from the very first modern patent pool to the very recent one), it can be 
argued that our sample of patent pools is a well representative sample for modern patent pools 
that is considerably larger than any other sample of the modern pools studied in the literature. 
Our sample comprises all the patent pool licensing packages administered by One Blue (22 
packages), DVD6C (42 packages), and ULDAGE (3 packages).  Moreover, all the patent pools 
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administered by SIPRO Lab except for G.723.1, were also included in our sample. This 
exception is due to the unavailability of public patent level data for G.723.1 patent pool. SIPRO 
lab.  has recently launched other pools namely AMR-WB AMR-WB+ and G.722 and are not 
included in our sample yet since the data was not available at the time of the data collection.  
From Mpegla, all the patent pool licensing packages except for Librassay® are also included in 
our sample. This exception is also due to the unavailability of public patent level data for 
Librassay® patent pool. Moreover, out of the 14 patent pools administered by Sisvel, UHF-
RFID, DECT, LTE, WIFI, TELEMTRY and DSL had no patent level data publically available at 
the time of the data collection and therefore were not included in our sample. 
 
We have not included Medicine Patent Pool as the major non-profit and non-standard based pool 
among the pools serving discrete technologies, as the main concern of our study is to investigate 
the relationship between pool participation intensity and the willingness to use non-pooled 
patents. First, Medicine Patent Pool is a non-profit pool that is established with the aim of 
lowering transaction cost and preventing stacking licensing royalty problem to lower the cost of 
production of HIV/AIDS drugs and make them marketable in developing countries and therefore 
will not provide any strategic or extra monetary rents for its licensors. Second, no licensor is a 
member of this patent pool, because the pool is sponsored by public funds and by public pressure 
on licensors to cooperate in the pool and therefore it serves as a an independent agent that 
operates as an intermediate between the licensors and the licensees (Generic Medicine 
Producers). Therefore the pool is aimed to primarily fulfill general public interest and not serving 
private profitability, and as a result its objectives are much more in line with the objectives of the 
licensees and the public, rather than those of the licensors. Consequently, the decision to join this 
is not actually favored by the licensors and is more a matter of serving the public interests. 
 
3.2 Analyzing (working) Sample  
As explained before, out of our entire sample of pool participants, 37 licensors were covered by 
PatVal II survey which have entered into the pools between 1990 and 2012 and hold 2149 non-
pooled patents.  The date of entry to each pool by each licensor is collected form the pools’ 
websites and if the date of entry was not found, the earliest publication date of its patents 
included in the patent pool was considered as a proxy of the entry time. 
Out of the whole sample of non-pooled patents (2149 patents), our analyzing sample includes 
those held by the pool members that have joined a patent pool between 2003 and 2011 (2002 < 
date of entry < 2012). We exclude patents held by licensors that have joined a patent pool before 
2003 and after 2011, as our primary data consists of patents with priority dates 2003-2005 whose 
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inventors were surveyed in 2010 and 2011. In other words, the relationship between a licensor’s 
willingness to use its non-pooled patent(s) and our independent variables cannot be captured for 
non-pooled patents held by those companies that have entered pools out of this time span (2003-
2011). This is due to the fact that first, the patent (or the invention’s application filed to patent 
office) did not exist before 2003 and second we cannot capture the changes in use/non-use of the 
patent and its owner’s willingness to use it after 2011. Out of the total non-pooled patents 
therefore, our analyzing sample includes 1300 patents held by 28 licensors participated in 15 
patent pools. As a considerable share of the licensors in our sample has participated in more than 
one patent pool (and therefore patent held by these licensors are non-pooled to more than one 
pool) and our unit of analysis is patent, we selected the most relevant patent pool to each non-
pooled patent based on the technological closeness of the pool to that patent (pools with higher 
share of patents with the same technological class of the non-pooled patent were chosen as the 
most relevant pool to each patent).   The list of these pools along with the number of their non-
pooled patent and the number of pool participants is presented in table A in Appendix. 
 
3.3 Descriptive statistics  
We start our discussion of the results with a set of descriptive statistics. The licensors in our 
entire sample of the patent pools are from 15 countries and are involved in several industries 
(totally 32 4-digit SIC codes). Morover, the patents in our sample of patent pools are from 96 
patent offices all around the world. Table 1 presents general patent pool information concerning 
number of licensing packages, pool formation year, patent pool size, number of licensors , 
number of licensees , number of inpadoc families and number of tech classes (4 digit). 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 In order to better understand the characteristics of the firms participating in the patent pools as well as the 
characteristics of the patents introduced to the patent pools, the descriptive analyses of patent pools in 
both firm and patent level is performed for the whole sample and for the sample of those patent pool 
licensors covered and not covered by PatVal II.  
The average patent pool age in our sample is 12.13 the most recent patent pool in our sample is One Blue 
that was established in 2011, and the oldest pool is WirelessMesh  formed in 1990. The oldest patent in 
our sample belongs to JVC KENWOOD Corporation and GE Technology Development Inc. that are 
members of MPGE4-Visual administrated by Mpegla. Patent pool formation has been more intensive in 
2006 when 6 modern pools (25% of our sample) were formed and in 1997 when 5 modern pools (20% of 
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our sample) were established. Furthermore, at least one patent pool has been established every year, 
duration the year 1997 to 2007. Moreover, after 1990 when Wireless Mesh was founded, no modern pool 
has been established until 1997 (a period of five years).  
The average pool size in terms of the number of patents is 1083.54 in our sample of modern 
patent pools. Although One Blue is the youngest patent pool in our sample, it is the largest one in 
terms of the number of patents, comprising 10386 patents included in 22 licensing packages. On 
the other hand, ATSS administrated by Sisvel with 5 patents is the smallest patent pool in our 
sample. As it is shown in Table 1, particularly in consumer electronic industry, in standards such 
as (audio and video) compression and codec the numbers of licensees are considerably large (e.g. 
MPEG2, MPEG4 Visual and AVC pools) as the patent pools in this areas offer a wide 
technological coverage. On the other hand, in home systems, telecommunication and 
broadcasting technologies the pool’s technological coverage is limited and therefore the numbers 
of licensees are much lower as compared to the CE patent pools. As depicted, a very large patent 
pool such as One Blue (home systems technology) has only 58 licensees. The number of 
licensees in ATSC, DVB-T, CATV and ARIB (broadcasting) and W-CDMA, IEEE 1394 and 
Wireless Mesh (telecommunication) are not also considerable. 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Out of the 70 patent pool members from the 86 pool licensing packages offered by 24 patent 
pools in our sample, 37 firms are covered by PatVal II. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of 
the general characteristics of entire sample of patent pools, patent pool licensors covered by 
PatVal II and patent pool licensors not covered by PatVal II and the result of the t-test of the 
equality of the means between them.  We show that patent pool licensors covered by PatVal II 
have a higher average age and size as compared to patent pool licensors not covered by PatVal 
II. This is basically due to the presence of Nordic European countries which comprise the oldest 
firms in our sample of patent pool licensors covered by PatVal II. Moreover, patents held by 
patent pool licensors covered by PatVal II are more recent (higher priority year and publication 
earliest year) as compared to patent pool licensors not covered by PatVal II. However, as their 
patents are more recent they have received lower number of forward citations. “No. of inpadoc 
families/licensor” is measured as the total number of inpadoc families which belong to a licensor 
in the total sample. Likewise, No. of tech classes/licensor is calculated as the total number of 
technological classes which belong to a licensor in the total sample.  
Table 3 illustrates the geographical distribution of the patent pool licensors in our sample. 
Europe has the highest average licensor age (92.88). As discussed, the oldest companies 
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participating in patent pools are from the Nordic European countries including Norway, Finland, 
Germany, and Sweden. The oldest licensor in our sample is SIEMENS (firm age = 168) and the 
youngest are DTVG LICENSING INC and JVC KENWOOD Corporation (firm age =7). 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
The most active firms in terms of participating in the pools are from US (22 firms) and Japan(18 
firms).Pool licensors covered by PatVal II are from Norway, Finland, Germany, Sweden, Canada 
and US. Moreover, the most active companies covered by PatVal II in terms of participating in 
pools are from Japan (12 firms) and US (8 firms). 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Graph 1 and Graph 2 about here 
   ------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 As depicted in Graph 1 and Graph 2 the highest share of the pool licensors covered by PatVal II 
are from Japan and US, respectively.  Firms from these two countries comprise also the highest 
share of licensors not covered by PatVal II , however Japan has a lower share with respect to US. 
Moreover, while companies from Korea, China and Canada are not covered by PatVal II survey, 
PatValII does not also cover pool licensors from Italy although PatVal II surveyed Italian 
companies too. In fact,  some companies within the pools  were surveyed , but they are not in the 
list of respondent companies. Some of these licensors are large and others are smaller.  
The frequency analysis of the 4-digit SIC codes in our sample shows that Household audio and 
video equipment (8.93%), Telephone and Telegraph apparatus (8.93%), Electronic components, 
not elsewhere specified (7.14%) and Telephone communications except for radio (7.14%) are the 
most common industries the patent pool members are involved in our sample of patent pools.  
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Furthermore, with the aim of better understanding the technological area where a patent pool is 
specialized in, the Revealed Technological Advantage (RTA) for each patent pool is calculated 
on the basis of the formula adopted from Patel & Pavitt (1997). They argue that defining a large 
firm’s technological competencies simply in terms of a few fields of excellence is misleading 
and it is better to think in terms of profiles of competencies with varying levels of commitment 
and competitive advantage in a range of technological fields. Based on the Patel & Pavitt (1997) 
approach, the distinctive core technical competencies are those with relatively high RTA and 
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Patent Share. Based on their approach in this study RTA is addressed as the relative importance 
of the firm to each field of technological competence, after taking account of the firm's total 
volume of competencies. Moreover, patent share is addressed as the relative importance of the 
firm’s competencies in each of the technological fields (30 fields). Based on their approach the 
Revealed Technological Advantage related to the Top OST for each pool is calculated as the 
share of the Top OST technological filed in the patent pool’s portfolio divided by the share of the 
Top OST technological filed in the entire portfolio of the 24 patent pools in our sample. 
      
                                
                                                                    
 
Where     i = the Top OST technological filed in patent pool j 
We calculate an Index for RTA as I  =  (RTA - 1) / (RTA + 1) ,  -1 < I  < 1 
Following their approach in calculating patent share we measure Technological Field Share 
(TFS) as the share of the pool’s top technological field (Top OST) in the entire sample of the 
patent pools.  The higher the RTA and TFS the more important (central) is the technology for the 
patent pool. In other words the closer the RTA index to 1 the more important (central) is the 
technology for the patent pool. As depicted in Table 4, Audio-visual technology is the most 
dominant technological area covered by the patent pools in our sample (54.17% of the total 
sample). Moreover, Telecommunications (29.17% of the total sample) and Information 
Technology (16.67% of the total sample) are the other two technological areas covered by the 
patent pools in our sample. On the basis of Patel & Pavitt (1997) approach we find that Audio-
visual technology is the core technology (I > 0.5) for four patent pools, including ATSC, ATSS, 
H.264 SVC and WSS. Telecommunication is the main technological area in six patent pools 
including W-CDMA, Wireless Mesh, ARIB, CATV, CATV Compliant and DVB-T2. Moreover, 
information technology is the core technological area in four patent pools including G.711.1, 
G.729.1, VC-1 and TOP Teletext. Audio-visual technology is not identified as the core 
technology for One Blue, DVD (6C), AVC, MPEG2, MPEG-4 Visual, MVC and DVB-T patent 
pools (I < 0.5). Surprisingly, RTA index is lowest for One Blue and DVD (6C) as the largest 
patent pools in consumer electronics industry. 
Table 4 also depicts the firm-level and the patent-level descriptive analyses for each patent pool 
in our sample. The number of observations in the this table is associated to the total size of the 
database for each single patent pool in our sample. As shown, DVB-T has the highest average 
firm age (100) with minimum 6 and maximum 102 years. It has also the highest average firm 
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size (no of employees) of 290235, with minimum 13299 and maximum 293742 employees. 
G.711.1 has the earliest average application priority year (2004) with the earliest patent applied 
in 2000 and the latest in 2007. The earliest average publication year (2006) is also associated to 
this patent pool, with the youngest paten published in 2001 and the oldest published in 2010.  
DVD-ROM (DRD) licensing package from DVD6C has the earliest average priority year (1976) 
among the 86 licensing packages in our sample with the earliest priority year of  1927 and the 
latest priority year of 2008. The average publication earliest year for this licensing package is 
1980 with earliest publication year of 1929 and the latest of 2008.Moreover, G.711.1 has the 
highest average number of applicants (1.49) with the minimum of 0 and maximum of 12 
applicants which is also the highest number of applicants associated to the patents in our patent 
pool sample.DVD-(+)RDisc administered by DVD6C has the highest average number of 
inventors (1.49) with the minimum of 0 and maximum of 12 applicants which is also the highest 
in our sample. This implies that on average the highest efforts have been dedicated to develop 
patents included in this patent pool in our sample. The patents from Wireless Mesh administrated 
by Mpegla have the highest average number of forward citations (159) among our sample of 
patent pools with the minimum citation of 6 and the maximum of 436, implying that companies 
participated in this pool are on average holding the highest quality pooled patents in our sample. 
Wireless Mesh has also the highest average number of publications claims (22) with a minimum 
of 0 and maximum of 64 publication claims implying that patents included in this pool have the 
highest avrage scope. Moreover, the patents from DVD-Video(DAP) licensing package 
administered by DVD6C have the highest number of publication claims (138) among the patents 
from our  sample of  patent pools.  
Our data also shows that companies surveyed by PatVal II have participated in all the 24 patent 
pools licensing packages except for WirelessMesh, ATSS and TOP Teletext. The companies 
covered by PatVal II that have participated in G.729.1 have the highest average firm age (106) 
with the oldest firm aged 167 and the youngest aged 23, and those participated in G.711.1 have 
the lowest average firm age (21) with the oldest firm aged 26 and the youngest aged 17. The 
oldest company covered by PatVal II that has participated in the patent pools is SIEMENS (167-
years) and the youngest is Thomson Licensing (15-years). The companies covered by PatVal II 
that have participated in DVB-T have the highest average firm size (291256 employees) with the 
largest firm size of 293742 and the lowest firm size of 118087 and those participated in MPEG-2 
Systems have the lowest average firm size (8238 employees) with the maximum firm size of 
110000 and the minimum firm size of 539. The companies covered by PatVal II that have 
participated in One Blue hold patents with lowest average priority earliest year (1988),with the 
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earliest patents applied in 1925 and the latest patents applied in 2009. The highest average 
priority earliest year (2003) is associated to the patents held by the companies covered by PatVal 
II that have participated in G.711.1 with the earliest patents applied in 2000 and the latest patents 
applied in 2007. The lowest average priority earliest year in our sub-sample of the companies 
covered by PatVal II that have participated in patent pools is 1908 which is associated to the 
patents held by Panasonic Corporation in AVC and MPEG2 and the highest is 2011 which is 
associated to the patents held by Dolby Lab in MVC and VC-1. 
Moreover, those companies covered by PatVal II that have participated in WSS hold patents with 
lowest average publication earliest year (1991), with the patents published in 1991 (Only one 
company: France Telecom). The highest average publication earliest year (2006) is associated to 
the patents held by the companies covered by PatVal II that have participated in G.711.1 with the 
oldest patents published in 2003 and the youngest patents published in 2010. The lowest average 
publication earliest year in our sub-sample of the companies covered by PatVal II that have 
participated in patent pools is 1909 which is associated to the patents held by Panasonic 
Corporation in AVC and MPEG2 and the highest is 2012 (associated to a number of licensors 
and pools in our subsample). Furthermore, those companies covered by PatVal II that have 
participated in ARIB hold patents with lowest average no of applicants (0.95), with minimum 0 
(no applicant is recorded in EPO) and maximum 3 applicants. The highest average no of 
applicants (1.49) is associated to the patents held by the companies covered by PatVal II that 
have participated in G.711.1 minimum 1 and maximum 12 applicants. Those companies covered 
by PatVal II that have participated in WSS hold patents with lowest average no of inventors (1) 
(Only one company: France Telecom). The highest average no of inventors (6.75) is associated 
to the patents held by the companies covered by PatVal II that have participated in G.711.1 with 
minimum 0 and maximum 11 inventors. This implies that on average the highest efforts have 
been dedicated to develop patents included in this patent pool in our sample.Moreover,those the 
companies covered by PatVal II that have participated in WSS hold patents with lowest average 
no of forward citations (2) (Only one company: France Telecom). The highest average no of 
forward citations (117) is associated to the patents held by the companies covered by PatVal II 
that have participated in Mpeg 2- Systems with minimum 0 and maximum 224 citations, 
implying that the companies covered by PatVal II that have participated in this pool are on 
average holding the highest quality pooled patents in our sample.Finally, the companies covered 
by PatVal II that have participated in WSS hold patents with lowest average no of publication 
claims (0) (Only one company: France Telecom). The highest average no of publication claims 
(8.24) is associated to the patents held by the companies covered by PatVal II that have 
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participated in W-CDMA with minimum 0 and maximum 80 publication claims. This implies 
that these companies are holding pooled patents with broadest average scope in our sample. 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Graph 3 about here 
   ------------------------------------------------------------------ 
As it is depicted in Graph 3 more than 68% of the licensors have participated in more than one 
patent pool. Although these licensors are in general large and very large companies, there exist 
also some large firms that have not participated in more than one patent pool in our sample 
which might imply the fact that pool participation rate does not necessarily depend on the firm 
size as it might be expected and there might be several other factors that can explain pool 
participation rate. The largest rate of pool participation is fifteen for France Telecom and 
Panasonic Corporation and, thirteen for JVC KENWOOD Corporation, respectively. Sisvel SPA 
as a major pool administrator has participated as a licensor in one patent pool in our sample. This 
along with other data that we further explain in section 4 of this study regarding vertical 
integration to the pool technological standard implies that not necessarily all the pool members 
are manufacturing depending on the standard despite the fact that most of these companies in our 
sample are  large or very large firms.  
 Furthermore, participation in more than one patent pool is particularly interesting when a firm 
that is mainly operating in one core technological area, is participating in patent pools 
contributing to different technologies. This might imply that a firm is seeking multimarket 
contacts or it is seeking strategic presence in some of these pools.  Multimarket contact happens 
when companies come across the same competitors within various markets. Multimarket contact 
will help a company mitigate the risk of having aggressive competition in different markets with 
a competitor (mutual forbearance effect) (Edwards, 1955).  Furthermore, in the market for IPR-
based technologies a firm’s bargaining power depends on the size of the firm’s patent portfolio 
(Noel and Schankerman, 2006). In general firms with weaker bargaining power as compared to 
their competitors might acquire patents from others in order to strengthen their patent portfolio 
and increase their bargaining power. Nevertheless, firms might pursue another strategy as patent 
acquisition is not always a long term and less costly solution if a company is competing in 
various markets with others. Indeed, firms are at a higher risk of having less bargaining power in 
some technological areas which is not in their core business as compared to their competitors 
that are operating mainly in those technological areas. Therefore, they might take advantage of 
the pool’s membership in an attempt to moderate the effect of other’s bargaining power in those 
technological fields. In other words multiple pool membership provides a firm with access to 
other competitors’ technology with a lower bargaining and contracting cost (lower transaction 
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cost). Hence, in general apart from seeking broader technological capacities and rent earning 
advantages, it can be argued that firms participating in multiple pools might have higher strategic 
intentions in dealing with their competitors.  
 
4. Measurements, data analysis and regression results 
4.1 Measurement  
4.1.1. Dependent variable 
Our dependent variable in this study is the willingness to use non-pooled(unused) patent which is 
a dummy equal to 1 if a (non-pooled) patent is not used ( in either of the 4 ways including 
internal commercialization, licensing, sale and spin off ) but its owner is willing to use it and 0 
otherwise. PatVal II askes among other things if the applicant(s) or affiliated parties ever used 
the patented invention commercially or if the ownership right to the patent was sold or licensed 
to another party not related to the original owner(s) or applicant(s), or if this patent been used by 
any of the inventors or applicants to found a new company. It also askes whether the owner is 
willing to use the patent in case the patent is not used in either of these ways. Descriptive 
statistics show that 40.62% of the patents in our working sample (528 observations) are not used 
but their owner is willing to use them.   
4.1.2. Explanatory variables 
Our explanatory variables include participation intensity and technological complementarity 
4.1.3. Participation intensity: 
Participation intensity in our study refers to the number of patents a licensor has included in each 
pool out of its patent portfolio. In fact, the share of a licensor’s patent stock that is included in a 
patent pool shows how intensively it has contributed to the pool. Since the contribution to the 
pool in this sense is related to the portion out of the firm’s patent portfolio (patent stock) that is 
incorporated into the pool, we operationalized participation intensity in patent pools as the 
number of patents included in a patent pool by a licensor divided by its patent stock. The 
intensity of participation is therefore different from the firm’s bargaining power within the pool, 
which is in fact the share of a licensor’s patents out of the patent pool’s patent portfolio (total 
patents within the pool).  We further control for firm’s bargaining power within the pool in our 
analysis as it is discussed in the next section. 
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4.1.4. Technological complementarity: Makri, Hitt, and Lane (2010) define Technology 
Complementarity between ﬁrms as “the degree to which their technological problem solving 
focuses on different narrowly deﬁned areas of knowledge within a broadly deﬁned area of 
knowledge that they share”. In their approach technology complementarity is operationalized as 
the overlap in patents in the same subcategory (field) but in a different class. This definition 
implies technology complementarity within a value chain activity versus asset complementarity 
across different value chain activities. According to them a broader definition of 
complementarity from an economic perspective by Milgrom and Roberts (1990; 1995) is also 
supported by this definition in which marginal return from an input increases as it is combined 
with another impute.  
Adapting the same approach and using the same level of aggregation we operationalize 
technological complementarity between a firm’s patents and a patent pool as the overlap in 
patents in the same technological field (30 OST) but in a different patent class (3-digit-IPC) 
weighted by the importance of each patent tech field in each pool. 
 (
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For instance, two patents build on technological field ‘Telecommunications’ (3) but on different 
class ‘Digital information transmission’ (H04L) and ‘Telephone communication’ (H04M), 
occupy complementarity technologies. This measure is validated in the context of M&A by 
Makri, Hitt, and Lane (2010) using a 1996 sample of 95 high-technology M&As.  They collected 
data from trade magazines on the acquiring and acquired ﬁrms’ research content  for 24 deals in 
the electronics industry and for 24 deals in the drug industry (n = 48). They asked two highly 
qualiﬁed professionals (unrelated to their study) to carefully read through all of the information 
provided for each ﬁrm and to rate the knowledge complementarity present between the two ﬁrms 
in each deal. They rated the complementarity between the two ﬁrms on a ﬁve-point Likert scale.  
Then they calculated the correlations between their ratings on knowledge complementarity and 
their objective measures of technology complementarity. They found a positive and statistically 
signiﬁcant correlation between their objective measure of technology complementarity and the 
raters’ evaluation of knowledge complementarity. These results provided support for the 
construct validity of their measure of technology complementarity. 
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4.1.5. Control Variables  
We control for various patent pool, firm, and technological level factors in our analyses which  
are examined in the literature. Our patent pool-level control variables include patent pool age and 
patent pool size.  Patent pool age is calculated at the time of this survey (2011) on the basis of 
the formation year of the patent pool in years. Patent pool’s state of technology is captured by 
pool age.  The higher the age of the patent pool the lower the probability that pool attracts new 
members as the technology covered by the pool becomes more obsolete and therefore the 
companies might have less willingness to find a way to use their patents through participating in 
these pools. At pool level we also control for patent pool size.  Pool size is measured as the total 
number of patents included in a pool by the licensors.  Firm-level control variables include 
licensor size, licensor age, licensor’s pooling experience and membership duration. We control 
for the size of the licensor by using 6 dummy variables. Through these dummies we distinguish 
the size by number of employees from the baseline category of small firms employing 1 to 100 
workers (representing 1 % of the observations in our sample) to very large firms employing more 
than 5000 workers(representing 81.3% of the observations in our sample). We also control for 
Licensor age measured at the time of the survey in years. Pooling experience is measured as the 
number of pools each licensor has participated in. As argued companies with higher pooling 
experience (participated in more pools) might have higher strategic intentions in dealing with 
their competitors which might affect their willingness to use their non-pooled patents through 
participating in pools composed of higher number of their competitors.  We also control for the 
firm’s bargaining power within the pool.  In principle, firms that own more patents within the 
pool as compared to other members have a higher contribution to the technological development 
of the pool and therefore attain more bargaining power within the pool. In fact, firms bargaining 
power within the pool motivates it to take more advantage of the pool in order to commercialize 
its patents. Moreover, having more patents within the pool as compared to other members might 
also imply that the licensor has higher presence in the technological area of the pool and as a 
result might have more willingness to use its non-pooled patents through pool participation too 
since these patents are more likely to be related to the pool’s technology. We also control for 
membership duration. The longer a firm has been participated in a pool, the more likely it is to 
use its patents through pool participation because it is more familiar with the pools’ technology, 
which helps it to figure out better ways to use its non-pooled patents through having access to the 
pool’s technology. Longer membership duration also increases the familiarity of the firm with 
other members and licensees and therefore increases the likelihood for collaboration opportunity 
outside the pool with them. Moreover, the longer a firm has participated in a pool, the more it 
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could learn novel and more efficient ways of commercializing its patents through pool 
membership opportunity.  Our first patent-level control variable is the number of inventors for 
each patent which provide us with a measure of the efforts that have been dedicated to 
accomplish an invention. The higher the number of inventors for each patent the higher might be 
the willingness to use an invention as more efforts has been dedicated to develop it. At the patent 
level, we also control for the priority date (year) of patents for 2003-2004-2005.   
4.2 Empirical Framework  
 
Table 5 shows the list of variables used in our analyses along with their descriptions and sources. 
The descriptive statistics for these variables and their correlation matrix are also presented in 
Table 6 and Table 7.  
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 Table 6 and Table 7 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
4.3 Regression results and discussion  
Before carrying the econometrics analysis of our study we checked for the existence of 
multicollinearity among the explanatory variables which is considered as one of the most typical 
econometrics issues with cross-sectional regressions.  In the correlation matrix of the covariates, 
Pearson correlation coefficients were all < 0.5 except for some values for number of inventors, 
patent pool age and patent pool size. We further investigated the issue computing variance 
inflation factor. We found that VIF is less than 2.5 for all our variables. Moreover, the average 
variance inflation factor for our model is 1.49.  
Since our dependent variable willingness to use non-pooled patents is dichotomous we employ 
probit estimator in our regression analysis (Greene, 2000). The results of the probit estimation 
are shown in Table 8. We first ran the control model including patent, firm and patent pool level 
factors. The first column of the table shows the average marginal effects calculated for the direct 
effect model including our main dependent variable and our two explanatory variables. In the 
second column we show the results of our probit estimation for our control model. We 
progressively add our regressors including participation intensity and technological 
complementarity to the control model through column 3 and 4. As it is shown this did not really 
impact the significance and magnitude of each variable. Therefore, we interpreted the results 
from our last model (column 4). 
Hypothesis 1 is regarding the link between the level of technological complementarity between 
firm and patent pool and willingness to use non-pooled patents. Technological complementarity 
is positive and significant increasing the likelihood of willingness to use non-pooled patents by 
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66.8% and as a result Hypothesis 1 is supported by our results. This significant magnitude shows 
that while a company might contribute to development of a pool’s technology, it considers patent 
pool as an important complementary technology supplier. Since 81.30 % of the licensors in our 
smaple are very large companies our results further imply that, albite such companies broadly 
operate in one or more technological fileds they still seek less costly and easier access to 
complementary technologies provided by other companies and even by their rivals.  
Hypothesis 2 is concerning the link between pool participation intensity and willingness to use 
non-pooled patents. The results from our final model shows that pool members participating 
intensively in patent pools are more likely to hold non-pooled patents that they are willing to use 
through pool participation as participation intensity is positive and significant. The magnitude of 
the link between participation intensity and the willingness to use non-pooled patents is 
considerable while we have controlled for patent, firm and patent pool observable factors. 
Participation intensity in patent pools increases probability of willingness to use non-pooled 
patents by 18.9%. Hence our results support hypothesis 2. Again, since very large licensors 
comprise a considerable share of our sample these results further suggest that as the most active 
companies in patent pools they are also more willing to use their non-pooled patents through 
pool participation as they also contribute more intensively to the technology development of the 
pool’s standard. 
We controlled for patent, firm and patent pool level variables. As expected membership duration 
is positive and singinicant (about 7%) while its magnitude remains almost unchanged after we 
progressively add explanatory variables to our model. Licensors involved in pools for a longer 
duration have in principle higher willingness to use their patents as they have gain higher 
inforamtion and knowledge from the pool, while being involved in technology development of 
the pool. They have also higher collaboation opportunities with other members and licensees out 
of the pool as they have been longer connected to them through the pool. Pooling experience 
while positive is also not significant. Patent pool size is positive and significant however its 
magnitude is zero. Furthermore, patent pool age while negative is not significant.  
While positive all size dummies are also not significant compared to baseline licensor size 
category (1-99 licensors) except for medium (100-299) size dummy that is negative and 
significant at 10% level. Nonetheless, medium size licensors comprise only 1% of our sample 
and therefore it could be argued that the effect of the licensor size is negligible. Moreover, while 
the magnitide of licensor age is almost zero it is not significant. Number of inventors is negative 
and significant however its magnitude is not really considerable(1%) too. Comparing to our 
baseline category for priority date (2003), only priority date 2004 is positive and significant (P < 
0.05) and its magnitude remains unchanged while progressively adding the explanatory 
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variables. This implies that licensors are more likely to be willing to use those non-pooled 
patents which were filed in 2004, through pool participation.   
An important issue addressed in this study is the issue of self-selection bias as the companies are 
self-selected to the sample of pool licensors since they decide whether or not to participate in a 
pool. Since participation intensity is used as our explanatory variable for willingness to use non-
pooled patents, being a choice variable (self –selection) causes endogeneity issue. To test the 
endogeneity of participation intensity we used Durbin Wu Hausman and Wald test of 
endogeneity.  We found that our hypothesis of exogeneity is rejected and participation intensity 
is endogenous at 10 percent level. The results of these tests are reported in table 9. Furthermore, 
in order to address the endogeneity issue we use instrumental variables approach. Since our 
endogenous variable is continues we use IVProbit model to address the issue (Neway, 1987). 
Relying on the literature on patent pools we employ vertical integration (dummy) as our 
instrumental variable that explains pool participation. According to Layne-Farrar and Lerner 
(2011), vertically integrated firms with patents and downstream operations (companies 
conducting relevant R&D and manufactures a product dependent on the standard) are more 
likely to join patent pools. In order to construct the variables vertically integrated (to the 
standard) the relevant information on product and services is collected for each licensor to 
identify if that licensor is involved also in  manufacturing any products based on the standard 
associated to the pool it has participated in. This included searching the licensor's web-site, 10-k 
and finally keyword searching in search engines to double check the results. The non-vertical 
integrated licensors include those which do not manufacture any product relying on the standard 
associated to the pool. Our instrument vertically integrated is correlated with pool participation 
intensity (r = 0.205, p< 0.001) and uncorrelated with willingness to use non-pooled patents.  
In employing the instrumental variable method, the effectiveness of the procedure depends on 
the instruments’ validity. The validity of vertical integration as the instrumental variable is 
examined by weak instruments test using the first stage regression summary statistics.  Our 
partial test statistics (F = 61.24 and p < 0.000) proves that we don’t have weak instrument 
variable problem. According to Stock and Staiger (1997) the endogeneity tests can be 
misrepresentative if we have weak instruments. Indeed, in case of employing a weak instrument 
the presence of other control variables will bring about an artificially high correlation between 
the instrument and the endogenous variable. Staiger and Stock (1997) propose evaluation of the 
partial correlation of the endogenous variable and the instruments as a test for weak instrument.  
According to their test a partial F-statistics value higher than 10 ensures that our instrument is 
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not weak. We also used   Finlay and Magnusson (2013) test for weak instrument to further check 
the robustness of our instrumental approach
13
. They developed a series of inference tests 
including the Anderson - Rubin (AR) that is robust to weak instruments for the IV Tobit/Probit 
model in Stata.  The Anderson and Rubin (1949) test determine the significance of the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients of the endogenous regressor in the equation is equal to zero. As 
shown the confidence set from the Wald test is very close to those from AR, which indicates that 
our instrumental variables is not weak.The result of this test is shown in table 10. 
While results reveal the consistency of our probit model, our IVProbit model demonstrates how 
the relationships between our main regressors and willingness to use non-pooled patents hold 
after controlling for the potential endogeneity of participation intensity. In other words, while the 
average marginal effects resulted from the instrumental variable estimation are still positive and 
significant for all our three regressors the coefficient for participation intensity using 
instrumental approach is significantly bigger than the coefficient from probit approach with 
higher significance level, suggesting that endogeniety is not a major problem.  
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 9 and Table 10 about here 
                                  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
In order to further check the robustness of our results we also tested our hypothesis by running 
linear probability model. The results are consistent with our finding through probit estimation. 
To account for the endogeniety issue, we also used instrumental variables approach employing 
2SLS model. While results reveal the consistency of the LPM model, two-stage least squares 
model demonstrates how the relationships between our main regressors and willingness to use 
non-pooled patents hold after controlling for the potential endogeneity of participation intensity. 
In other words, while the coefficients resulted from the instrumental variable (2SLS) regression, 
are still positive and significant for both regressors with almost the same significance level as 
that of the LPM model, the coefficient for participation intensity using instrumental approach is 
significantly bigger than the coefficient from LPM approach, suggesting that endogeniety is not a 
major problem. The resuls of these estimations are presented in Tabel 11. 
       ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 11 about here 
                                  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                                          
13
 We use  weakiv (Finlay et al., 2013) commands in STATA, available at: 
http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s457684.html (weakiv) 
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5 Implications and conclusion  
The emergence of patent pools as policy tools facilitating technology commercialization and 
alleviating patent litigations among rivals holding overlapping IPRs has caught management 
scholars and policy makers’ attention. Looking at the role of patent pools in the market for 
technology from this lens, in this study we focused on extending the empirical literature on 
patent pools and patent nonuse.  In light of the existence of considerable number of unused 
patents held by pool members out of the patent pool, and different mechanisms that patent pools 
offer which might favor the use of patents, the main focus of our study has been on the 
association between participation in patent pools and firm’s willingness to use their non-pooled 
patents through pool participation. We provide novel findings on how the benefits associated to 
pool membership can go beyond the pooled patents. In fact, the convergence between strategic 
patenting (and patent nonuse) literature and patent pool studies identifying the benefits related to 
patent pools does not exceed some theoretical papers concerning the role of patent pools in 
decreasing the transaction cost associated to licensing of blocking patents (Carlson, 1999; 
Shapiro, 2001 ; Merges, 1999), providing equal access of all the pool members to these patents 
(Sung and Pelto, 1998) and very few empirical studies concerning  the role of pools in 
decreasing the rate of strategic patenting in the market for technology (Lampe and Moser, 2014). 
Therefore, there exists particularly a lack of empirical analysis on the relationship between pool 
participation and facilitation of patent use perceived by companies. We cover this gap, extending 
the theory on the patent commercialization benefits associated to pool participation perceived by 
firms involved in the market for technological standards to the commercialization of their non-
pooled patents.  Starting with the theoretical literature, two hypotheses were developed that were 
tested using a sample of pool participants from PatVal II Survay data that have joined patent 
pools in  telecommunication and consumer electronics industry between 2003 and 2011. We 
show that pool licensors are more likely to be willing to use their non-pooled patents by 
participating in patent pools with higher level of technological complementarity to their own 
technology.  We also show that pool members participating more intensively in patent pools are 
more likely to be willing to use their non-pooled patents through pool participation. The two 
hypotheses we developed were supported by our econometrics analysis. In our final probit 
model, the strongest support was for H2 that predicted pool licensors are more likely to be 
willing to use their non-pooled patents through participating in patent pools with higher level of 
technological complementarity to their own technology.  
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In fact, pools provide different level mechanisms, which are seen by companies as means for 
facilitating their technology commercialization. Particularly, pool members facing challenges 
with licensing out or selling their non-pooled patents or those holding unused patents within 
technology markets where brokers and intermediaries are not efficiently connecting licensees 
and licensors see participation in patent pools an opportunity in order to commercialize their 
patents. This is due to the fact that first, providing technologies, which are complementary to the 
firm’s technology is a beneficial patent (technology) level mechanism provided by the patent 
pools to its licensors that can help the licensor exploit its non-pooled patents. In fact, by getting 
access to the technologies provided by other members within the pool, the company can exploit 
its technological resources, which have not been involved in the pool. Perceiving, such benefits 
affects a licensor’s willingness to use its non-pooled patents through participating in patent 
pools. Second, increased information and knowledge spillover and higher collaboration 
opportunities are other beneficial mechanisms offered by patent pools at the firm level, which 
affects the willingness of a pool member to use their non-pooled patents through participating 
more intensively in pools. Moreover, providing access to broader technology implementers 
within the market is another mechanism offered by patent pools at market level which increases 
the likelihood of willingness to use non-pooled patents through more intensive participation in 
pools. 
This study contributes to the current discussion on social, economic and technological benefits of 
patent pools. We argue that companies involved in highly fragmented IP markets that have the 
possibility to adopt a more  progressive IP exploitation approach and use their patents beyond 
just protecting their products and services by contributing them to patent pools, do not only see 
participation in patent pools as an opportunity to facilitate their patent (technology) 
commercialization by introducing their patents to the pool since in the absence of a pool they 
can’t use their technology without infringing on their competitors’ patents.  They also see pool 
participation as a way to facilitate the use of their unused patents which have not been included 
in the pool due to different reasons.  
Moreover, in order to contribute to the better understanding of how pool participation explains 
the willingness to use non-pooled patents we investigated if pool’s level of technology 
complementary to a licensor’s technology as a pool characteristic is associated to the willingness 
to use these patents through participating in patent pools.  
 
96 
 
 
5.1. Study limitations and future research  
Our research is limited by the unavailability of further data on use of patents. We can only 
observe use/nonuse of the patent and the willingness to use of its owner. We cannot observe the 
time of use of the patent to further investigate to what extent patent pools can affect the rate of 
use of non-pooled patents. Future research might use a more detailed database to investigate this 
effect.  
Moreover, the relevance of our findings might be limited to the patent pools involved in 
industries with complex technologies as the results of our study is based on the data from the 
patent pools in ICT sector. Our data shows the number of patent pools in complex industries 
have been growing during the last two decades while the number of patent pools formed in 
discrete technologies has been considerably lower. Moreover, the significance of patent pools in 
the context of standard technology developments is more within complex technologies were 
access to complementary standard essential patents is important for commercializing a firm's 
patent. As a result, we believe our findings cannot be generalized to discrete industries due to the 
difference between market and technology drivers and mechanisms within these two types of 
industries. 
5.2. Policy implications  
The results of this study have practical implications for strategic decision-makers and for 
companies and policy makers dealing with the issue of patent nonuse, overlapping IPRs and 
cumulative innovations. In particular, this study highlights the role and importance of patent 
pools perceived by companies involved in in highly fragmented IP markets in facilitating the 
commercialization of their technology, for scholars, policy makers and practitioners. Moreover, 
it is important for policy makers to understand in which areas the key enabling technologies 
provided by patent pools are more relevant and advantageous to the companies as technology 
transfer and exploitation tools. Accordingly, policy makers might also dedicate efforts to find out 
sectors in which there is a clear lack of patent pools.  
This study also suggests alternative solutions to compulsory licensing purposed by policy makers 
as a legislative way to facilitate the external commercialization of patents that is not considered 
as a favorable solution in many countries. In fact, while enforcement of some IP laws cannot be 
always efficient and socially acceptable, encouraging companies to contribute to aggregation 
mechanisms such as patent pools would be less costly and more expedient. Our study also 
suggest that rather than acquiring complementary patent portfolios which apart from being costly 
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and more risky is not always a long term solution particularly if the company is competing in 
various markets, a firm seeking complementary technologies could consider joining patent pools 
which provide a broader and more efficient access to these technologies.  Government bodies 
should therefore consider policies which can foster the formation and optimal functioning of 
patent pools. Moreover, they should consider policies that encourage and facilitates the process 
of IP aggregation or encourage participating in them. 
Furthermore, as discussed large and very large firms comprise the highest share of the companies 
participating in patent pool. This might show that large firms as compared to SMEs have a 
higher opportunity to join pools and therefore have a greater chance to get their technology 
commercialized. This fact should be considered by policy makers in order to design policies that 
could help SMEs with key technologies to overcome entry barriers to the pools and consequently 
advance their technology commercialization through pool membership.  
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Table 1- Summary of patent pools’ information 
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3G-G.729.1 1 2006 56 9 5 27 21 
3G-W-CDMA 1 2004 649 12 10 438 85 
DVD (6C) 42 1998 5046 9 106 2802 407 
Mpegla-ATSC 1 1996 246 9 130 68 26 
Mpegla-AVC 1 2002 1042 27 1177 286 116 
Mpegla-IEEE 1394 1 1999 271 10 226 178 93 
Mpegla-MPEG2 1 1997 1041 27 1432 281 115 
Mpegla-MPEG-2 Systems 1 2001 237 11 206 66 46 
Mpegla-MPEG-4 Systems 1 2003 66 7 41 38 31 
Mpegla-MPEG-4 Visual 1 2003 1248 29 701 458 194 
Mpegla-MVC 1 2002 2940 27 19 679 232 
Mpegla-VC-1 1 2006 787 18 287 202 78 
Mpegla-Wireless Mesh 1 1990 41 2 41 11 17 
Uldage-ARIB 1 2006 511 13 283 404 123 
Uldage-CATV 1 2006 342 15 8 256 81 
Uldage-CATV Compliant 1 2006 468 15 8 353 103 
Sisvel-ATSS 1 1997 5 2 20 2 1 
Sisvel-DVB-T 1 2004 386 4 476 92 88 
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Sisvel-H.264 SVC 1 2007 61 3 1321 13 5 
Sisvel-TOP Teletext 1 1997 13 2 64 8 3 
Sisvel-WSS 1 1997 11 5 20 4 2 
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                                     Mean 
                                   STD 
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Table 2- Descriptive statistics of the general characteristics of entire sample of patent pools, 
Patent pool licensor covered by PatVal II and Patent pool licensor not covered by PatVal II 
      Full sample Patent pool licensor 
covered by PatVal II 
Patent pool licensor not 
covered by PatVal II 
 
P value Variables               No. of 
Obs. 
Mean STD No. of 
Obs. 
Mean STD No. of 
Obs. 
Mean STD       
Firm-Level Characteristics  
Licensor age 70 64.86 44.56 37 79.61 43.01 33 47.42 40.37 0.001 
Licensor size  70 72703 91621 37 9090
6 
95232 33 48223 81831 0.081 
  Patent-Level Characteristics  
Priority earliest year 21476 1990 16.41 164121 1990 16.35 18407 1988 16.72 0.000 
Publication earliest year 21476 1995 17.30 164333 1995 17.26 18411 1992 17.40 0.000 
No. of applicants 21476 .99 .37 164546 .99 .37 18417 .97 .31 0.000 
No. of inventors  21476 2.44 2.09 164546 2.49 2.16 18417 2.02 1.25 0.000 
No. of forward citations  21476 27.44 36.13 164546 27.32 35.51 18417 28.51 41.21 0.000 
No. of publication claims  21476 4.62 10.41 164546 4.74 10.50 18417 3.57 9.57 0.000 
No. of Inpadoc 
families/licensor 
21476 1000 744.46 164454 1076 742.7 17893 306.24 207.45 0.000 
No. of tech classes/licensor 21476 1427 1122 163644 1526 1134 17893 519.23 315.18 0.000 
 
                          Table 3: Geographical distribution of patent pool licensors 
Country Licensor  age average 
Norway 159 
Finland 149 
Sweden 138 
Denmark 99 
Netherlands  68.33 
United Kingdom 62.5 
France 44.25 
Italy 23 
Europe  92.88 
United States 45.8182 
Canada 15 
North America 30.40 
Japan 82.38 
Korea 54.2 
China 43.5 
Taiwan 18 
Asian countries excluding Japan  34.67 
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Table 4 -Patent pool-level descriptive statistics – Pool licensors covered by PatValII 
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One Blue 
(N= 10386)  
Mean 91.55 154058.6 1988 1992.24 .96 2.40 17.50 4.13 Audio-visual 
technology 
365 0.02 
STD 18.55 120960.5 18.55 19.60 .45 2.27 27.55 10.93 
3G-G.711.1 
(N=30) 
Mean 21.5 154347 2003.5 2006.4 1.45 6.75 13.20 6.16 Information 
technology 
481 0.84 
STD 4.54 14498.82 3.51 3.01 2.22 4.36 9.67 7.92 
3G-G.729.1 
(N=56) 
Mean 106.6 173942.8 1995.34 1998.46 1 1.67 15.26 3.39 Information 
technology 
481 0.67 
STD 65.33 44122.95 3.87 4.29 0 1.18 10.93 5.42 
3G-W-CDMA 
(N=649) 
Mean 88.30 221582.9 1996.61 2002.67 .99 2.34 40.03 8.24 Telecommunications 481 0.73 
STD 38.99 89786.74 4.61 3.73 .14 2.37 25.00 9.92 
DVD (6C) 
(N=5046) 
Mean 91.75 221912.5 1989.42 1993.22 1.03 2.99 34.70 5.32 Audio-visual 
technology 
363 0.12 
STD 12.00 69147.62 18.90 18.99 .38 2.29 44.85 10.99 
Mpegla-ATSC 
(N=1478) 
Mean 98.90 188843.7 1994.88 1999.21
4 
.98 1.21 29.37 5.78 Audio-visual 
technology 
365 0.57 
STD 16.93 105896.4 5.21 6.71 .20 .56 26.67 9.28 
Mpegla-AVC 
(N= 246) 
Mean 74.90 88940.16 1989.60 1996.21 .96 2.12 63.03 3.86 Audio-visual 
technology 
365 0.38 
STD 37.74 98864.79 10.63 12.60 .24 1.49 56.72 8.21 
Mpegla-IEEE  
1394 
N=(1042) 
Mean 79.21 131921.6 1992.37 1998.9 .986 3.02 46.61 5.16 Telecommunications 365 0.34 
STD 31.03 111118.6 8.70 10.18 .204 1.57 45.67 8.39 
Mpegla-MPEG2 
(N=271) 
Mean 71.68 70037 1989.57 1995.96 .971 2.19 60.92 3.72 Audio-visual 
technology 
365 0.31 
STD 40.71 82601.28 9.50 11.47 .360 1.59 54.22 9.08 
Mpegla-MPEG-2 
Systems 
(N=1041) 
Mean 26.06 8238.70 1992.26 1999.02 1 1.55 117.5
6 
2.25 Audio-visual 
technology 
366     0.35 
 
 STD 31.05 24199.53 3.12 6.25 .07 .77 87.69 4.74 
Mpegla-MPEG-4 
Systems 
(N=237) 
Mean 72.20 165925.3 1992.99 1997.19
9 
1.09 2.03 40.43 2.004 Audio-visual 
technology 
369 0.36 
STD 36.08 96549.21 9.304 9.71 .37 1.11 36.98 6.10 
Mpegla-MPEG-4 
Visual (N=66) 
Mean 97.91 181960.2 1991.84 1997.69 .971 2.53 39.95 3.81 Audio-visual 
technology 
363 0.18 
STD 18.12 106873.9 12.52 14.10 .220 1.75 40.78 9.92 
Mpegla-MVC 
(N=1248) 
 
Mean 100.5
6 
138651.8 1999.92 2005.48 1.00 2.50 21.20 5.29 Audio-visual 
technology 
363 0.17 
STD 26.87 26.87 26.87 26.87 26.87 26.87 26.87 26.87 
Mpegla-VC-1 
(N= 41) 
Mean 74.33 90306.32 1996.57 2001.96 1.01 2.39 32.94 7.61 Information 
technology 
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0.91 STD 33.19 33.19 33.19 33.19 33.19 33.19 33.19 33.19 
Mpegla-Wireless 
Mesh (N= 0) 
Mean - - - - - - - - Telecommunications  0.78 
STD - - - - - - - - 
Uldage-ARIB 
(N=1210) 
Mean 84.98 170883.1 1994.28 1999.39 .957 2.216 17.53 .001 Telecommunications 367 0.58 
STD 15.35 66578.85 4.873 5.4445 .337 2.23 27.95 .057 
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Table 5- Variables used in this study 
Variable Description  Source 
Unused-willing to use  Dummy-The patent is not use in either of the 4 ways   
(internal commercialization, licensing(and cross licensing), 
sale, spin off) but its owner is willing to use it   
 PatVal II 
Participation intensity  Number of patents firm has included in a pool divided by its 
patent stock  
EPO Patstat  
Technological complementarity  overlap in patents in the same subcategory but in a different 
class (Makri, et al) 
EPO Patstat, UC Berkeley 
Fung database & Patent 
pool websites 
Priority year   Dummy-The year in which the invention was filed to EPO EPO Patstat 
No. of inventors  Dummy- The number of inventors for each patent EPO Patstat 
Licensor size Dummy- Dummy-6 dummy variables to distinguish the size by 
number of employees from small firms (1-100 employees) to 
very large organizations (more than 5000 employees).   
Amadeus, Lexis Nexis, 
Osiris 
Licensor age age of the licensor at the time of survey (2011)  Amadeus, Lexis Nexis, 
Osiris 
Patent pool age The age of the pool at the time of the survey (2011)  Patent Pool websites 
Patent pool size Number of patents included in each patent pool Patent Pool websites 
Pooling experience Number of patent pools a company has participated in  Patent Pool websites 
Licensor’s Bargaining Power  Number of patents a licensor included in a pool/pool size Patent Pool websites 
Membership duration  The duration a licensor has participated in each patent pool 
(years) 
Patent Pool websites, EPO 
Patstat 
Vertically integrated 
(Instrument) 
dummy- 1 if a firm with patents and downstream operations 
manufactures a product dependent on the pool’s standard 
Companies’ websites, 10k  
                                                                         
 
Uldage-CATV 
(N=342) 
Mean 93.01 191662.4 1991.35 2001.66 1.011 1.041 44.44 2.58 Telecommunications 357 0.69 
STD 23.37 111649.8 4.64 6.34 .116 .4041 16.45 4.25 
Uldage-CATV 
Compliant 
(N=468) 
Mean 92.20 174384.8 1994.45
1 
1999.98 1.03 2.37 26.15 .0053 Telecommunications   357 0.65 
STD 24.93 114481.1 4.75 5.187 .29 2.06 40.06 .163 
Sisvel-ATSS 
(N=0) 
 
Mean - - - - - - - - Audio-visual 
technology 
749 0.87 
STD - - - - - - - - 
Sisvel-DVB T 
(N=386) 
Mean 100.6 291256.1 1991.35 2001.66 1.011 1.041 44.44 2.58 Audio-visual 
technology 
363 0.12 
STD 10.36 18058.23 4.64 6.34 .116 .4041 16.45 4.25 
Sisvel-DVB T2 
(N=122) 
Mean 93.98 68107.52 1996.64 1999.91 1.07 1.77 11.77 3.25 Telecommunications 365 0.65 
STD 19.85 41294.91 12.99 13.45 .332 1.45 21.94 5.745 
Sisvel-H.264 SVC 
(N= 61) 
Mean 25.21 128878.2 1993.37 1998.27 1.02 2.75 13.49 4.02 Audio-visual 
technology 
489 0.78 
STD .411 20804.88 9.97 10.16 .147 .83 13.55 6.51 
Sisvel-TOP 
Teletext (N=0) 
Mean - - - - - - - - Information 
technology 
 0.84 
STD - - - - - - - - 
Sisvel-WSS 
(N= 11) 
Mean 26 168694 1990 1991 1 1 2 0 Audio-visual 
technology 
599 0.92 
STD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 6- Descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
      Variable      Mean        Std. Dev.                Min                Max 
     Priority date  2003.931 0.786 2003 2005 
     No. of inventors 2.691 1.845 1 15 
     Licensor size  1-100 empl 0.01 0.01 0 1 
     Licensor size  100-249 empl 0.009 0.095 0 1 
     Licensor size  250-499 empl 0.007 0.08 0 1 
     Licensor size  500-999 empl 0.007 0.083 0 1 
     Licensor size  1000-4999 empl 0.037 0.190 0 1 
     Licensor size 5000-9999 empl 0.813     0.389          0 1 
     Patent pool size 2004.2 2765.02 30 10386 
     Patent pool age 6.55 2.603 0 10 
     Pooling experience 7.271 3.869 1 15 
     Licensor’s bargaining power .070 .055 .0002 .3914 
     Membership durarion 6.148 2.28 0 8 
     Unused-willing to use 0.406 0.491 0 1 
     Participation intensity 0.173 0.193 0.0001 0.399 
     Complementarity     0.033 0.062 0.0004 0.570 
     Vertically integrated 0.838 0.372 0 1 
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Table 7- Bivariate Correlations Matrix (N= 1300) 
 
*** p < 0.001, p** < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0. 1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1Priority date 1                  
2 No. of inventors .03 1                 
3 Licensor size 1-100  -.03 .01 1                
4 Licensor size  100-249  .03 .04 -.01 1               
5 Licensor size  250-499 -.03 .07** .01 -.01 1              
6 Licensor size  500-999 .01 .06* -.01 -.01 -.01 1             
7 Licensor size  1000-4999  .06* .02 -.02 -.02 -.02 -.02 1            
8 Licensor size  5000-9999 .01 -.06* -.21*** -.2*** -.17*** -.17*** -.41*** 1           
9 Licensor age -.01 -.13*** .04 .07* -.01 .03 -.04 .04 1          
10 Patent pool size -.01 -.04 -.04 -.01 -.02 -.03 0 .02 -.23*** 1         
11 Patent pool age .01 .01 .01 -.01 0 .03 .04 -.05† .18*** -.6**** 1        
12 Pooling experience .01 0.1*** .02 -.04 .03 -.02 .02 -.09*** -.27*** -.1*** .13*** 1       
13 Bargainijng power  -.06 0 .02 .03 -.03 .02 -.05 .04 .06* -.31*** -.02 -.16**** 1      
14  Membership Duration .02 0 .01 0 0 .03 .03 -.04 .26*** -.69*** .97*** .07* .07* 1     
15  Unused-willing to use .04 -.06** -.02 -.06** .01 -.01 -.01 .27*** .03 -.01 .03 0 0 .04 1    
16 Complementarity 0 .02 .05* .05* .01 -.01 -.03 0 -.25*** -.22*** -.12*** .38*** .14**** -.11*** .05 1   
17 Participation intensity     -.06 -.08*** .01 .09*** -.02 0 -.01 .05* .44*** .13*** -.19*** -.42*** .25*** -.12*** .06** -.18*** 1  
18 Vertically integrated  .04 0 0 .04 .04 .01 0 -.03 .03 -.19*** -.04 -.22*** .06** .04 .05 .04 .21*** 1 
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     Table 8- Probit estimation - Average marginal effects 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses, adjusted for clusters by firms’ identifier.  All models include 
dummies for missing values for licensor size. *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.000 
Variables 1 
 
2 
 
3 4 IVProbit 
1
st
 stage 
IVProbit  
2
nd
 stage  
 
Technological Complementarity 0.169**  0.678** 0.668** 1.554** 1.554** 
 (0.072)  (0.279) (0.280) (0.762) (0.762) 
Participation intensity  0.451**   0.189**  2.409** 
 (0.224)   (0.092)  (1.051) 
Priority date-2004  0.073** 0.072** 0.073** 0.204** 0.204** 
  (0.033) -0.033 (0.033) (0.087) (0.087) 
Priority date-2005  0.036 0.039 0.043 0.154 0.154 
  (0.036) -0.036 (0.036) (0.096) (0.096) 
No. of inventors   -0.013* -0.012 -0.012* -0.034* -0.034* 
  (0.008) -0.008 (0.008) (0.020) (0.020) 
Licensor size  100-249 empl  -0.253* -0.259* -0.264* -1.078 -1.078 
  (0.116) (0.113) (0.108) (0.615) (0.615) 
Licensor size  250-499 empl  0.153 0.181 0.180 0.430 0.430 
  (0.228) (0.227) (0.226) (0.552) (0.552) 
Licensor size  500-999 empl  0.024 0.044 0.053 0.222 0.222 
  (0.216) (0.218) (0.219) (0.561) (0.561) 
Licensor size  1000-4999 empl  0.057 0.081 0.076 0.152 0.152 
  (0.161) (0.162) (0.161) (0.406) (0.406) 
Licensor size 5000-9999 empl  0.136 0.151 0.152 0.433 0.433 
  (0.121) (0.117) (0.117) (0.364) (0.364) 
Licensor age  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.004* -0.004** 
  (0.000) -0.025 (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) 
Pooling experience  0.005 0.002 0.004 0.031 0.031** 
  (0.004) -0.004 (0.004) (0.016) (0.016) 
Licensor’s Bargaining Power   -0.057 -0.124 -0.303 -2.276* -2.276* 
  (0.288) -0.292 (0.308) (1.136) (1.136) 
Membership duration   0.074** 0.081* 0.072* 0.106 0.106 
  (0.036) -0.037 (0.037) (0.110) (0.110) 
Patent pool size  0.000 0.000* 0.000* 0.000 0.000 
`  (0.000) 0 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Patent pool age  -0.047 -0.045 -0.038 -0.023 -0.023 
  (0.029) -0.029 (0.029) (0.089) (0.089) 
Observations  1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0047 0.106 0.109 0.112   
Prob > chi2 P < 0.05 P < 0.001 P < 0.001 P < 0.001  P <0.001 
Log liklihood -873.892 -784.764 -781.713 -779.592  -115.664 
Wald chi -square 8.17 63.13 65.32 69.48  95.09 
Instrument Vertically   integrated     
F-value on instruments            61.24 
Significance of the instrument      P <0.001 
Durbin test of endogeneity       2.84* 
Wu_Hausman 
Wald test of exogeneity χ2(1) 
     2.80* 
  4.22** 
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Table 9-Weak instrument robust tests and confidence sets for IV probit 
H0: β[Unused but willing to use :participation intensity] = 0 
Test Statistic p-value Conf. level Conf.  Set 
AR chi2(1)   = 4.43 0.0353 95% [.237572,5.09323] 
Wald chi2(1)   = 4.22 0.0399 95% [.11618, 4.92329] 
 
Table 10-LPM and IVRegress- Dependent Variable is Unused but willing to use 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                               Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses, adjusted for clusters by firms’ identifier.    
                               All models include dummies for missing values for licensor size. *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.0                                               
 
Variables LPM IVRegress 
   1
st
 stage 
IVRegress 
    2
nd
 stage 
Technological Complementarity 0.615** 0.0671 0.556**   
 (-0.246) (0.0803) (0.262)    
Participation intensity 0.179**  0.843** 
 (-0.088)  (0.413)    
Priority date-2004 0.068* -0.009 0.073**   
 (-0.03) (0.009) (0.031)    
Priority date-2005 0.036 -0.024 0.050    
 (-0.034) (0.010) (0.035)    
No. of inventors  -0.012 0.001 -0.013*    
 (-0.007) (0.002) (0.007)    
Firm size  100-249 empl -0.264 .068 -0.315 
 (-0.156) (.058) (-0.193) 
Firm size  250-499 empl 0.17 -.009 0.167 
 (-0.211) (.063) (-0.206) 
Firm size  500-999 empl 0.048 -.048 0.08 
 (-0.203) (.063) (-0.206) 
Firm size  1000-4999 empl 0.073 .0195 0.06 
 (-0.146) (.045) (-0.149) 
Firm size  5000-9999 empl 0.165 -.005 0.17 
 (-0.128) (.041) (-0.132) 
Licensor age 0.000  0.002***          -0.001 *   
 (0.000) (0.0001) (0.001)    
Pooling experience 0.004 -0.0089 0.011*    
 (-0.004) (0.0012) (0.006)    
Bargaining power  -0.197 0.924*** -0.743*    
 (-0.256) (0.0852) (0.435)    
Membership duration  0.070* 0.023** 0.041*    
 (-0.034) (0.011) (0.039)    
Patent pool size 0.000* 0.000*** 0.000*    
` (0.000) (2.57E-06) (0.000)    
Patent pool age -0.037 -0.020304 -0.011    
 (-0.027) (0.0087) (0.032)  
Observations  1300 1300 1300 
R-squared 0.0.1137 0.4341 0.0732 
Prob > F P <0.001 P <0.001 P <0.001 
Wald chi -square          - 95.09 159.57 
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 Graph1:     Country of origin of patent pool licensors                      Graph2:     Country of origin of patent pool licensors   
                                  covered by PatVal II (N= 37)                                                             not covered by PatVal II (N= 37) 
                                                              
        
                                               
Graph 3- Patent pool participation 
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Table A– Patent pools in our working sample  
 Patent pool No. of non-pooled patents No. of licensors participated 
1 3G G.711.1 2 1 
2 3G W-CDMA 483 5 
3 Mpegla  AVC 13 4 
4 Mpegla MPEG-2 Systems 4 1 
5 Mpegla MPEG-4 Systems 1 1 
6 Mpegla MPEG-4 Visual 102 10 
7 Mpegla MVC 259 13 
8 Mpegla VC-1 171 11 
9 One Blue 115 5 
10 Sisvel DVB-T 16 1 
11 Sisvel DVB-T2 7 2 
12 Sisvel H.264 SVC 15 1 
13 Uldage ARIB 44 5 
14 Uldage CATV Compliant 47 8 
15 Uldage CATV Essential 21 4 
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CONCLUSION  
The central concern of this thesis is patent nonuse particularly from strategic point of view; when 
a patent is not used due to pure strategic purposes or inhibits the use of other inventions which 
can be employed as better alternative solutions within the market for technology.  While the 
literature has investigated some drivers for strategic patenting, the welfare effect of strategic 
patenting as well as the solutions to tackle issues caused by strategic patenting, there is still clear 
lack of theory explaining (1) the managerial decision making process for strategic use of patents 
and (2) how to assess welfare effect of strategic patenting and (3) a comprehensive solutions to 
tackle issues caused by strategic blocking patents and benchmark to assess their effectiveness.  
 
Moreover, while there exists few empirical studies that have distinguished between used and 
unused strategic patents (e.g. Torrisi et al., 2014) no study has investigated the divers of unused 
play patents as a particular type of strategic patents. In addition, while the current literature has 
emphasized on the role of patent pools in dealing with potential issues such as excessive 
transaction cost caused by patent thickets and blocking patents (overlapping IPRs) that might 
hamper the use of patents in the market for technology, no study has investigated the role of 
patent pools perceived by companies in facilitating technology commercialization and favoring 
the use of patents. This thesis sheds light on the factors explaining unused play patents by 
identifying technological uncertainty and technological complexity as two technology 
environment drivers for this type of unused patents. Furthermore, this thesis investigates the 
association between participation intensity in patent pools and the willingness to use non-pooled 
patents through pool participation by pool members. Moreover, it uncovers those characteristics 
of patent pools in complex technological fields that can explain the willingness to use a non-
pooled patent by a pool member through pool participation. This thesis contributes to the 
literature on strategic management of IPRs by examining the underlying technological 
mechanisms leading to patent nonuse. It also contributes to the current discussion on social, 
economic and technological benefits of patent pools. The results of this thesis have practical 
implications for strategic decision-making and for policy makers dealing with the issue of patent 
nonuse, overlapping IPRs and cumulative innovations. 
 
 
